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Legitimising Discourses and the Efforts to Reform the 
European Union’s Fiscal Governance Arrangements 
 
……..…………..Abstract……………………. 
 
With a rapid centralisation of fiscal sovereignty now being aired as a possibility 
following on from the financial and economic crisis, this thesis considers how 
legitimising discourses are shaping the efforts to reform EU fiscal governance. 
Norman Fairclough’s ‘moderately constructivist’ three-dimensional framework 
for CDA is drawn upon. This approach is also combined with insights drawn 
from the new institutionalist literature base (particularly from its historical and 
discursive strands of thought), with an additional emphasis being placed on 
broader understandings of structural forms of power as developed through the 
writings of Susan Strange. It is found that the emerging debate over EU fiscal 
governance reform is dominated by a limiting neoliberal legitimising discourse. 
This research also makes a contribution to our understanding of the ideational 
and institutional roots of the current impasse in European Integration. Finally, it 
is concluded that the efforts to reform the EU’s fiscal governance arrangements 
are likely to bring about, at best, incremental change along a path-dependent 
line. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
Despite warnings from economists during the run up to monetary union in 
Europe, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was designed on an asymmetrical 
basis with member states retaining ultimate budgetary sovereignty (Verdun 1996, 
1998). Within this framework, fiscal policy coordination remained firmly under the 
guidance of the rules-based Stability Growth Pact (SGP) framework for fiscal 
discipline. The intensification of the global financial and economic crisis in Europe 
around late 2010 has, however, broken the relative stability which characterised the 
fiscal governance policy-making environment. With policy-makers confronting at 
times an ‘existential crisis of the EU’ (as termed by a Senior Spokesman for the 
European Council President; Interview Extract O 2014:1), they have been forced to 
embark on a potentially far reaching program to reform the EU’s existing fiscal 
governance arrangements.  
 
Current reform possibilities progress from what would be a limited status quo 
reform agenda building on the SGP framework up until an altogether more far 
reaching integration leap in the direction of full fiscal and political union. With fiscal 
policy and the ability to tax and spend remaining deeply rooted at the national 
parliamentary level, this reform debate is intimately linked with emotional 
conceptions of state sovereignty and moral hazard. The possibility for a rapid 
transfer of fiscal sovereignty to the supranational level also raises highly challenging 
questions over democracy and how the balancing act between the European 
Parliament and its national level counterparts should function. These events could 
also necessitate a fundamental rethink of the labels we might attach to the EU as an 
actor—whether federal or intergovernmental. In sum, the EU fiscal governance 
reform issue is an important and uniquely politically salient issue—and it is this fact 
that makes the need for legitimisation arguments all the more acute.  
 
The literature base on EU fiscal governance has been overwhelmed by 
contributions from the economics profession. While not to be dismissed, these 
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contributions have been underpinned largely by rational choice models of analysis, 
which eschew more ideational accounts of institutional change in favour of material 
interests. There has also been little in the way of political analysis carried out into the 
role of legitimacy considerations within this context (even in the wake of the financial 
and economic crisis), which is unfortunate in this instance given the richness of the 
political issues at stake. In order to bridge these gaps in the literature, the central 
research question guiding this research process is: Which legitimising discourses are 
shaping EU fiscal governance reform? A hypothesis is not adopted here due to the 
qualitative methodology and open ended nature of the study. A number of sub-
questions also logically flow from the main research question. These sub-questions 
include: what legitimising discourses have been produced in the course of the reform 
debate?; how do they relate to political and economic power structures?; and what is 
the impact on policy proposals?.  
 
To answer the research question (and sub-questions) Norman Fairclough’s 
‘moderately constructivist’ three-dimensional framework for Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) is drawn upon which analyses discourse as a text, as a discourse 
practice, and as a form of social practice (Fairclough 1992, 2003, 2005, 2005a, 
2006). However, with a view to increasing the explanatory potential of a CDA 
approach that is well suited to interdisciplinary research (Woodak & Meyer 2001), it 
is combined with a selection of broader theoretically informed ideas and power 
concepts. Central here are the insights drawn from the new institutionalist literature 
base (particularly from its historical and discursive strands of thought), with an 
additional emphasis being placed on broader understandings of structural forms of 
power as developed through the writings of Susan Strange (1994). In developing a 
conceptualisation of legitimacy, the work of Fritz Scharf is drawn upon. He manages 
to capture the multiple dynamics of legitimacy by making a useful distinction between 
input and output dimensions of legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). The two-dimensional 
framework for legitimacy developed for this research process is also receptive to the 
institutional and procedural dimensions as well as to more sociological/discursive 
and constructivist processes by which legitimacy is, at least partly, socially 
constructed. Combined such theorising provides a fruitful explanatory framework for 
exploring legitimising discourses in what is a uniquely politically salient policy-making 
area.  
3 
 
 
 
Research Focus  
 
 
Since the launch of the common euro currency in 1999, the EMU set-up has 
been characterised by a profound asymmetry between a centralised monetary policy 
and a decentralised fiscal policy (Verdun 1996, 1998). Within this schema, while 
monetary policy decision-making was placed in the hands of the independent ECB, 
fiscal (as well as broader economic) sovereignty continued to reside with member 
states at the national level. As will be discussed at length in chapter 1, from early on 
many economists were united by what they saw as an incomplete blueprint for 
integration within EMU, i.e. monetary union without fiscal union (see Eichengreen 
1990, Sala-i-Martin &  Sachs 1991, Robert & Rubinfeld 1992, Tamim & Masson 1995, 
Eichengreen  & von Hagen 1996, amongst others). In short, these economists 
reached a series of negative conclusions regarding the absence of a system of fiscal 
redistribution (or solidarity mechanisms) to offset asymmetric shocks across the 
single currency area. Moreover, Belgium economist and foremost expert on the 
functioning of monetary unions Paul De Grauwe  has used Optimal Currency Area 
(OCA) theory to warn against the inherent fragility of EMU without a fiscal union—in 
terms of a ‘European government with the power to tax and spend’ (De Grauwe 
2006:72). Yet despite persistent doubts being raised about the suitability of 
constructing EMU on an asymmetric basis, no major integration steps were taken in 
the direction of a deeper level of fiscal union during the first decade of the single 
currency area.  
 
This asymmetry within the EMU set-up when it was created, however, did 
raise the issue of possible ‘negative spill-overs’, resulting from member states with 
excessive deficit biases transferring negative costs on to neighbouring member 
states in the form of inflation or high interest rates (Feldmand 2003, Heipertz & 
Verdun 2004). With a view to limiting such negative spill over effects, the EU sought 
to maintain a level of fiscal discipline within EMU through the rules-based SGP 
framework, adopted in 1997 (Begg et al. 2003, Fatás et al. 2003). A product of a 
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memo put forward in 1995 by the then German Minister for Finance Theo Waigel, 
the SGP that was finally adopted through secondary legislation following 
negotiations did not include some of the provocative elements, including automatic 
sanctioning or fully independent supervision (Heipertz & Verdun 2011:5). As laid 
down within the original Maastricht Treaty, the SGP was guided by two key 
budgetary criteria: 1) budget deficits should not be allowed to exceed 3% of GDP; 2) 
and public debt should not be seen to exceed 60% of GDP. The relevant legal acts 
on which the SGP was comprised were two Council regulations: regulation No 
1466/97 ‘on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the 
surveillance and coordination of economic policies’ (the so-called preventative arm); 
and regulation No 1467/97 ‘on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure’ (the so-called corrective arm)—with a politically 
significant resolution as agreed by the European Council to underpin the fiscal 
framework as a whole (see European Council 1997).  
 
The full aims and operational procedures of the original SGP as adopted in 
1997, as well as the key institutional actors involved in fiscal policy coordination, will 
be discussed at length as part of chapter 4. In brief, whereas the emphasis on the 
preventative arm was more on ‘soft’ coordination through multilateral surveillance 
and peer pressure, the corrective arm was more concerned with ‘hard’ formal 
procedures leading up ultimately to the possibility of financial sanctions. In terms of 
the actors involved in SGP coordination, it is also notable that finance ministers 
operating within the ECOFIN Council (acting on the basis of Commission 
recommendations) were left with considerable political discretion in advancing 
decision making procedures under both the preventative and corrective arms of the 
pact (see Figure 1 and Figure 2 in the appendix for a overview of the actors involved 
in advancing procedures under both arms of the SGP). Despite some minor reforms 
to the SGP being implemented in 2005 providing for a more flexible interpretation of 
the rules, the procedures, rules-based nature and two-pronged structure of the pact 
remained largely in place. This is not to say, however, that there was not a significant 
level of doubt as to both the underlying logic and effectiveness of the pact in 
exercising fiscal discipline within EMU (for a detailed discussion see Coeuré & 
Pisani-Ferry 2005, Calmfors 2005a, Buiter 2006 , Fischer et al. 2006, amongst 
others). 
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With a relatively benign macroeconomic environment prevailing in Europe 
during the first decade of the single currency area, the SGP framework remained in 
place as the most visible way of coping with an asymmetrical EMU institutional set-
up. However, this benign macroeconomic environment was shattered by the 
intensification of the financial and economic crisis in Europe around the middle of 
2010—a period which saw investor confidence collapsing and bond yields on weaker 
Eurozone countries diverging markedly with the core states. While a full overview of 
the key events and characteristics defining this period of ‘crisis’ will be provided in 
chapter 4, in brief the use of the term ‘crisis is justified in this context by the 
considerable ‘risk’ element associated with sovereign default and contagion, with an 
added crucial ‘timing’ dimension resulting from the need to keep up with market 
forces. Faced with a financial and economic crisis of potential existential proportions, 
the EU was forced to embark in haste on a program to reform the EU’s existing fiscal 
governance arrangements. In brief, chief amongst the reform initiatives implemented 
included an economic legislative six-pack (adopted December 2011), a related 
legislative ‘two-pack’ (adopted March 2013) an intergovernmental ‘Euro Plus Pact’ 
(adopted in March 2011) and finally a fiscal compact (an intergovernmental treaty 
adopted in March 2012) (Commission 2012). 
 
 A defining characteristic of these short term reform initiatives is that they 
were largely limited to strengthening fiscal discipline within EMU by building on, 
rather than replacing, the pre-existing SGP framework. Nevertheless, with market 
sentiment towards the Eurozone seen to be improving significantly come the later 
end of 2012 (owning largely to rhetoric and exceptional monetary policy actions 
taken by the ECB under the leadership of Mario Draghi), the attention of European 
leaders has now switched to the longer term reform measures required to strengthen 
EMU (read the remarks made by the President of the European Council following a 
meeting of EU leaders at the end of June 2012 where the prospect for a ‘longer-term’ 
reform vision for EMU was set out; Van Rompuy 2012). There is now a prospect for 
marked increases in the centralisation of fiscal powers at the European 
supranational level—in a policy area that remains deeply embedded embed in 
national conceptions of sovereignty. The possibility of heightened fiscal integration 
also poses highly challenging questions over democracy legitimacy and 
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accountability and to the role of the European Parliament alongside its national level 
counterparts. This raises the spectre of what legitimising arguments will be required 
in this politically salient domain.  
 
Fundamentally, it is the legitimising discourses emerging in the context of this 
ongoing reform debate over the future of EU fiscal governance that are the focus of 
this research. Before moving on to outline the key patterns of legitimising discourse 
that feature in this analysis, it is important to briefly expand on the concept of 
legitimacy guiding this research process (for a far more detailed overview of the key 
legitimising arguments involved here see chapter 2). The research builds on the 
work of Fritz Sharpf (1999). He makes an analytical distinction between the concepts 
of ‘input legitimacy’ and ‘output legitimacy’. This leaves a normative articulation of 
legitimacy underpinned by a set of arguments related to input legitimacy (‘involving 
political participation by and representation of the people’) and output legitimacy (‘a 
performance criterion centred on the ability of EU institutions to govern effectively’) 
(Schmidt 2010:6). These arguments can be explored through discourse in the 
context of the ongoing fiscal governance reform debate. The framework for 
legitimacy drawn on in this research context is also receptive to the institutional and 
procedural dimensions (Pierson 1996, 2000, 2001, 2004, Bulmer 1998, 2009, 
Majone 1998,   Scharpf, 1999, 2006   Moravcsik 2002) as well as to the complex 
sociological/discursive and constructivist processes by which legitimacy is, at least 
partly, socially constructed (March and Olsen 1989, Hall & Taylor 1996, Schmidt 
2006, 2008, 2010).  
 
A classification of the key patterns of legitimising discourse that need to 
explored in the context of the ongoing debate over EU fiscal governance can now be 
expanded upon—following on from findings that will be detailed in full during the 
undertaking of the critical literature review (before being built on further in chapter 3). 
In an overarching sense, two key patterns of legitimising discourse can be identified 
as needing to be factored into the analysis. The first is an output oriented neoliberal 
discourse which is centred on the securing of strengthened fiscal discipline within 
EMU under the SGP framework, with input legitimacy being incurred largely 
indirectly. As a model of fiscal federalism this discourse if implemented would 
represent the point of minimum departure from the status quo. The second reform 
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discourse brings together both the input and output dimensions as part of a 
synergising relationship with the prospect of making a qualitative integration leap 
within EMU towards full fiscal and political union. As a model of fiscal federalism, this 
discourse, if implemented, would represent a significant departure from the current 
status quo. These key patterns of discourse have been presented below as part of a 
refined table that corresponds with the two-dimensional framework for legitimacy 
already outlined (for a more in depth reading as to how these patterns of discourse 
will guide the analysis stage see chapter 4). 
 
 
Table 1.1: Reform Options for EU Fiscal Governance  
 
 
Input legitimacy Output legitimacy 
Model of Fiscal 
Federalism 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
1 
 
Indirect legitimacy via 
representative of member 
states in the Council and 
European Council 
 
Inspired by a neoliberal 
ideology. 
 
Building on, rather than 
replacing, the rules-based 
SGP framework as a means 
to secure fiscal discipline. 
 
Limited model 
of fiscal 
federalism: 
rules-based 
fiscal union with 
indirect channels 
of legitimisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
2 
 
More channels of direct 
legitimacy via a 
strengthening of the 
European Parliament  
 
 
 
Inspired by an economic 
solidarity agenda.  
 
Enhanced (neo-Keynesian) 
solidarity mechanisms 
involving debt mutualisation 
and/or the development of a 
EU fiscal capacity (EU 
budget) with redistributive 
and/or stabilisation 
functions. 
 
 
 
 
Far reaching 
model of fiscal 
federalism: full 
fiscal union with 
flanking political 
union aspect. 
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In recognition of the deficiencies that have already been identified within the 
asymmetric EMU framework concerning the lack of a fiscal union aspect—a 
deficiency which ultimately has been seen to play a crucial role in bringing about the 
intensification of the financial and economic crisis in Europe (see De Grauwe 2013) 
—a position in favour of the implementation of the more far reaching reform 
discourse is adopted for the purposes of this research undertaking (arguments which 
will be developed further as part of chapter 1 and chapter 3). Such a positioning is 
also beneficial here as it helps to guide the research in a more critical direction. 
Some of the key questions that need to be explored in this schema include which 
dominant ideologies are guiding the reform debate and from within which institutional 
setting?; do these policy responses result from a particular interpretation (possibly a 
misguided one) of the crisis in the first instance?; are these discourses recently 
established or can they be historically located in the EU context?; and is the mix 
legitimising mechanisms being relied upon sufficient? Also, if a more limiting 
neoliberal discourse is dominating in a particular institutional setting, then exploring 
some the broader arguments that may be being used to prevent an integration leap 
towards a deeper level of fiscal and political union in Europe is essential. And, as will 
be discussed at length in the critical literature review, this is where sensitive issues 
related to sovereignty concerns and issues of moral hazard may need to be factored 
into the analysis—in a policy area which after all has historically remained deeply 
embedded at the national level.   
 
Finally, three key policy settings have been identified in chapter 4 as 
dominating fiscal policy coordination within EMU: 1) the intergovernmental settings, 
including the European Council, ECOFIN Council (shadowed by the Eurogroup), as 
well as the various deliberations which take place at committee level; 2) the 
Commission setting as the Unions foremost supranational actor; 3) and the 
European Parliament setting as a more marginal, although not inconsequential, 
policy actor within EMU. And a separate case study chapter is devoted to exploring 
legitimising discourses from across the three institutional settings identified.  
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Research Agenda: Distinguishing Features and Intellectual 
Contribution  
 
 
The literature compiled on the EU’s fiscal governance arrangements is 
dominated by contributions from the economics profession, who generally have 
carried out analysis that eschew more ideational accounts of institutional change in 
favour of material interests (see chapter 1 for a critical overview of the literature 
base). And relatively little in the way of political analysis has been carried out into 
exploring the topic of EU fiscal governance reform in the wake of the financial and 
economic crisis, particularly with a view to factoring in the role played by the all-
important legitimacy considerations. In order to bridge these observed gaps in the 
literature base, this research is underpinned by a strong political dimension, and it 
applies meanings and concepts from European political economy. As already made 
clear, at the heart of this more politically aware approach is Scharpf’s (1999) two-
dimensional concept of legitimacy, which is explored through discourse in the 
context of the ongoing efforts to reform the EU’s fiscal governance arrangements. In 
order to operationalise these research objectives, Norman Fairclough’s three-
dimensional framework for CDA (see chapter 3) is drawn upon in which discourse is 
analysed as a text, as a discourse practice, and as a form of social practice 
(Fairclough 1992, 2003, 2005, 2005a, 2006). The complex methodological issues 
underpinning this CDA approach will be discussed in depth as part of chapter 3. 
However, there are a number of unique features to the CDA approach that make it of 
particular value to the researcher in this context.  
 
First, Fairclough’s CDA approach is underpinned by the premises of critical 
realism (see Bhasker 1986, 1989, Archer 1995, Sayer 2000): a philosophy that 
retains an ontological realism (a real world exists independently of our knowledge 
about it) while accepting a form of epistemological relativism (our understanding of 
this reality is partly constructed from our own perspectives and standpoint). For this 
reason the approach can be labelled as being ‘moderately constructivist’, with the 
tendency on the part of some extreme constructivist or post-modernist scholars to 
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reduce the study of social life to discourse being rejected here. As Fairclough 
explains: 
 
‘‘This version of CDA views discourse as an element of social 
processes and social events, and also an element of relatively 
durable social practices, though neither are reducible to discourse: 
they are articulations of discourse with non-discoursal elements’’ 
(Fairclough 2005:921). 
 
The focus of this CDA approach is, therefore, far broader than discourse per 
se, for it also factors in its dialectical relationship with non-discourse elements of the 
social at the broadest levels. It is also on the basis of these assumptions that 
Fairclough is also able to integrate broader social theory with more textually 
orientated discourse analysis (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999); and, in doing so, is 
able to oscillate from the micro text level up to the broader cultural, institutional, and 
societal context at the macro level. Such dialectic logic also allows for a more 
detailed exploration of the interrelations between structure, agency and change—a 
characteristic seen to be lacking in some of the earlier more social grounded 
research traditions (Newton 1998, 2003, Reed 1997, 2000). The moderately 
constructivist approach adopted by Fairclough is also consistent with the concept of 
legitimacy being drawn upon to guide this research process, i.e. one which is 
receptive to both the institutional and procedural dimensions as well more  complex 
sociological/discursive and constructivist processes. In sum, Fairclough’s three-
dimensional framework for CDA is understood to be able to achieve a far more 
complex understanding as to the relations between legitimising discourse and non-
discourse elements of the social in the context of the ongoing efforts to reform the 
EU’s fiscal governance arrangements.  
 
In a more general sense, as an approach to social enquiry CDA is also well 
suited to interdisciplinary investigations (Woodak & Meyer 2001). Therefore, with a 
view to providing for greater explanatory potential, Fairclough’s CDA approach is 
combined at the broadest level of social practice—the point at which due 
consideration is given to the wider policy environment (in terms of the ‘institutional’, 
‘situational’ and ‘societal’ context) from which the reform discourse has been 
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produced—with a selection of wider theoretically informed ideas and power concepts 
(for a full overview of how such diverse theorising will be combined and incorporated 
into the CDA analysis see chapter 2). Key here are the insights drawn from the ‘new’ 
institutionalist literature, with particular attention being paid in this instance to the 
historical (see Zysman 1994, Pierson 1996, 2000, 2001, 2004, Bulmer 1998, 2009, 
Thelen 1999, Mahoney 2001, Ackril & Kay 2006, Kaiser 2008, amongst others) and 
discursive components (see Campbell & Pedersen 2001, Hay 2001, Blyth 2002, 
Schmidt 2002, 2006, 2008, 2010a, 2011, amongst others). While historical 
institutionalism’s focus on concepts such as ‘path dependency’ and ‘critical junctures’ 
is useful for helping understand the ‘stickiness’ that often characterises many 
aspects of EU policy-making (Pierson 1996, Greer 2000, Mahoney 2001, Bulmer 
2009, Ackril & Kay 2006), discursive institutionalism helps to focus more on the role 
of ‘substantive ideas’ and ‘discursive interactions’ in  bringing about potential change 
(or continuality as the case may be) (Schmidt 2006a, 2008a, 2011). 
 
Moreover, while notions of power are implicit within both CDA and new 
institutionalist theorising (at both a ideational and structural level), for the purpose of 
analysing discourses at the level of social practice it is felt necessary to provide a 
more explicit concept of power (for the reasoning behind this logic see chapter 2). 
Particularly relevant here is the concept of ‘structural power’ as developed by Susan 
Strange. She defines it as ‘the power to shape and determine the structures of the 
global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their 
economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professional people 
have to operate’ (Strange 1994:24-25). As well as not being overly deterministic, 
structural power also combines ideational and material components. And these 
qualities also make the concept well adapted to exploring where relations of power 
may lie within the EMU institutional setting. In sum, it is believed that by combining 
Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA framework with the new institutionalism and 
deeper understandings of structural power it should facilitate a fruitful explanatory 
framework at the level of social practice.  
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Thesis Overview 
 
 
This research thesis was undertaken over a 36-month time period based at 
the University of Plymouth. It consisted of a detailed reading of the literature across 
the major areas of interest including, but by no means confined to, legitimacy, fiscal 
governance, and the broader European political economy literature. The theoretical 
and methodological premises of discourse analysis were also studied at length. The 
data collection phase involved an extensive sourcing of official EU policy documents 
released on the subject of fiscal governance reform. Also, two separate trips were 
made to Brussels in the Spring of 2013 and 2014. A total of 20 in depth interviews 
were carried out during this time with senior level officials located within all of the 
relevant institutional settings. This list includes senior members of DG ECFIN 
involved in fiscal policy coordination (including members of the secretariat who are 
represented within the Eurogroup and further down at committee level); senior 
officials located within the Council Directorate for Economic Policy; senior members 
of the Cabinet for the European Council President; ministers of the Permanent 
Representation for Economic, Financial and Monetary Affairs; and finally, members 
of the European Parliament. Due to the seniority and expert knowledge of the 
interviewees, their individual views on the process of fiscal governance reform are 
invaluable in both contextualising and adding to the more formal discourse collected 
from official EU policy documents. Informal observations of the policy-environment 
were also made during this time, and there were also opportunities to speak more 
informally with members of the policy community working within the EMU institutions.   
 
The structure of this research thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 provides a critical 
overview of the literature base with a view to outlining the key justifications for the 
research focus. Chapters 2 and 3 are both necessary to outline in full the complex 
theoretical and methodological underpinnings. First, a two-dimensional conceptual 
framework for legitimacy will be developed (along with the key legitimising 
arguments that feature on both the input and output side).  A general introduction to 
CDA as an approach to social enquiry will then be provided, and the broader 
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theoretical insights being drawn upon with a view to enriching the analysis will be 
discussed. Following this, a far more exacting methodological overview of Fairclough 
three-dimensional framework for CDA will be carried out. The key legitimising 
patterns of discourse making up the data analysis will also be presented at this point.  
Chapter 4 provides an overview of fiscal-policy coordination within EMU (in terms of 
the key decision-making procedures and institutional actors involved), as well as an 
in depth reading of the financial and economic crisis period. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
make up the core of the analysis. A contextual overview has been provided for each 
case study in order to make the chapters more intelligible. All of these chapters are 
quite detailed in their analysis, although an effort has been made to make clear and 
concise arguments. Following the CDA framework as set out by Fairclough, a 
separate chapter (no. 8) will be allocated at the end of the analysis for carrying out a 
much broader exploration (from a historical perspective) of the institutional, 
situational and societal context that surrounds the discourse at the level of social 
practice. Finally, the conclusion will bring together the analysis chapters and make 
some general comments on the future prospects for fiscal governance reform in light 
of the legitimising discourses previously uncovered. 
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Chapter Two: Critical Literature Review 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This literature review is organised according to a two-topic format, which is 
appropriate in this instance given the two broadly distinct subject areas that lie at the 
heart of the research: ‘legitimacy’ and ‘fiscal governance’. First, a review of the 
literature is completed for fiscal governance; and second, a review of the literature is 
completed for the concept of legitimacy. Finally, there will be a review of the 
literature base linking the two subject areas together. According to which is 
appropriate, the literature is presented in either chronological order or in accordance 
with the literatures key theoretical premises. The key aim of this chapter is to outline 
in full the key justifications for the focus of this research. Knowledge gaps within the 
literature will therefore be highlighted in the literature—along with any theoretical or 
methodological deficiencies that are found to be occurring. Many of the key concepts 
and terms that form the nucleus of the research are also introduced. At the beginning 
of the literature review a brief (unreferenced) summary is provided of the current 
state of knowledge within the research area. Finally it should be observed that the 
purpose of this chapter is not to outline in any substantive detail the complex 
theoretical and methodological framework that has been developed in order to inform 
the research process (that is undertaken in chapters 2 and 3).  
 
 
Summary 
 
 
Legitimacy can be identified as one of the main challenges confronting the EU 
in the modern period. The most popular way of framing the legitimacy issue in this 
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context has been through the two-dimensional framework for legitimacy provided by 
Schaprf (1999). He makes a useful distinction between the input and output 
dimensions of legitimacy in a democratic polity. In the context of this debate, while 
some contributions emphasise the alternative ways by which legitimacy may be 
conferred through a focus on effective policy outputs alone, such claims are 
increasingly doubtful given the nature of the EU as an actor in the modern period. 
Instead, there is an increasing need to consider the democratic legitimacy and 
accountability of decision making on the input side is well.   
 
The defining feature of the literature base on EU fiscal governance is that it 
has been dominated by contributions from economists employing largely rational 
choice accounts of institutional change. These approaches have often been 
neglectful the rich political dimension that surrounds what is a highly politically salient 
research area, and they have generally eschewed more ideational accounts of 
institutional change in favour of material interests. Some of the earliest literature 
discussing EU fiscal governance was produced by economists who were united by 
what they perceived to be an incomplete blueprint for integration within EMU, i.e. 
monetary union without fiscal union. These economists typically drew on the optimal 
currency area (OCA) literature and reached a series of negative conclusions 
regarding the absence of a system of fiscal solidarity (or transfer mechanisms) to 
offset asymmetric shocks across the single currency area. 
 
A whole new wave of literature has emerged focussing on EU fiscal 
governance following on from intensification of the financial and economic crisis in 
Europe around mid-2010. The crisis has reignited early scepticism amongst many 
economists concerning the viability of constructing a monetary union without taking 
major integration steps towards a fiscal union. Two key explanations exist as to why 
the crisis erupted in Europe and the single currency area: 1) the Keynesian view, 
with the crisis being understood more as a balance-of-payments crisis; 2) and the 
misguided neoliberal interpretation of events which focuses on fiscal discipline—or 
the lack of. Stark policy implications result from the particular crisis diagnosis elected 
for. For example, those who adopt a neoliberal interpretation of the crisis are more 
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likely to focus on limited measures to strengthen fiscal discipline. However, those 
who accept the Keynesian version of events focus more on EMU’s structural 
deficiencies (i.e. the lack of fiscal union), and they proceed accordingly to propose a 
series of integration steps towards the implementation of solidarity mechanisms 
within the single currency area.  
 
When framed in the context of Schaprf’s two-dimensional conception of 
discourse, the two reform discourses identified are seen to rely on highly contrasting 
legitimising arguments. While one is reliant on the quality of its neoliberal policy 
outputs, the other brings together the two dimensions of legitimacy with a view to 
making a qualitative integration leap in the direction of full fiscal and political union. 
With the latter reform discourse, in particularly, implying a rapid centralisation of 
fiscal policy at the supranational EU level, more emotional conceptions of state 
sovereignty and moral hazard may also be influential here. With the research area 
being dominated by contributions from economists, legitimacy considerations have 
not been explored within the context of this emerging reform debate over EU fiscal 
governance. This is unacceptable as tax and spend policy is deeply rooted within 
national conceptions of state sovereignty and has major redistributive consequences. 
There is a requirement, then, to see how these legitimising discourser are shaping 
the official debate over EU fiscal governance reform—and in turn how they may be 
influencing policy.  
 
 
 
Legitimacy and the EU 
 
 
 
Legitimacy, and the beliefs surrounding it, are understood to play a crucial 
function in ensuring an effective functioning government in liberal democratic polities. 
As Scharpf (2006) argues: 
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‘‘[L]egitimating arguments invoking shared legitimacy beliefs imply a 
socially sanctioned obligation to comply with government policies 
even if these violate the actor's own interests or normative 
preferences, and even if official sanctions could be avoided at low 
cost’’ (Scharpf 2006:1). 
 
It follows, therefore, that if such legitimising beliefs are not held by the citizen 
base at large, then the polity in question would be seen to be chronically 
‘ineffective’—or at worse it would need to transform into a non-democratic entity, i.e. 
a ‘police state’ (Scharpf 2006:1-2). Such logic is worrying if applied in the EU context 
where the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the French and Dutch voters in 
2005; the ongoing budgetary issues; the declining public support for the European 
project as reflected in public opinion polls; and the rise of anti-establishment parities 
in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections all points to the existence of a serious 
legitimacy problem for the EU. In view of the elevated significance of this debate, it is 
not unsurprising that the scholarly literature concerning EU legitimacy has grown to 
vast proportions in recent years. 
 
The majority of scholars who have addressed the topic of EU legitimacy have 
done so—in either explicit or implicit terms—through the two-dimensional framework 
for legitimacy provided by Fritz Scharpf (1999). He distinguishes between input 
legitimacy and output legitimacy. This leaves a normative articulation of legitimacy 
that is underpinned by a set of arguments related to input legitimacy (‘involving 
political participation by and representation of the people’) and output legitimacy (‘a 
performance criterion centred on the ability the ability of EU institutions to govern 
effectively’) (Schmidt 2010:6). A minority of scholars have recently added a third 
dimension in the form of ‘throughput legitimacy’ (Risse 2010, Schmidt 2010, Schunz 
& Bruyninckx 2011). As an under-theorised concept, however, there is still much 
confusion as to the precise qualities which the term defines (Meuwese, 2008, 
Schmidt 2010)—although vaguely the concept points to the quality of the decision 
making process itself. In any case, many of the scholars who incorporate the notion 
of input legitimacy into their analysis are receptive to many of the legitimising 
arguments commonly associated with throughput legitimacy, including the norms of 
accountability, transparency and deliberative quality. Throughput legitimacy, 
18 
 
therefore, will not be considered as a separate analytical category of legitimacy 
during this review of the literature base. 
 
One final distinction can be made when considering the literature exploring 
legitimacy and the EU through the two-dimensional conceptual framework provided 
by Scharpf. Building on the reflections made by Schmidt (2010), whereas one group 
of scholars provide accounts of legitimacy broadly based on either ‘rational choice’ 
(Majone 1998, Moravcsik 2002, Scharpf, 1999, 2006) or ‘historical institutionalist’ 
frameworks of analysis (Pierson 1996, 2000, 2001, 2004, Bulmer 1998, 2009); a 
second group approach legitimacy through a framework of analysis more closely 
aligned with ‘sociological’ (March and Olsen 1989, Hall & Taylor 1996) and 
‘discursive’ institutionalist theorising (Schmidt 2006, 2008, 2010), or more broadly 
constructivism (Risse 2009). As such, while the former group of scholars develop 
accounts of legitimacy that draw upon the ‘logic of institutional form and decision 
making’, the latter group are more inclined to emphasise the ‘ideational constructions 
and discursive interactions of identity and community’ (Schmidt 2010:5-6). In view of 
the observations made so far concerning the literature base on EU legitimacy, it is 
appropriate to review the literature in sequence across the input and output 
dimensions. During this review of the literature a further distinction is also made 
where appropriate between institutional form and practice and interactive 
construction, although the boundaries between the two are often not exacting. 
 
 
Output Legitimacy 
 
 
A number of scholars, drawing on analytical frameworks focused largely on 
institutional form and practice, have argued that the EU is able to derive its 
legitimacy almost solely from the effectiveness of its policy outputs. Relevant here is 
Sharpf (1999, 2001, 2006, 2009) who discounts the possibility of input-orientated 
solutions for the EU democracy because such solutions ignore the ‘preconditions of 
legitimate majority rule’, which he argues ‘cannot be created through constitutional 
engineering’ (Scharpf 2006:18). In terms of the preconditions involved, Scharpf 
(1999) is making reference to the lack of a ‘thick collective identity’ (or demos) of the 
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kind that we have come to associate with national level democracies. Here Scharpf 
is forming an argument on the basis of the ‘no demos thesis’. This thesis runs the 
argument that without a European demos—which is usually conceptualised in terms 
of the ‘democratic identity of the population’, a ‘European public space’ or a 
‘European civil society’ (Wiesner 2009:103-105)—then there is little point in 
proceeding with further democratisation within the EU, until that is it is able to pass 
the ‘no demos’ hurdle (Grim 1995, 1997, Kielmasegg 1996).  
 
Yet, while Scharpf remains sceptical regarding the democratic potential of the 
EU, the possibility of legitimising selected policy areas by reference to the 
effectiveness of their policy outputs is not discounted. At present though he identifies 
a ‘problem solving gap’ that needs to be overcome in politically salient policy areas. 
This refers to situations where the ‘EU generates problems and constrains solutions 
at national levels’, but ‘where effective solutions at the European level are blocked by 
political conflicts among member governments’ (Schaprf 2006-17-18). One key 
suggestion put forward for securing more effective policy outputs is through what is 
termed as ‘differentiated integration’—of a kind that would permit ‘member states to 
adopt consensual European solutions applying only to members of the group’ 
(Scharpf 2003).  
 
Like Scharpf, Majone (1996, 1998, 2009) also privileges the ‘output’ 
dimension of legitimacy, but on the grounds that he understands the EU as 
essentially a ‘regulatory state’, i.e. one without a widespread redistributive social 
policy. Because regulatory policies are considered by Majone as a potentially 
‘positive sum game’ (one in which everybody can gain provided the right polices are 
adopted)—as opposed to redistributive (which is zero sum)—the EU is said to be 
exempt from the majoritarian standards of democratic legitimacy required at the state 
level. According to this logic, then, for as long as the EU continues to focus 
overwhelmingly on efficiency enhancing regulatory policies, the Union will not be 
required to reach the normative democratic standards expected of the nation state 
(Majone 1996, 1998). From his perspective this is just as well. After all, Majone  
remains unequivocal that we ‘cannot expect democratic politics to flourish at the EU 
level’ as long as the ‘citizens of the member states oppose the idea of a European 
super-state’ (Majone 1998:6). 
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Moravcsik (2001, 2002) develops a number of similar themes to the scholars 
cited above. First, the notion that the EU ought to be held to the same democratic 
standards as its member states is contested because the EU’s substantive mandate 
is said to be focused primarily on the ‘regulation of policy externalities resulting from 
cross-border economic activity’ (Moravcsik 2002:607). By this logic, the EU is said to 
resemble only a limited constitutional polity, which is more constrained than any 
national polity due to its ‘own plural structure of checks and balances’ (Moravcsik 
2002:611). Moravcsik (2002) also cites two supplementary mechanisms which from 
his point of view ensure that adequate standards of democratic participation and 
accountability are met:  ‘indirect democratic control via national governments’ and 
‘the increasing powers of the European Parliament’ (Moravcsik 2002: 611). These 
democratic mechanisms and inbuilt constitutional checks and balances are believed 
to be adequate for ensuring that ‘EU policy-making is, in nearly all cases, clean, 
transparent, effective and politically responsive to the demands of European citizens’ 
Moravcsik (2002:605). 
 
There is also an important interactive construction component that needs to 
be taken into consideration here too. As Schmidt (2010) argues, being ‘European’ is 
generally built not just on ‘doing’ (institutional outputs) but also on ‘saying’ what the 
EU is doing—a process which in turn makes for more constructive outputs (Schmidt 
2010:13). Important in this respect is communicative discourses, which are 
understood to play an important ‘identity building function’ (Schmidt 2006, 2010). If 
accurate, this analysis raises several inconveniences for the EU polity. Firstly, and 
perhaps most significantly, it has been documented by Koopmans (2010) that 
‘executive actors’ (political and business elites) remain by far the most ‘important 
beneficiaries of the Europeanization of public debates’, at the expense of the core 
representatives of the EU who are accountable to the citizen base (Koopman 
2010:120). As such, European political communication is seen to take place within a 
highly competitive environment in which actors compete for very limited public 
visibility, resonance and legitimacy (Koopmans 2004, Koopmans & Statham 2010). It 
is of little surprise, then, that it that discourse intended as a means to convince the 
citizen of the requirement or suitability of an EU policy is often marginalised (Schmidt 
2006, Koopmans & Statham 2010, Risse 2010). Of course, because national 
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politicians rarely will speak out on the EU’s behalf this problem is, at least partly, 
facilitated by the nature of the particular institutional environment—although through 
the increased development of communal aspirations and activities the degree to 
which citizens are able to identify with the EU could potentially be altered over time. 
Or, as Schmidt (2006:17) argues, identity is not only a question of ‘being’ but also of 
‘doing’.   
 
The contributions that have been cited above demonstrate the alternative 
ways by which the EU, partly owing to its unique institutional format and decision 
making structures, may be able to preserve its legitimacy through a focus on 
effective policy outputs. There are some possible risks, however, that could result 
from an over reliance on deriving legitimacy from the output side alone. First, 
because of the increasing range and depth of EU competencies, the degree to which 
the EU is functionally distinct from member states is no longer clear. It has already 
been observed, for example, that the lack of ‘electoral contest’ over the EU’s ‘political 
leadership’ and future ‘policy agenda’ is a key instigator for apathy and disconnect 
between the citizen and the Union (Føllesdal & Hix 2006). Also relevant here is 
Schmidt (2006). She points out that EU policymaking is still made with little in the 
way of democratic inputs—a situation which she claims has made for ‘policy without 
politics’. Not only are these deficiencies said to leave European citizens with little 
direct input over EU related polices that affect them but; far more alarmingly, it is 
observed that such circumstances could act as catalyst for voter dissatisfaction or 
even political extremism (Schmidt 2006:6-9). There is certainly a risk, then, that a 
failure to embed more explicitly redistributive policy areas (including those related to 
budgetary matters in particularly) in a democratic framework could ultimately provoke 
some sort of backlash from the citizen base as they reject integration in these 
domains.  
 
Of course, it could be argued that this is where indirect forms of citizen 
representation come into play given ministers links to the democratic nation state 
(Moravcsik 2002), although this is also a problematic interpretation of events. First, 
national parliaments are not equal in their indirect representation at the European 
level, particularly in the Council and European Council settings where powerful 
member states enjoy increased bargaining power. Also if there is no direct 
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democratic process in play it is difficult to see how it could be guaranteed that 
ministers are aware and acting on behalf of the preferences of their national citizen 
base. Furthermore, while Scharpf draws attention to the possibility of legitimising 
certain policy areas through a focus effective policy outputs, he makes it perfectly 
clear that the current arrangements are far from optimal. In view of these 
qualifications, it would seem that legitimising arguments focussing solely on the 
output dimension appear to be resting on increasingly thin foundations. 
 
 
Input legitimacy 
 
 
Through the application of frameworks receptive to institutional form and 
practice, it is notable that a separate group of scholars have chosen to reflect more 
on the role of input legitimacy in the EU context. As one might expect, this debate is 
has been heavily influenced by insights drawn from normative democratic theory. A 
number of scholars, for example, have set out to explore if the EU meets a series of 
normative democratic standards concerning accountability and representation 
(Beetham, 1991, Beetham & Lord 1998, 2001, Coultrap 1999, Dahl 1999, Decker 
2002, Bellamy and Castiglione 2003). However, while there has been an almost 
unanimous agreement amongst these scholars that there is a need to apply certain 
representative standards of democracy at the EU level, there has been little 
agreement as to whether these standards should mirror the democratic systems as 
they exist at the member state level 
 
To begin with, Dahl (1999) argues that a democratic polity requires political 
institutions that provide citizens with ‘opportunities for political participation, influence 
and control’ that are approximately ‘equivalent’ to those existing in democratic 
countries (Dahl 1999:31). Accordingly, the EU is considered as a non-democratic 
entity by Dahl because accountability is still seen to be confined to elitist 
stakeholders and will be, it is claimed, for as long as there is no ‘international 
equivalent to national political competition by parties and individuals seeking office’ 
(Dahl 1999:31). Beetham & Lord (1998, 2001) also argue that democratic standards 
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as they exist at the level of the state should apply to the EU, notwithstanding the 
polity’s sui generis character. This is said to be justified by the nature of the 
decisions being taken by the EU and by the mandate that enables it to do so, which 
are considered as being on a similar level to that currently enjoyed by member states. 
Accordingly, while a selection of ‘post-parliamentary solutions’ are suggested, the 
scholars are defiant that these can only serve as ‘complements’ rather than 
‘substitutes’ for parliamentarism at the EU level (Beetham & Lord 2001:458).  
 
Focussing more on interactive input construction, Føllesdal & Hix (2006) draw 
attention to the importance of citizen preferences that have had a chance of being 
‘created’ or ‘modified’ in arenas of ‘political contestation’ (Føllesdal & Hix 2006:22). 
Following this trajectory, Føllesdal & Hix assert that the main challenge for the EU 
should be to develop institutions that provide more ‘opportunities’ and 
‘responsiveness’ (Føllesdal & Hix 2006:22-24). As well as proposing substantial 
increases in the powers conferred on the European Parliament, they suggest that the 
direct election of the Commission President represents the most obvious way to 
generate political contestation and debate. Of course, concerns about the lack of 
political contestation at the European level are by no means new. For example, 
concerns were first raised all the way back in 1979 when the European 
parliamentary elections of that year were famously described as representing 
“second-order national elections” (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). This phrase has since 
become a dominant one in subsequent scholarly dissuasions concerning the EP 
elections (Marsh & Franklin 1996, Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996, Follesdal & Hix 
2006, Van der Brug & Van der Eijk 2007). Nevertheless, it has been reasoned that 
because very little is perceived to be at stake in terms of executive power, the fact 
that national parties treat European Parliament elections with indifference is not 
unjustified (Marsh & Franklin 1996:12). 
 
Separately, research conducted by Koopmans (2004) suggests that the lack 
of input legitimacy is also strongly related to the lack of collective communicative 
discourses within the EU’s political sphere. Responsibility for Europe’s rather thin 
political discourse structure has been blamed on the lack of a European demos and 
on the high degree of language diversity across Europe (Kielmasegg 1996, Grimm 
1997, Weiler 1999). However, in responding to the no demos thesis, both Habermas 
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(2001a, 2006, 2006a) and Weiler (1995, 1997, 1999) have firmly rejected any notion 
that a demos has to be conceptualised in exclusively ethno-cultural terms. Habermas, 
in particularly, has sought to expose the myth of national consciousness which he 
claims is shaped as much by the ‘intellectual construction of national histories’ as it is 
by the ‘discourse of competing parties’, ‘struggling for political power’ (Habermas 
2001a:15-16). It is these artificial conditions in which national consciousness came 
into existence, he argues, that have given rise to the ‘empirical circumstances 
necessary for an extension of identity formation beyond national boundaries’ 
(Habermas 2001a:16). These conditions are said to include the ‘emergence of a 
European civil society’, the ‘construction of a European-wide public sphere’ and the 
‘shaping of a political culture that can be shared by all European citizens’ (ibid).  
 
While the emergence of a European demos still appears to be some way off, 
it has been recognised in fact that a limited form of Europeanization of national 
political debates is already taking place (Koopmans 2004, Risse 2010, Koopmans & 
Statham 2010). Empirical research has, however, revealed that European elections 
still barely feature in the general media, with few references to the debates or 
character of the elections being apparent (De Vreese et al 2007). Moreover, to the 
extent that there is a debate, this is still deemed to be no match for the debate that 
takes place between national governments and the European Commission 
(Koopmans & Statham 2010, Risse 2010). The propensity of national leaders to hold 
the EU responsible for unpopular polices while taking the credit for more popular 
ones has also been documented (Schmidt 2006:37-43). Nevertheless, while the 
current lack of Europeanized identities and a transnational public sphere are seen to 
be detrimental to the EU’s input legitimisation potential, it is recognised that the lack 
of a collective EU political discourse is, at least partly, also a result of the tangible 
institutional deficiencies that also need to be factored in (Risse 2010, Schmidt 2010). 
And, as noted above, there are reasons to believe that collective identify can be 
manufactured.  
 
All of the contributions from the scholars that have been cited above point 
towards the need to increase the level of democratic inputs at the EU level. Key here 
is increasing the mechanisms of representative democracy at the EU level 
(particularly through a strengthened European Parliament), although the extent to 
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which these should mirror those currently in place at the member state level is 
disputed. One issue that has yet to be addressed fully is the balance that needs to 
be set between the European Parliament and its national level counterparts. 
Alongside representative democracy, more participatory forms of democracy (or 
‘post-parliamentary’ mechanisms) can also not be discounted in the EU context is 
well. Aside from matters of institutional form and practice, interactive construction 
has also been seen to be vital to ensuring input legitimacy. While at present a demos 
or collective public sphere would appear to be lacking at the European level—a 
feature detrimental to achieving adequate levels of political contestation—there are 
grounds to believe that these will not prove permanent hurdles to effective 
democratisation at the EU level. It also may be the case that citizen interest in EU 
politics may increase as (if) they are afforded more opportunities to have their say 
over the shape of EU policy.  
 
To conclude this section on legitimacy and the EU as whole, it has been clear 
from an evaluation of the literature that legitimacy is one on the main challenges 
confronting the Union as a whole. It has also been demonstrated that the most 
effective way of framing the legitimacy issue in this context is through the input and 
output concepts as provided by Schaprf (1999). While some contributions have shed 
light on the alternative ways by which legitimacy may be able to be conferred 
through a focus on effective policy outputs, such claims have been shown to be 
increasingly doubtful given the nature of the EU as an actor in the modern period. 
Instead there is an increasing need to consider the democratic legitimacy and 
accountability of decision making on the input side. It has been observed, however, 
that there exists little in the way of any consensus over the precise representative 
and participatory mechanisms that are required to secure adequate democratic input 
legitimacy. Before reviewing the state of the literature addressing legitimacy and EU 
fiscal governance combined, a critical overview of the literature compiled on EU 
fiscal governance will be provided   
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EU Fiscal Governance 
 
 
Since the launch of the common euro currency in 1999, the EMU set-up has 
been characterised by a profound asymmetry between a centralised monetary policy 
and a decentralised fiscal policy (Verdun 1996, 1998). This resulted from the fact 
that monetary policy decision-making was placed in the hands of the independent 
ECB while fiscal (as well as broader economic) sovereignty was left to reside with 
member states at the national level. Within this framework, fiscal policy coordination 
has taken place under the guidance of the rules-based Stability Growth Pact (SGP) 
framework for fiscal discipline (an in depth overview of the logic, rules and 
procedures underpinning this fiscal policy coordination instrument will be provided for 
in chapter 4). As will be demonstrated, the most defining feature of the literature on 
EU fiscal governance over more than a decade is that it has been dominated by 
contributions from economists employing largely rational choice accounts of 
institutional change (an observation already confirmed by Dyson 2002a, Overbeek 
2003, Heipertz & Verdun 2005, 2005a, Talani 2008, 2014). These approaches have 
often therefore been neglectful of the rich political dimension that surrounds what is a 
highly politically salient research area, and they generally have employed analysis 
that eschew more ideational accounts of institutional change in favour of material 
interests. 
 
Some of the earliest literature discussing EU fiscal governance was produced 
by economists who were united by what they perceived to be an incomplete blueprint 
for integration within EMU, i.e. monetary union without fiscal union (see Eichengreen 
1990, Sala-i-Martin & Sachs 1991, Robert & Rubinfeld 1992, Tamim & Masson 1995, 
Eichengreen  & von Hagen 1996, amongst others). These economists typically drew 
on the optimal currency area (OCA) literature (Mundel 1961) and reached a series of 
negative conclusions regarding the absence of a system of fiscal solidarity (or 
transfer mechanisms) to offset asymmetric shocks across the single currency area. 
More recently, Belgium economist and foremost expert on the functioning of 
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monetary unions Paul De Grauwe (2006, 2007, 2010a, 2013) has also used OCA 
theory to warn repeatedly of the fragile nature of EMU without a deeper level of fiscal 
union. He spoke at length, for example, about some of the benefits of achieving a 
higher degree of fiscal solidarity in a monetary union:   
 
‘Political union makes it possible to organize systems of fiscal 
transfers that provide some insurance against asymmetric shocks. 
Thus when one member-country is hit by a negative economic shock, 
the centralized union budget will automatically transfer income from 
the member states that experience good economic conditions to the 
member state experiencing a negative shock’ (De Grauwe 2006: 
722-733).  
 
Thus, while De Grauwe agrees that the EMU is a ‘remarkable achievement’, 
he warned that it remains ‘fragile because of a flaw in its governance’ (De Grauwe 
2006:73).  Furthermore, the size of the current EU budget leaves little reason for 
optimism here. As Begg (2011) observed:  
 
‘‘Certainly, the EU budget does not provide an answer. Not only is it 
too small relative to GDP – barely 1 percent – to have more than a 
minimal stabilising effect, but it is also structured in a way that does 
not easily respond to macroeconomic shocks or cycles’’ (Begg 2011).  
  
The conclusions to be drawn from this literature is that EMU is incomplete and 
could be left vulnerable to economic shocks unless it is accompanied by a deeper 
level of fiscal integration, i.e. in the direction of a deeper level of fiscal union with 
solidarity mechanisms. An important early discussion of many of these key issues 
can be found in the 1977 MacDougall Report, which was produced at the request of 
the Commission to study public finance issues in the context of increasing integration 
of the European Community. It is worth citing the report findings at some length here: 
 
‘‘As well as redistributing income regionally on a continuing basis, 
public finance in existing economic unions plays a major role in 
cushioning short-term and cyclical fluctuations. For example, one- 
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half to two-thirds of a short-term loss of primary income in a region 
due to a fall in its external sales may be automatically offset through 
lower payments of taxes and insurance contributions to the centre, 
and higher receipts of unemployment and other benefits’’ 
(MacDougall Report 1977:12). 
 
In simple terms, this means that an effective monetary union was understood 
to require the implementation of considerable fiscal solidarity mechanisms, i.e. in the 
form of a fiscal union endowed with a strong fiscal capacity (or federal budget) for 
stabilisation purposes. Following this logic the MacDougall Report concluded: 
  
‘‘If only because the Community budget is so relatively very small 
there is no such mechanism in operation on any significant scale as 
between member countries, and this is an important reason why in 
present circumstances monetary union is impracticable” 
(MacDougall Report 1977:12). 
 
Of course, the Maastricht Treaty did in fact set the path towards the 
development of a single currency area of the type that was coined as ‘impracticable’ 
by this analysis. After all, it has already been noted that the Community budget 
remains to this day anchored at around 1% of Europe’s annual GDP. This compares 
with a figure of between 5% and 7% as advised within the MacDougal Report for a 
‘federal’ EU (and this figure was itself conservative—lying far short of that achieved 
in mature federations).  
 
It is worth noting that the MacDougal Report—as well as many of the early 
sceptical contributions by economists—were inspired by more by Keynesian ideas, 
which after all assign a proactive role to fiscal policy. During the negotiations over 
EMU, however, it was very much neoliberalism and its early financial counterpart 
‘monetarism’ that was the dominant paradigm (McNamara 1998, Verdun 1998, 
Marcussen 2000, Heipertz, M. & Verdun 2004, 2005, 2011)—an ideology which is 
sceptical regarding the implementation of an active fiscal policy, beyond rules on 
fiscal discipline. This goes someway to explaining why, despite widespread doubts 
being raised about the suitability of constructing EMU on an asymmetric basis, no 
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major integration steps were taken in the direction of a deeper level of fiscal union 
during the first decade of the single currency area (see chapter 8 for a complete 
overview of institutional and ideational factors leading to the embedding of 
neoliberalism within this framework). Instead, fiscal policy coordination remained 
firmly under the guidance of the rules-based SGP framework for fiscal discipline.  
 
With the SGP framework being a central feature of EU fiscal governance, it is 
little surprise that a very substantial literature base has been amassed looking into 
the design and reform of the pact—without anything in the way of a consensus 
forming.  And again, this literature has been very much dominated by contributions 
from the economics profession. Following the systematic analysis of over 100 reform 
proposals that were put forward by academic and non-academic economists 
between 1998 and 2003 for the SGP, Fischer et al (2006) classified them into four 
broad schools of thought. 1)  ‘disenchanted reformers’ (scholars with a very critical 
view of the utility of effectiveness of the SGP; see Uhlig 2002, Camlfours, 2003, 
Tanzi, 2004); 2) ‘defenders of fiscal discipline’ (scholars who consider a common 
framework as necessary and useful to achieve fiscal discipline; see Wyplosz 2002, 
Calmfors 2003,  Eichengreen 2003); 3) ‘advocates of economic growth’ (scholars 
who argued that an excessive focus on short-term fiscal discipline provides 
insufficient scope for achieving economic growth; see Bolfinger, 2003, Fitoussi 2002, 
Mathieu and Sterdyniak 2003); 4) ‘supporters of long-term sustainability’ (scholars 
who prioritise the sustainability of public finances in the long run as target; see 
Pisani-Ferry  2002,  Beetsma & Debrun 2003, Calmfors & Corsetti 2004). From a 
reading of these proposals the overriding view was one of mild scepticism. This 
scepticism also continued following a series of minor reforms to increase the SGP’s 
flexibility in 2005 (Calmfors 2005a). Buiter (2006:391) even went so far has to 
declare the pact ‘de facto dead’. 
 
Moving on to the more politically themed literature, on the infrequent 
occasions when political scientists have approached the topic of EU fiscal 
governance, their analysis have usually been set on the domestic (and more 
infrequently international) conditions which prevailed within or amongst the most 
powerful EU member states around the time of the SGP’s formation (Sandholtz 1993, 
Martin 1994, Moravsik 1998, Dyson & Featherstone 1999, Young 1999, Verdun & 
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Christiansen 2000, Heipertz & Verdun 2004, 2005, 2011, Talani 2008). Furthermore, 
when political scientists of a broadly neo-constructivist persuasion have applied 
methodologies more accommodating to the role of ideational or discursive 
constructions, their analytical focus has often been limited to exploring the dialectic 
relationships between experts and politicians within the EMU’s advisory committees 
(Engelmann et al. 1997, McNamara 1998, Risse et al. 1999, Dyson 2000, 
Marcussen, 2000). Most of these analyses are therefore heavily tied to the dominant 
theories of EU integration, and the majority are set firmly around historical events 
surrounding the birth of the SGP. The latest account by Heipertz and Verdun (2011) 
also provides a theoretical account of the evolution of the SGP, but it does lead them 
to make some predictions on the functioning of the SGP following on from the recent 
crisis period. This account though is focussed quite narrowly on the implementation 
and effectiveness of the SGP specifically, and it does not consider the far broader 
(and potentially more far reaching) fiscal governance reform debate evolving in the 
EU context. 
 
The literature on EU fiscal governance so far has been dominated by 
economists and can be split into two groups. First there are the economists who 
have focussed on fiscal governance in the broader EMU context. They are largely 
united by what they see as an incomplete blueprint for integration within EMU, i.e. 
monetary union without a full fiscal union. Then there are the economists who have 
focused far more specifically on the SGP instrument, with little in the way of any 
consensus forming on issues related to the design and reform of the SGP reform—
although the overriding feeling is one of scepticism. It is worth noting though that a 
whole new literature emerged focussing on EU fiscal governance following on from 
intensification of the financial and economic crisis in Europe around mid-2010—a 
period which saw investor confidence collapsing and bond yields on weaker 
Eurozone countries diverging markedly with the core states (see chapter 4). In 
particularly, the crisis has reignited early scepticism amongst many economists 
concerning the viability of constructing a monetary union without taking major 
integration steps towards a fiscal union. And, linked to this debate, it has also led to 
a number of policy recommendations being suggested as to the reforms that need to 
be enacted to secure the single currency area.  
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Crisis and the Reform of EU fiscal Governance 
 
 
There are two explanations as to why the crisis erupted with such added 
intensity within Europe and the single currency area—with stark policy implications 
arising in accordance with the particular diagnosis elected for. The first explanation is 
a Keynesian one, with the crisis being understood more as a balance-of-payments 
crisis (see Buiter et al 2011, Alessandrini et al 2012, Merler and Pisani-Ferry 2012, 
De Grauwe 2013, amongst others). Rather than focussing on the build-up of public 
sector debt, this interpretation focuses on the role of macroeconomic imbalances—
particularly those related to the current account positions of member states within 
EMU. The second explanation is the neoliberal interpretation of events which places 
fiscal discipline, or the lack of, at the heart of any account of the crisis (von Hagen et 
al 2009). Here, certain member states are blamed for pursuing lax fiscal policies in 
breach of the SGP rules. Stark policy implications arise from the interpretation of 
events drawn upon. After all, those who adopt a Keynesian view of the crisis pay 
recognition to the major structural deficiencies that have been present from the 
beginning within the EMU framework related to the lack of a fiscal union aspect, 
which have played a crucial role in bringing about the intensification of the crisis in 
Europe (De Grauwe 2013). However, those who adopt a more narrow neoliberal 
interpretation of the crisis are more likely to focus on limited measures to strengthen 
fiscal discipline under the pre-existing SGP instrument. In view of the evidence, it will 
be argued here that the neoliberal explanation of the intensification of the financial 
and economic crisis in Europe is ultimately a misguided one that results from a 
misdiagnosis of the crisis itself.  
 
The majority of observers and academic analysts argue, more in accordance 
with the Keynesian perspective, that the financial and economic crisis in Europe is at 
least as much of a balance-of-payments crisis as a fiscal one—with the northern (or 
core) member states profiting from surpluses and the south (or periphery) member 
states enduring chronic deficits (see Buiter et al 2011, Alessandrini et al 2012, Merler 
and Pisani-Ferry 2012, amongst others). For example, Alessandrini et al (2012) finds 
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that the divergences in the Eurozone member states imbalances have been driven 
largely by ‘wage and labour productivity differentials which have not been 
compensated by real exchange rate adjustments’. A Keynesian reading of the crisis 
is also adopted by the foremost expert on monetary unions Paul De Grauwe (2013): 
 
‘‘With the exception of Greece, the reason why countries got into a 
sovereign  debt crisis has little to do with public profligacy. The 
cause of the debt  problems in the Eurozone is to be found in the 
unsustainable debt accumulation of the private sectors in many 
Eurozone countries […] It can be seen that household and bank debt 
were increasing fast prior to the debt crisis. Surprisingly, the only 
sector that did not experience an increase in its debt level (as % of 
GDP) was the government sector’’ (De Grauwe 2013:11-12).   
 
From this reading, it was therefore the accumulation of private debt (as 
opposed to public debt) that led to the development of boom and bust cycles in the 
Eurozone—before governments were forced to intervene (resulting in the transfer of 
private sector debt onto public sector balance sheets.   
 
The Keynesian view also contains an inherent rejection of the neoliberal 
explanation that fiscal profligacy (i.e. the build of public debt) was the proximate 
cause of the crisis. The evidence provided to support this view is that many of the 
southern European countries (Greece being the exception) who found themselves 
under market pressure had in fact pursued sounder fiscal positions than many of the 
northern states (including even Germany) prior to the onset of the crisis. Again, as 
De Grauwe (2013) observes: 
 
‘‘Even more striking is to find that in two countries that have 
experienced severe government debt problems recently, Ireland and 
Spain, the government debt ratios were declining spectacularly prior 
to the crisis. These were also the countries where the private debt 
accumulation has been the strongest’’ (De Grauwe 2013:18). 
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Krugman also reaches similar conclusions: ‘For this is really, really not about fiscal 
irresponsibility. Just as a reminder, on the eve of the crisis Spain seemed to be a 
fiscal paragon’. And again, Alessandrini et al (2012) adds that the crisis ‘cannot be 
interpreted only as the result of fiscal indiscipline’.   
 
Adopting such a Keynesian view of the crisis has major implications in terms 
of the resulting reform agenda that is understood to be required within EU fiscal 
governance. After all, those scholars who subscribe to a Keynesian view of the crisis 
focus on some of the major structural deficiencies that have long been identified as 
being present within the EMU framework relating to a lack of a fiscal union (see 
Eichengreen 1990, Sala-i-Martin & Sachs 1991, Robert & Rubinfeld 1992, Tamim & 
Masson 1995, Eichengreen & von Hagen 1996, De Grauwe 2006, 2007, amongst 
others). As already noted, these economists were seen to have reached a series of 
negative conclusions early on regarding the absence of a system of fiscal solidarity 
(or transfer mechanisms) to offset asymmetric shocks within EMU. As you might 
expect, the intensification of the financial and economic crisis in Europe has only 
magnified these doubts and led to renewed calls for EMU to be completed through a 
major policy shift towards the development of a fiscal union endowed with substantial 
fiscal solidarity mechanisms.  
 
For example, in the wake of the crisis De Grauwe (2013) reiterated that EMU 
must ultimately be embedded in a fiscal union to be sustainable:  
 
‘Finally, in the long run the monetary union will have to be embedded 
in a significant fiscal union. This is probably the hardest part of the 
process to make the Eurozone sustainable in the long run, as the 
willingness to transfer significant spending and taxing powers to 
European institutions is very limited. It remains a necessary part, 
though. Without significant steps towards fiscal union there is no 
future for the euro’ (De Grauwe 2013:31). 
 
The literature concerning the specific fiscal solidarity measures required to 
complete fiscal union within EMU is itself very sizeable. However, the most common 
policy initiatives revolve around two themes: 1) debt mutualisation and financial risk 
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sharing instruments; 2) and/or the development of an EU fiscal capacity (federal EU 
budget) with a mixture of redistributive and/or stabilisation functions. Both of these 
solidarity mechanisms are supported by De Grauwe (2012, 2013) is well. First he 
argues that a form of debt mutualisation is necessary in order to ‘shield the weakest in 
the union from destructive movements of fear and panic that regularly arise in 
financial markets of a monetary union and that can hit any country’ (De Grauwe 
2013:28). And second he calls for the development of an EU fiscal capacity (or 
‘central budget’) that can ‘automatically organise financial transfers towards 
countries experiencing economic difficulties’ (De Grauwe 2012:407). 
 
In terms of some of the broader literature, the discussion concerning debt 
mutualisation is very extensive—although the scholars are agreed that some form of 
risk sharing is required in Europe (see Claessens et al. 2012 for a complete overview 
of the main proposals). Some of the more prominent suggestions for commonly 
issued securities include: the so called European Safe Bonds (Euro-nomics group 
2011), Eurobills-blue/red bond (Delpha & Von Weizsäcker 2010, Philippon & Hellwig 
2011), Redemption bonds (Bofinger et al. 2011) and stability bonds (Commission 
2011). Generally speaking, the proposals envision a partial debt mutualisation. Also, 
it is generally envisioned that such risk sharing will need to be combined with 
safeguards to ensure sustainable budgetary positions. As with the proposals for debt 
mutualisation, there have been many suggestions put forward as to how the 
development of an EU fiscal capacity should take place. According to a Bruegel 
Policy Contribution, there are four main options for the development of a fiscal 
capacity for the purposes of stabilisation of regional shocks to the euro area are: 1) 
unemployment insurance; 2) payments related to deviations of output from potential; 
3) the narrowing of large spreads; 4) and discretionary spending. In terms of size, 
resources amounting to around 2 percent of Eurozone GDP is envisioned to start 
with (Wolf 2012).  
 
A policy paper released by Notre Europe also explores this issue and 
suggests introducing a ‘Cyclical Adjustment Insurance Fund’ based on differences in 
output gaps, with a view to increasing convergence across the cycle. (Enderlein 
2013). A separate study by Pisani-Ferry et al (2013) examines four different 
schemes for fiscal stabilisation and proposes a unique scheme based on GDP-
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indexed debt instruments, or bonds. The options considered here are: 1) ‘A federal 
budget with unemployment and corporate taxes shifted to euro-area level’; 2) ‘a 
support scheme based on deviations from potential output’; 3) ‘an insurance scheme 
via which governments would issue bonds indexed to GDP’; 4) and ‘a scheme in 
which access to jointly guaranteed borrowing is combined with gradual withdrawal of 
fiscal sovereignty’. The analysis reveals very differing results depending on the 
original debt levels and macroeconomic situation of the member state involved.  
 
Of course, completing fiscal integration within EMU through the 
implementation of fiscal solidarity mechanisms of this kind would be dependent on 
significant transfers of sovereignty (of varying degrees) to the EU level. This is not 
least because a centralised European authority would in principal need to be put in 
control of managing the transfer of taxpayer’s money across borders. Debt 
mutualisation, which would involve shared liability for each other’s debt across 
borders, would also have to be introduced alongside a framework providing for 
increased budgetary surveillance. The main reason for this is the issue of moral 
hazard—a fear that countries with higher borrowing costs may take advantage of 
those with a better credit worthiness. In order to reduce these fears it is therefore 
inevitable that significant transfers of budgetary sovereignty would need to be 
transferred to the central level. Numerous proposals have been put forward as to 
how this could be achieved (see Von Hagen & Wyplosz 2008, Dullien & Schwarzer 
2009, Baldwin, et al. 2010, Baldwin & Gros 2010, Burda & Gerlach 2010, Calmfors 
2010, Eichengreen 2010, Holinski et al. 2010, IMF 2010, Lane 2010, Larch et al. 
2010, ECB 2011, Clasessens et al. 2012, 2012a, Whalley & Nam 2012, amongst 
others). Most of these proposals suggest increased EU level supervision of national 
budgets through a whole variety of supervisory procedures. More decentralised 
solutions have also been suggested, although this is a minority standpoint (Wyplosz, 
2010, 2011) 
 
The second explanation for the intensification of the financial and economic 
crisis in Europe is the neoliberal interpretation of events which places fiscal discipline, 
or the lack of, at the heart of any account of the crisis (von Hagen et al 2009). Here, 
the periphery member states are blamed for pursuing lax fiscal policies in breach in 
of the SGP rules. As already demonstrated, this viewpoint is not common amongst 
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academic economists, with most commentators subscribing to the more Keynesian 
version of events. This is not unexpected since it has already been demonstrated 
that, with the possible exception of Greece, the fundamental causes of the crisis are 
to be found in unsustainable private debt accumulation and major structural 
deficiencies related to the lack of a fiscal union within EMU (De Grawue 2013). 
However, one notable exception is provided by von Hagen et al (2009). They argue 
that ‘financial markets’ reactions were not random but rather reflect an intensification 
of risk concerns, especially regarding the state of public finances’. They conclud that: 
 
‘‘Calls for more European solidarity, for instance via issuing EU 
common bonds to avoid an alleged irrationality of financial markets, 
are not justified. On the contrary, they may result in higher interest 
rates if market participants anticipate less disciplined fiscal policies 
as a consequence’’ (Von Hagen 2009). 
 
Instead, in accordance with a neoliberal logic, they suggest that ‘compliance 
with the European rules for public finances, as included in the Stability and Growth 
Pact, is a necessary condition to safeguard against the high costs of public debt’ 
(ibid).  
 
While the neoliberal interpretation is not a popular one amongst academics, 
there are several good reasons to suspect that it may still be influential in guiding the 
official EU fiscal governance reform debate. First, during the time of EMU’s 
construction there was a shift in economic thinking amongst the monetary authorities 
of Europe away from Keynesianism in favour of neoliberalism and its early financial 
counterpart ‘monetarism’ (McNamara 1998, Verdun 1998, Marcussen 2000, Heipertz, 
M. & Verdun 2004, 2005, 2011). While monetarism as a set of economic ideas is to a 
large extent concerned with monetary policy and its related institutional frameworks, 
it is also understood to be important that excessive levels of public debt do not inhibit 
the maintenance of the price stability objective (Heipertz & Verdun 2011:93). For 
these reasons EMU can be interpreted as representing the implementation of the 
constitutionalism of ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ (see Gill, 1998). And there is no 
doubting that it was designed partly as a neoliberal construction in the first instance, 
with price stability and fiscal discipline objectives at its heart—and Germany’s 
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uploading of ‘ordoliberal ideas’ was particularly influential here too (see chapter 8 for 
an in depth analysis of how neoliberalism became institutional and ideationally 
embedded within EMU). Neoliberalism within Europe is also of course intimately 
linked too much wider process. Important here are global and regional institutions 
who lend intellectual support to the neoliberal paradigm. This includes (but by no 
means is excluded too) the IMF, OECD, Bank for International Settlements, as well 
as multinational corporations (Dyson 2000, 2002). Finally, on a more global level, it 
is also worth observing that neoliberalism has been seen to have remained 
surprisingly resilient since the 2008 financial crisis (Grant & Wilson 2014). 
 
To conclude this section, a mass of literature emerged focusing on EU fiscal 
governance reform following on from intensification of the financial and economic 
crisis in Europe around mid-2010. It has been found that two key explanations exist 
as to why the crisis erupted in Europe and the single currency area: 1) the 
Keynesian view, with the crisis being understood more as a balance-of-payments 
crisis; 2) and the misguided neoliberal interpretation of events which focuses on 
fiscal discipline—or the lack of. Stark policy implications have been seen to result 
from the particular crisis diagnosis elected for. For example, those who are seen to 
adopt a neoliberal interpretation of the crisis are more likely to focus on limited 
measures to strengthen fiscal discipline. However, those who accept the Keynesian 
version of events focus more on EMU’s structural deficiencies (i.e. the lack of fiscal 
union) and proceed accordingly to propose a series of integration steps towards the 
implementation of solidarity mechanisms within the single currency area. The 
emerging reform debate on EU fiscal governance raises a number of legitimacy 
considerations —and it to these issues that literature review will now turn.  
 
 
Legitimacy Considerations and EU Fiscal Governance 
 
 
Legitimacy considerations, on both the input and output side, have already 
been shown to be one of the key challenges confronting EU integration in the 
modern period. There is also good reason to believe that these legitimacy 
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considerations could be amplified in the fiscal governance domain more specifically. 
As Scharpf (2003) argues: 
 
‘‘[T]he need for legitimation varies with the salience of the 
preferences that are potentially violated. Policies that interfere 
significantly with life, liberty or property interests, or that violate 
deeply held normative preferences of the governed, will need to be 
justified by stronger legitimating arguments than pareto-superior 
policies that are thought to increase social welfare without violating 
salient interests’’ (Scharpf 2003:6). 
 
This is significant because tax and spend policy, like foreign and social policy, 
is deeply rooted within national conceptions of state sovereignty. Fiscal policy also 
by its very nature has major redistributive consequences, and the tax policies that 
are pursued by different states are often embedded in quite specific social, cultural, 
political and economic traditions. There is, therefore, every reason to suppose that 
legitimacy considerations will be an important factor in shaping the latest reform 
debate over EU fiscal governance reform—particularly given that there is a prospect 
for a rapid centralisation of fiscal sovereignty. 
 
Despite the potential importance of legitimacy considerations within the 
context of EU fiscal governance, the literature exploring the two issues combined is 
very thin. This is not unsurprising. After all, the literature base has already been 
revealed to be dominated by contributions from economists who have neglected the 
rich political dimension that surrounds this politically salient research area. Even 
within the literature that has addressed legitimacy in this context, it has largely done 
so as part of a wider research context concerning EMU more generally. For example, 
early on disapproval was expressed with the EMU framework as a whole because it 
was seen to have no overarching supranational authority that could be held 
accountable for the management of EMU (Verdun 1998, 2000, 2002, Verdun & 
Christiansen 2000). A central issue for Verdun was ‘How to handle the politicisation 
of EMU as its effects become more visible and directly impact on individuals in the 
absence of a supranational structure of democratic legitimacy’ (Verdun 2002:97). 
Similarly, Hodson & Maher (2001:1-2) argued that monetary credibility is too ‘narrow 
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a pedestal upon which to build EMU’; and, more relevant in this context, they added 
that if economic policy becomes ‘more a creature of the EU’ then an ‘alternative 
basis for legitimacy will be needed’ (Hodson & Maher 2001:2-3). Moreover, Dyson 
(2002b) pointed out  that notions of ‘accountability’ and ‘transparency’ are ‘tests that 
Euro economic governance must meet if it is to prove compatible with democratic 
legitimisation’, even if they are disputed (Dyson 2002b:352-3). A number of scholars 
have focused more narrowly on the ECB (Begg & Green 1998, Buiter 1999, De 
Grauwe 2000, Dyson 2000, Hadjimmanuil 2000, Hodson & Maher 2001, Jabko 2003, 
De Hann et al. 2005). In short, while some commentators denounced the ECB’s 
operational independence for its lack of democratic inputs, others maintained that for 
the sake of efficient output it should be exempt from parliamentary involvement 
(Scharpf 1999, Issing 1999, & Vila Maior 2003 argued quite strongly on this last 
point). 
 
Although the above mentioned literature was not focus on the EU’s fiscal 
governance arrangements per sa, it did highlight some of the tensions that exist 
between the input and output dimensions within the broader EMU framework. For 
reasons already made clear, however, there is a need to consider more specifically 
legitimacy considerations in relation of the emerging reform debate over EU fiscal 
governance. In this context, two contrasting reform options have already been laid 
out. The first is limited to the securing of strengthened fiscal discipline within EMU 
and results from a neoliberal interpretation of the crisis. The second reform 
possibility is centred on the prospect of a qualitative integration leap towards a far 
deeper level of fiscal union and results from a Keynesian interpretation of the crisis. 
From our previous analysis of the wider legitimacy literature on the EU, it is also 
quite well established that deeper integration in politically salient areas such as the 
fiscal domain need to be underpinned by sufficient democratic inputs. This means 
that deeper fiscal integration will also require parallel integration steps in the 
direction of a deeper level of political union—as reflected in the saying no taxation 
without democratic representation. This leaves two reform possibilities that are 
reliant on very different legitimising arguments. For ease of understanding, these two 
reform models have been provided below as part of table that corresponds with 
Scharpf (1999) two-dimensional conception of discourse. 
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Table 2.1. Reform Options for EU Fiscal Governance   
 
 
 
Input legitimacy Output legitimacy 
Model of Fiscal 
Federalism 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
1 
 
Reliant on at best indirect 
legitimacy via 
representative of member 
states in the Council and 
European Council 
settings. 
 
Inspired by a neoliberal 
interpretation of the crisis as 
a public debt crisis 
 
Involving building on, 
rather than replacing, the 
rules-based SGP 
framework for budgetary 
surveillance as a means to 
secure fiscal discipline and 
broader objectives related to 
price stability and securing 
economic growth potential. 
 
 
 
 
Limited model 
of fiscal 
federalism: 
rules-based 
fiscal discipline 
with indirect 
channels of 
legitimisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
2 
 
Calls for more channels of 
direct legitimacy via a 
strengthening of the 
European Parliament as 
the only directly elected 
representative of the 
citizens of Europe as a 
whole. 
 
Most commentators also 
envision a role for 
(indirect) national 
parliamentary involvement 
in European economic 
affairs here-although 
there is need to ensure 
that nationally elected 
bodies do not encroach 
on, the European 
Parliament 
 
 
 
Inspired by a Keynesian 
view of the crisis as a 
balance-of-payments 
crisis 
 
Centred on a commitment to 
endowing the single 
currency with enhanced 
neo-Keynesian solidarity 
mechanisms involving debt 
mutualisation/financial risk 
sharing instruments and/or 
the development of a EU 
fiscal capacity (EU budget) 
with redistributive and/or 
stabilisation functions. 
 
EU level supervision, 
including a possible veto 
over national budgets also a 
possibility here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Far reaching 
model of fiscal 
federalism: full 
fiscal union 
with flanking 
political union 
aspect. 
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Two overarching patterns of legitimising discourse have been identified in the 
table above. The first is an output oriented neoliberal discourse which is centred on 
the securing of strengthened fiscal discipline within EMU under the SGP framework, 
with input legitimacy being left to be conferred largely indirectly. As a model of fiscal 
federalism this discourse represents the point of minimum departure from the status 
quo. The second discourse brings together both the input and output dimensions as 
part of a synergising relationship with the prospect of making a qualitative integration 
leap within EMU towards full fiscal and political union. As a model of fiscal federalism, 
this discourse represents a significant departure from the current status quo. It has 
also already been established that the neoliberal discourse is based on a misguided 
view of the crisis and ultimately fails to address the underlying structural deficiencies 
within EMU related to a lack of a fiscal union. There is, therefore, a need to explore 
which patterns of legitimising discourses are dominating the official fiscal governance 
reform debate and crucially whether the legitimacy mechanisms being relied upon 
are sufficient. It also could be that more emotional conceptions of state sovereignty 
and moral hazard—which have already been shown to be significant in the context of 
this debate—are preventing a leap towards a deeper level of fiscal and political union 
in Europe.  
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Chapter Three: Theoretical and Conceptual Overview 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The central concept in this piece of research is that of legitimacy, and it will be 
explored through discourse in the context of the ongoing efforts to reform the EU’s 
fiscal governance arrangements. In order to operationalise these research aims, a 
dual framework for legitimacy is developed building on the work of Fritz Sharpf 
(1999). He makes a useful distinction between ‘input’ and ‘output’ dimensions of 
legitimacy. Moreover, with a view to providing a more eclectic conceptualisation of 
legitimacy, a range of legitimising arguments related to both institutional form and 
practice and interactive construction are drawn upon. 
 
 The methodological framework informing this research process follows 
closely the work of Critical Discourse Analyst analyst Norman Fairclough (1992, 
2003, 2005, 2005a, 2006). With a view to increasing the explanatory potential of a 
CDA approach that is well suited to interdisciplinary research generally (Woodak & 
Meyer 2001), it is combined with a selection of broader theoretically informed ideas 
and power concepts. Central here are insights drawn from the new institutionalist 
literature bases, with particular attention being focused on the historical (see Zysman 
1994, Pierson 1996, 2000, 2001, 2004, Bulmer 1998, 2009, Thelen 1999, Mahoney 
2001, Ackril & Kay 2006, Kaiser 2008, amongst others) and discursive 
institutionalism (see Campbell & Pedersen 2001, Hay 2001, Blyth 2002, Schmidt 
2002, 2006, 2008, 2010a, 2011, amongst others). These new institutionalist strands 
of thought are also combined with a broader understanding of structural forms of 
power as developed through the writings of Susan Strange (1994). Such theorising 
when combined provides a fruitful explanatory framework for exploring the broader 
social environment that surrounds the EU fiscal governance reform debate. 
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Legitimizing Framework: Between Input and Output 
 
 
As summarised in the critical literature review, legitimacy and the beliefs 
surrounding it are understood to play a crucial function in ensuring an effective 
functioning government in liberal democratic polities (Scharpf 2003). In the context of 
this process, a dual framework for legitimacy is developed building on the work of 
Fritz Sharpf (1999). He makes a useful distinction between ‘input’ and ‘output’ 
dimensions of legitimacy. This leaves a normative articulation of legitimacy that is 
anchored in a set of arguments related to input legitimacy (‘involving political 
participation by and representation of the people’) and output legitimacy (‘a 
performance criterion centred on the ability the ability of EU institutions to govern 
effectively’) (Schmidt 2010:6) These argument can be explored through discourse in 
the fiscal governance context . 
 
As observed during the undertaking of the critical literature review, by and 
large the majority of the scholars who have explored legitimacy considerations in the 
EU context as part of Scharpf’s (1999) two-dimensional typology adopt one of two 
analytical approaches: One group provided accounts of legitimacy broadly based on 
either ‘rational choice’ (Majone 1998, Moravcsik 2002, Scharpf, 1999, 2006) or 
‘historical institutionalist’ frameworks of analysis (Pierson 1996, 2000, 2001, 2004, 
Bulmer 1998, 2009); whereas a second group approached legitimacy through a 
framework of analysis more closely aligned with ‘sociological’ (March and Olsen 
1989, Hall & Taylor 1996) and ‘discursive’ institutionalist theorizing (Schmidt 2006, 
2008, 2010) or more broadly constructivism (Risse 2009). In the context of this 
research process, however, the framework for legitimacy drawn upon is receptive to 
both the institutional and procedural dimensions as well as to the complex 
sociological/discursive and constructivist processes by which legitimacy is, at least 
partly, socially constructed.   
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Such a commitment follows on from the observation that the literature on EU 
fiscal policy has been dominated by contributions from economists employing largely 
rational choice accounts of institutional change (Dyson 2002a, Overbeek 2003, 
Heipertz & Verdun 2005, 2005a, Talani 2008, 2014). It is, therefore, deemed 
important that the analysis is receptive to the importance of identity, normative belief 
systems, speech acts, modes of argumentation and discursive power structures for 
the legitimation of the EU polity (Diez 1999, Dyson 2002, Jabko 2006, Schmidt 2006, 
Risse 2010). Also, such an understanding of legitimacy represents a tacit 
acknowledgement on the part of the researcher that both material and ideational 
aspects are important in producing social outcomes (Patomaki & Wight 2000)—a 
methodological stance that is very much in keeping with the moderately 
constructivist CDA approach through which this research process is operationalised. 
 
With the above prerequisites in mind, the framework for legitimacy drawn 
upon for this research draws extensively, although not exclusively by any means, on 
the work contributed by Schmidt (2006, 2008, 2010). More specifically, input 
legitimacy is judged in terms of the ‘EU’s responsiveness to citizen concerns as a 
result of participation by and representativeness of the people’; and output legitimacy 
is judged in terms of the ‘effectiveness of the EU’s policy outcomes for the people’ 
(Schmidt 2010:5). Moreover, for reasons already discussed, several of the 
legitimising arguments that are occasionally located under the rubric of throughput 
legitimacy are in this context incorporated under the input dimension of legitimacy. 
Thus, throughput legitimacy, which can be judged in terms of the accountability, 
transparency and efficiency of the EU’s decision-making processes  along with their 
openness to pluralist consultation with the people (Schmidt 2010:5), is integrated on 
the input side of the framework. For the sake of clarity, an illustration of the key 
arguments that make up the conceptual framework for legitimacy being 
operationalised for this research process has been provide below (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 3.1: Two Dimensional Legitimacy Framework 
 
 
Source: Building on the work of Schmidt (2006, 2008, 2010) 
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The methodology through which this dual framework for legitimacy is explored 
through discourse in the context of the ongoing fiscal governance reform debate will 
be expanded upon as part of chapter 4. However, in short here, the key patterns of 
discourse being explored as part of the analysis will conform broadly with the two-
dimensional conceptual framework for legitimacy provided above.  
 
 
 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
 
The operationalisation of this research process takes place through the 
application of Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of CDA (1992, 2003, 
2005, 2005a, 2006). The precise methodology underpinning Fairclough’s moderately 
constructivist CDA approach will be outlined as part of chapter 4. However, in short it 
demands not just an analysis of the linguistic features of texts and the wider 
discourse from which the text is situated, but ultimately a much broader analysis of 
the institutional, situational and societal context at the level of ‘social practice’. And 
notably, it is when approaching this broader level of social analysis that Fairclough’s 
CDA approach is combined with a selection of theoretically informed ideas and 
power concepts with a view to enriching the analysis. Central here are the insights 
drawn from the ‘new’ intuitionalist literature, with particular attention being paid to the 
historical and discursive components. While historical institutionalism’s focus on 
concepts such as ‘path dependency’ and ‘critical junctures’ is useful for helping us 
understand the ‘stickiness’ that often characterises many aspects of EU policy-
making (Pierson 1996, Greer 2000, Mahoney 2001, Bulmer 2009, Ackril & Kay 2006), 
discursive institutionalism helps us focus more on the role of ‘substantive ideas’ and 
‘discursive interactions’ in  bringing about potential change (or continuity as the case 
may be) (Schmidt 2006a, 2008a, 2011). When combined with a deeper 
understanding of structural forms of power (Strange 1994), such theorising facilitates 
a far more comprehensive analysis of the broader social context from which the 
current debate over EU fiscal governance reform has arisen. 
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Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Although in this research context the primary reference point is the CDA 
approach as theorised by Norman Fairclough (1992, 2003, 2005, 2005a, 2006), in 
more general terms CDA can be said to encompass a wide variety of theories and 
approaches towards social analysis (see Van Dijk 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998, Wodak, 
1995, 1996, Fairclough & Wodak 1997, Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999, Woodak & 
Meyer 2001, Chiapello & Fairclough 2002, Fairclough et al. 2004, amongst others). It 
is for this reason important to locate Fairclough’s version of CDA within the context 
of the wider scholarly environment from which it is part. While the individual CDA 
approaches may differ in ‘theory, methodology and the type of research issues to 
which they tend to give prominence’ (Fairclough 2005b:76), there are some notable 
commonalities that have come to define CDA as a distinct approach to social enquiry. 
For example, Hussein (2008) observes that CDA applicants generally: 
 
‘‘Define discourse in broad terms to include written and spoken 
language in addition to visual representation; they subscribe to the 
dialectical relationship between discourse and social reality; and 
they are all politically committed to examining the role of discourse in 
the (re)production of social power’’ (Hussein 2008:132).  
 
However, arguably the most defining characteristic that differentiates CDA 
from more traditional styles of discourse analysis are its ‘constitutive problem-
oriented’, ‘interdisciplinary’ style (Woodak & Meyer 2001:2). And these qualities are 
very much manifest in the broad domain of research areas embarked upon by 
scholars of CDA in recent times, which include political and economic discourse 
(Chilton 1988, 1995, Wodak 1989, Fairclough 1989, 1992, 2000, Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough 1999, Jessop 2004, Ngai-Ling & Jessop 2010), discourse of globalisation 
(Fairclough 2006), institutional discourse (Sarangi & Slembrouck, 1996, Wodak 1996, 
1997, Chouliaraki 1998, Kress et al. 2001, Hall et al. 2006), gender issues (Wodak 
1997a, Talbot 1998, Walsh 2001), and ideology more generally (Kress  Hodge 1979, 
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Wodak 1989, Thompson 1990, Van Dijk 1998, 2002). The adaptability of CDA to 
multidisciplinary research is taken advantage of in this research context, with a 
decision being taken to employ CDA alongside a selection of broader theoretically 
informed insights and ideas.  
 
In view of the diverse nature of the CDA paradigm, the observation that this 
mode of social enquiry is a product of a series of earlier research traditions is a fairly 
predictable, yet important, point (Woodak & Meyer 2001). And at the heart of the 
theory behind CDA is the ‘mediation between the social and linguistic’ (Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough 1999:16). With regard to the former, for example, scholars of CDA have 
been strongly influenced by a whole range of social theorists who have drawn 
attention to the role of language in society. Notable additions to this list includes: 
neo-Marxists (Althusser 1971, Gramsci 1971), critical theorists (Habermas 1984, 
1987), Sociologists (Bourdieu, 1990, Bernstein, 1996), theorists of post-modern 
thought (Harvey, 1989, Giddens, 1990, 1991) as well as post-modernists and post- 
structuralists (Lyotard, 1979, Derrida 1976). The Foucauldian view of discourse has 
also been very influential here, particularly with regard to the crucial role that 
discourse plays with regard to generating social change (Foucault 2002). Foucault’s 
concerns with power relations have also been matched by scholars of CDA, although 
power is not reduced to language in the Foucauldian sense. Fairclough, in 
particularly, has also been seen to draw heavily on the work of Foucault when 
developing understandings of discourse as a form of ‘social practice’ (Fairclough 
1989). The concept of ‘orders of discourse’ (which Fairclough understands to mean 
the semiotic aspects that take place at the level of social practice) has also been 
more explicitly adopted (and recontextulised) from the work of Focault.   
 
However, while scholars of CDA have clearly strived to anchor their analysis 
on the ideas developed as part of these more socially grounded research traditions, 
these fields of enquiry have been accused of falling into a level of discursive idealism 
(or reductionism), as well as being criticised for being seen to be unable to account 
for processes of human agency and change (Newton 1998, 2003, Reed 1997, 2000). 
CDA scholars, including Fairclough, have therefore sought to combine insights from 
the more socially grounded approaches to the analysis of discourse with a range of 
linguistic techniques for carrying out more textually orientated discourse analysis. It 
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is at this crucial juncture, then, that we can trace the immediate ancestry of CDA 
back to the Critical Linguistics (CL) movement that was born in the early 1970’s (see 
Fowler et al. 1979, Hodge & Kress 1979, amongst others). Like their contemporaries 
who work within the field of CDA, scholars active within this prior CL movement were 
observed to be primarily concerned with developing a ‘social approach to linguistics’ 
that is capable of theorising ‘power relationships’ (Flowerdew 2008:195). Another 
similarity was that scholars of CL were also seen to be keen to explore how agency 
is represented within language use. A key resource that aided CL scholars with their 
textual analysis was Halliday’s Systematic-Functional Linguistics (SFL; Halliday 
1978), which views ‘language as a semiotic system that is structured in terms of 
strata’ (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999). And fundamentally, it was out of this initial 
(rather limited) hybridisation of social theory and textually orientated discourse 
analysis that CDA as an approach to the study of language emerged in its 
contemporary form (Martin & Wodak 2003). 
 
Owing to its varied theoretical legacy, CDA in its modern guise offers offer a 
valuable research framework that brings together both linguistic and more 
sociological techniques to the (critical) analysis of discourse. There are also some 
more general theoretical observations that can be made at this point concerning the 
application of a CDA approach to social enquiry. First, and perhaps most importantly, 
all CDA scholars are committed to an understanding of discourse (which 
encompasses language use in both speech and writing) as a form of ‘social practice’ 
(Fairclough & Wodak 1997). This implies that there is a so-called ‘dialectical 
relationship’ between a particular discourse event (text) and the situation, institutions, 
and structures that frame it (ibid). Or, in other words, discourse is ‘socially 
constituted’ as well as ‘socially conditioned’ (ibid). In keeping with this logic, then, 
while a textual linguistic type analysis is understood to remain an integral part of any 
CDA exploration, it is also deemed essential that the analysis oscillates between a 
focus on specific micro-level texts and wider social-cultural practice at the macro 
level, with discourse practice mediating between the two (Fairclough 1992:231-238). 
And it is by means of such an understanding that CDA scholars are able to further 
incorporate insights from both broader social theory and more textually orientated 
analysis into their respective CDA approaches. Furthermore, such reasoning, 
through the aligning of notions such as ‘power with semiotic activity’ (a category 
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which includes non-linguistic elements) (Thompson 2003:352), implies that 
uncovering the discursive nature of power relations is at the forefront of the research 
agenda.  
 
Finally, a number of advantages are gained from the decision to adopt a CDA 
type approach to research—as opposed to a more conventional approach to 
discourse analysis. To begin with CDA, particularly of the variety developed most 
consistently by Fairclough (1992, 2003, 2005, 2005a, 2006), draws on a critical 
realist ontological position (see Bhasker 1986, 1989, Archer 1995, Sayer 2000). 
What it entails to apply critical realist ontology to research will be discussed at length 
in chapter 4. In short, though, critical realists place a particular emphasis on ‘social 
construction’ and the ‘critique of the idea that science is an objective process’; 
however, the ‘phenomena studied in research are not viewed as complete 
constructions’ but as ‘corresponding to real entities or processes which exist 
independently of us’ (Sullivan 2010:30). In adopting such a nuanced ontological 
position, critical realists manage to escape the intellectual straight jacket that can 
often result from a commitment to positivism or from extreme versions of 
constructivism (or post-modernist/ structuralist theorising) (Danermark et al. 1997, 
Kurki & Wight, 2007). Also critical realists are able to avoid the common tendency on 
the part of many discourse analysts (particularly post-structuralists and extreme 
constructivists) who end up viewing the ‘social as nothing but discourse’ (i.e. so 
called ‘discourse idealism’) (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999:28).  
 
Speaking in the context of this research process more specifically, adopting a 
version of CDA premised on the theoretical underpinnings of critical realism is also in 
keeping with the relational framework for legitimacy that has been outlined already 
(between institutional form and practice and interactive construction). And, by 
drawing attention to the influence the material world places on such discourse 
formations, it follows that versions of CDA underpinned by a critical realist ontology 
are able to facilitate a far more complete analysis of legitimising discourse effects 
and their dialectical relationship with non-discursive elements of the social. As 
already hinted at, owing to CDA’s highly varied intellectual and theoretical roots, 
CDA is also clearly well positioned to contribute to interdisciplinary research 
generally—and it is a position that the researcher takes advantage of by 
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incorporating new institutionalist insights alongside broader concepts of power. Also, 
because CDA has been applied successfully in the past in order to explore topics of 
interest across the social, political and economic fields, there is every reason to 
believe it is well suited to application at the intersection of politics and economics.  
 
 
Broader Theoretical Considerations 
 
 
With a view to increasing the explanatory potential of a CDA approach that is 
well suited to interdisciplinary research generally (Woodak & Meyer 2001), it is 
combined at the level of social practice with a selection of broader theoretically 
informed ideas and power concepts. Central here are insights drawn from the new 
institutionalist literature bases, with particular attention being focused on the 
historical and discursive institutionalist perspectives. These new institutionalist 
strands of thought are also combined with the broader concept of structural power. 
Together such theorising provides a powerful explanatory framework with which to 
explore the broader social context surrounding the current debate over EU fiscal 
governance reform. 
 
Since the 1980’s, there has been a movement within EU studies away from 
so-called ‘grand theorising’ over the process of EU integration—a state of affairs that 
had led to the field being dominated by neo-functionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism—in the direction of understanding how the EU functions as a 
political system. This movement has led to scholars drawing on wider political 
science literature with a view to developing a deeper understanding of how the EU 
actually works. It was set against this backdrop that the ‘new institutionalism’ 
emerged as a new way of understanding EU integration and governance. The one 
underlying assumption that unites the new institutionalism as a distinct approach is 
that ‘institutions matter’ (Armstrong & Bulmer 1998:50). Moreover, this new variant of 
institutionalism can be differentiated  from older variants in that ‘institutions are not 
only defined as the formal organisations that the old institutionalism had 
recognised—such as parliaments, executives and judicial orders—but also extended 
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to categorise informal patterns of structural interaction between groups as institutions 
themselves (Bache et al 2011:22). Of course, institutionalism did not originate in the 
field of EU studies per se; however, as an example of the most highly 
institutionalised model of regional cooperation in the world, it is of little surprise that 
the new institutionalism is utilised frequently with a view to accounting for policy 
developments in the EU (see Pollock 2008 for an overview of new institutionalisms 
vast application in EU studies).  
 
Much of the literature addressing the legitimacy of the EU can be broadly 
classified as new institutionalist in character. When piecing together the analytical 
framework for legitimacy for use during this research process, for example, a 
distinction was made between those scholars who have approached legitimacy 
through the lens of ‘rational choice’ and/or ‘historical institutionalism’ (see Bulmer 
1998, 1999, Hix 1998, 2008, Majone 1996, 1998, Pierson 1996, Moravcsik 2001, 
2002, Scharpf 1997, 2006, amongst others), and those who have drawn more 
strongly on the ‘sociological and/or ‘discursive institutionalist’ (or constructivist) 
insights to inform their analysis (see Habermas 1996, 2001, Dyson 2002, Schmidt 
2006, 2010, 2011, Risse 2010, amongst others). It should come as little surprise, 
then, to learn that these four strands of thought, broadly speaking, make up the new 
institutionalism: ‘rational choice’, ‘historical’, ‘sociological’ and ‘discursive’ 
(sometimes referred to as constructivist) (Schmidt 2011; see Table 3.2 for a more 
detailed breakdown of the key assumptions which inform these four strands of 
thought). As a broad church, the distinctions between these four research agendas 
are often somewhat blurred, particularly with regard to historical institutionalism and 
the nature of the interface between rational choice and sociological research 
agendas. 
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Table 3.2: The Four New Institutionalisms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Schmidt (2011:50) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Schmidt (2011:50) 
 
 
In the context of this research process, two theoretical approaches from the 
new institutionalist paradigm are primarily drawn upon when conducting the analysis 
at the level of social practice: namely historical (see Zysman 1994, Pierson 1996, 
2000, 2001, 2004, Bulmer 1998, 2009, Thelen 1999, Mahoney 2001, Ackril & Kay 
2006, Kaiser 2008, amongst others) and discursive institutionalism (see Campbell & 
Pedersen 2001, Hay 2001, Blyth 2002, Schmidt 2002, 2006, 2008, 2010a, 2011, 
amongst others). Discursive institutionalism, with its focus on ideas and discourse is, 
when employed alongside historical institutionalisms more structural, temporal 
insights, well suited to exploring the historical roots of the discourse environment 
surrounding the EU fiscal governance reform debate. Starting with historical 
institutionalism, this approach can be said to add an overall ‘temporal dimension’ to 
the research process (Bulmer 2007). Moreover, because historical institutionalism 
does not represent a direct ‘counterpoint’ to rational choice or more sociological 
institutionalist approaches (Bache 2008:14), the insights provided by the approach 
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can be incorporated with relative ease alongside those provided by discursive 
institutionalism (Schmidt 2006a, 2008a, 2011). 
 
In order to emphasise the importance of political practices embedded over 
time, historical institutionalist scholars point to the sources and significance of ‘path 
dependency’ and ‘critical junctures’ for helping us understand the ‘stickiness’ that 
often characterises many aspects of institutional change (Pierson 1996, Greer 2000, 
Mahoney 2001, Bulmer 2009, Ackril & Kay 2006). The basic idea behind path 
dependency is a simple one and it was neatly articulated by Bulmer (2009) when 
commenting on the founding contribution made by Paul Pierson in his text called 
Politics in Time 
 
‘‘Path dependence is not about expressing the point that history 
matters; it highlights how political processes entail trajectories that 
are difficult to reverse because they are underpinned by 
mechanisms of positive feedback and increasing returns, as 
reflected in sunk costs and vested interests’’ (Bulmer 2009:209-310).  
 
Path dependency is a particularly useful concept for application in the EU 
context generally due to the complexity of the EU as a legal system (e.g. with 
multiple veto points) and owing to the sheer diversity of opinion and interests that are 
reflected within it. Moreover, following numerous enlargements and the expansion of 
EU policy competencies, this observation is set to become even more relevant over 
time. Path dependency has already been utilized as means of exploring the evolution 
of policy in multiple areas of EU policy-making, including the Common Agricultural 
Policy and the Multiannual Financial Framework (see Bulmer 2009 for an overview of 
the application of historical institutionalism analysis to the political system of the EU 
connected with policy analysis). There are also several reasons to suppose that path 
dependency is a concept that is well suited to explaining institutional inertia in the 
fiscal governance domain. This is because of the considerable sunk costs made 
during the initial construction of EMU and in view of the possible forces of vested 
interests from member state actors, officials and other stakeholders who may be 
able to constrain far reaching reform in this area. 
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Historical institutionalism is also able to factor in more radical change as part 
of what it terms as a ‘critical juncture’ event—otherwise referred to as ‘punctuated 
equilibrium (Collier & Collier 1991, Bulmar 2009). As Bulmar (2009: 209) points out, 
‘These analyses bring in the second dynamic of radical change to challenge the 
default position of path dependence’. It has also been documented that critical 
junctures can be caused by a whole range of endogenous and exogenous crises or 
a combination of both, and that they can vary in duration from relatively quick 
moments to long periods of transitional change (Collier & Collier 1991). The 
possibility of a critical juncture event arising to break the path dependent nature of a 
policy area is relevant in the context of this research process, with the recent 
intensification of financial and economic crisis in Europe representing a moment 
when more radical change may be a possibility within EMU. The question is whether 
this critical moment will be exploited or not, as the case may be.  
 
Despite factoring in the possibility for critical juncture events, a case can be 
made that historical institutionalism is, on balance, better suited to ‘explaining 
institutional continuity rather than change’ (Schmidt 2008a:2). Therefore, while the 
temporal dimension is made explicit during the analysis at the level of social practice, 
discursive institutionalist theorising is also factored in at this level of the CDA 
analysis alongside its more historical/ structuralist counterpart (see Campbell & 
Pedersen 2001, Hay 2001, Blyth 2002, Schmidt 2002, 2006, 2008, 2010a, 2011, 
amongst others). What makes discursive institutionalism distinct is that it preferences 
the role of ‘substantive ideas’ and ‘discursive interactions’—a methodological 
position that should result in a more complete insight into why ‘institutions change’ 
generally (Schmidt 2008). Hence, when applied in the context of this research 
process, it is able facilitate a more in depth reading of the overarching ideological 
struggles (and in turn power relations) that may be constraining or facilitating change 
in the context of EU fiscal governance reform. Discursive institutionalism also 
recognises the role of communicative discourses in promoting legitimisation. As 
Schmidt (2011) outlines: 
 
‘‘Discursive institutionalism considers the discourse in which actors 
engage in the process of generating, deliberating, and/or legitimizing 
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ideas about political action in institutional context according to a logic 
of communication’’ (Schmidt 2011:48). 
 
On top of this, there are some obvious parallels between a CDA approach 
that emphasises the role of discourse in the (re)production of social power and 
discursive institutionalism, which is primarily interested in discourse as an agent of 
institutional and social change. 
 
Finally, these new instituionalist strands of thought are combined with a 
broader understanding of structural power as theorised by Susan Strange (1994). 
This is not to discount the large role that power relations play within new 
institutionalist thought by itself—at both a structural and ideational level. However, 
for the purpose of analysing discourses at the level of social practice in this research 
context, it is felt necessary to provide a more explicit concept of power. This because 
the distribution of power amongst member states, especially amongst Germany and 
France as the twin engines of EU integration, is certainly a key factor in any 
discussion addressing the nature EMU governance (Heipertz & Verdun 2011:19-42). 
Also, German power, including ideational power, needs to be factored in when 
addressing the construction phase of EMU in particularly (Verdun 1998, De Grauwe 
2007, March 2011).  
 
In order to take into account the impact of these power relations within EMU, 
a deeper understanding of power is needed that goes beyond simply direct or 
relational power. Relevant to this discussion is the concept of ‘structural power’ as 
developed by Susan Strange (1999). She defines it as ‘the power to shape and 
determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, 
their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists 
and other professional people have to operate’ (Strange 1994:24-25). Strange also 
argues that structural power can be derived from a distinct ideational component (or 
‘knowledge structure’) that ‘comprehends what is believed (and the moral 
conclusions and principles derived from those beliefs); what is known and perceived 
as understood; and the channels by which beliefs ideas and knowledge are 
communicated—including some people and excluding others’ (Strange 1994:119).  
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As well as bringing together material and more ideational components, 
structural power is not structurally deterministic. For example, In Search of Structural 
Power: EU Aid Policy as a Global Political Instrument, Holden (2009) draws on the 
work of Strange and formulates a working definition of structural power that 
recognises its scope for agency. Structural power is understood by the author to also 
include ‘agents that possess the capacity to mould the formal institutions and deeper 
material and ideational structures of the international system’ (Holden 2009:13). In 
sum, then, by incorporating structural power into the analysis at the level of social 
practice, it facilitates a more comprehensive analysis as to where power lies within 
EMU in terms of both material and ideational aspects—and in terms of the interplay 
between agents and structures who operate within this environment.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In order to operationalise the research question, a dual framework for 
legitimacy is  developed building on the work of Fritz Sharpf (1999). He makes the 
useful distinction between ‘input’ and ‘output’ dimensions. The framework also 
contains legitimising arguments related to both institutional form and practice and 
interactive construction. The overarching methodological framework guiding this 
research process is informed by the work of CDA analyst Norman Fairclough (1992, 
2003, 2005, 2005a, 2006). However, with a view to increasing the explanatory 
potential of this CDA approach at the broader level of social practice, a selection of 
broader theoretically informed ideas and power concepts are drawn upon. This 
includes insights taken from the new institutionalist literature bases, with particular 
attention being focused on the historical and discursive institutionalist perspectives. 
These new institutionalist strands of thought are also complimented by a deeper 
understanding of structural power as developed through the writings Susan Strange. 
Together, such theorising facilitates a far more comprehensive analysis of the 
broader social context from which the current debate over EU fiscal governance 
reform has arisen. 
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Chapter Four: Methodological Framework—A Critical 
Discourse Analysis Approach 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The methodology adopted for this research is based upon Fairclough’s three-
dimensional framework for CDA in which discourse is analysed as a text, as a 
discourse practice, and as a form of social practice (Fairclough 1992, 2003, 2005, 
2005a, 2006). This CDA approach is underpinned by the premises of critical realism 
(see Bhasker 1986, 1989, Archer 1995, Sayer 2000): a philosophy that retains an 
ontological realism (a real world exists independently of our knowledge about it) 
while accepting a form of epistemological relativism (our understanding of this reality 
is partly constructed from our own perspectives and standpoint). Such an 
understanding leads to an approach to social enquiry that is receptive to the role of 
discourse in leading to social change, although it represents a rejection of the 
tendency on the part of some extreme constructivist or post-modernist scholars to 
reduce the study of social life to discourse. The data collection phase is guided by 
the development of a mixed method approach involving in the main data collected 
through a series of interviews with senior level policy-makers and the sourcing of 
official EU policy documents. The operationalisation of such methods facilitates the 
collection of discourse on fiscal governance reform expressed both formally and 
informally. 
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Fairclough three dimensional CDA 
 
 
The specific linguistic, interpretative and explanatory techniques underpinning 
Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of CDA will be expanded upon in full in due 
course. In brief, however, there is a description as to the linguistic make-up of the 
text (text analysis); then the relationship between the productive and interpretative 
processes which lie between discourse practice and the text is interpreted (process 
analysis); and finally the wider relationship between discourse practice and social 
practice is explained (social analysis). The manner by which Fairclough’s three-
dimensional CDA approach brings together both the linguistic and more sociological 
techniques to the (critical) analysis of discourse can be made more intelligible for the 
reader by relating it to the diagram offered below (see Table 4:1). For the purposes 
of clarity, it should also be recalled that it is at the third level of analysis (i.e. 
explanation of discourse at the level of social practice) that the theoretical insights 
and power concepts provided for as part of chapter 3 are incorporated into the 
analysis.   
 
Figure 4.1 : Fairclough’s Three-Dimensional CDA framework 
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Source: Fairclough’s (1992:73; 1995) 
 
 
Fairclough adopts a view of discourse as an ‘element of all process, events 
and practices’, although these elements of social life are not reduced to discourse in 
their entirety (Fairclough 1992:2). Instead, it is more appropriate to think of discourse 
in this CDA context as ‘articulations of discourse with non-discoursal elements’ 
(Fairclough 2005:924). Discourse in the most general and abstract sense though is 
understood as being indicative of a grouping which encompasses the broadly 
‘semiotic elements’ (contrasting with ‘non-semiotic elements’) of the world, which 
includes ‘language’ ‘visual semiosis’ and ‘body language’ (Fairclough 2005b:77). 
Though as Fairclough (2005:925) comments, ‘the use of the term discourse rather 
than language is not purely or even primarily motivated by the diversity of forms of 
semiosis’. Instead, the use of such terminology is primarily a result of the ‘relational 
way’ by which Fairclough understands linguistic/semiotic elements of social events 
and practices as being interconnected with other components (ibid). It is through 
such an understanding of discourse that Fairclough is able to offer a far more 
complete analysis of discourse effects and their dialectical relationship with non-
discourse elements of the social.  
 
Fairclough’s methodological framework (similar to a large number of CDA 
approaches to social enquiry) is underpinned by a critical realist ontological position, 
along with the associated epistemological benefits it gives rise to (see Bhasker 1986, 
1989, Archer 1995, Sayer 2000). Such an ontological commitment to critical realism 
facilitates an awareness of the ‘real structures of society’ that are said to constitute 
our world, although with a recognition that knowledge of these structures will only 
ever reflect ‘partial experiences’ of them (Forsyth 2004:16). In keeping with this logic, 
Fairclough is guided towards a ‘dialectical’ understanding of the ‘relationship 
between structure and agency’ and of the ‘relationship between discourse and other 
elements or moments of social practices and social events’ (Fairclough 2005b: 76-
77). And this stance is manifested in Fairclough’s (2005, 2006) understanding of the 
dimension of social practice (a term that encompasses the relatively stable social 
networks that make up the social world, including institutional and organisational 
circumstances) as a mediating category between social structures and social events 
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(2005, 2005b). In sum, then, in an ontological sense there is understood to be an 
important semiotic element to every level of social reality: social structures to 
languages, social practises with orders of discourse, and social events with texts 
(Fairclough 2003:24).  
 
It is also as a consequence of Fairclough’s decision to draw on the ontological 
premises of critical realism that can account for his decision to centre the analysis of 
discourse within an analytically dualist epistemology: one that prioritises the 
investigation of relations between ‘agency’ (social processes and events) and 
‘structure’ (Fairclough 2005:916). While such an approach is receptive to the role of 
discourse in leading to social change, the tendency on the part of many extreme 
constructivist or post-modernist scholars to reduce the study of social life to 
discourse is outright rejected (Fairclough 2003, 2005). Rather Fairclough (2003) 
makes an important distinction between ‘construction’ and ‘construal’: 
 
‘‘[W]e may textually construe (represent, imagine etc) the social 
world in particular ways, but whether our representations or 
construals have the effect of changing its construction depends on 
various contextual factors-including the way social reality already is, 
who is constructing it, and so forth’’ (Fairclough 2003:7-8). 
 
The above remarks account for why a key endeavour of Fairclough’s CDA 
approach is to identify the dialectical relations between discourse and other non-
discursive elements of the social world. The latter of were identified by Harvey (1996) 
as encompassing a broad range of moments including: ‘power’, ‘values’, ‘social 
relations’, ‘institutions’ and ‘material factors’. And because this version of CDA is 
seen to be concerned with exploring the complex inter-relationship between 
discourse practices and social structures at the broadest levels, it is able to achieve 
a far more complex understanding as to the role of discourse in shaping (and being 
shaped) by the social world around us. 
 
The epistemological approach guiding Fairclough’s version of CDA is 
contingent on what is termed ‘retroductive’ reasoning, which involves explaining 
events by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are capable of producing 
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them (Sayer 1992:107). From such a vantage point, the research process is 
understood as initially progressing from the ‘concrete’ (or empirical) to the more 
‘abstract’ (or theoretical) explanations of the generative mechanisms concerned 
(Jessop and Sum 2006: as cited by Fairclough 2007:13). Following the completion of 
this step, a retroductive approach to social enquiry is then understood to be 
contingent on a ‘movement back to concrete-complex analysis of concrete realities 
that deploys in combination categories arrived at through abstraction’ (Jessop and 
Sum 2006: as cited by Fairclough 2007:13). This means that rather than ‘start from 
the text’ during the process of CDA, an exploration of the ‘complex articulation of 
diverse moments which constitute concrete process and events’ must first be carried 
out (Fairclough 2007-13-14).     
 
 
Operationalisation of Research 
 
 
Chapter 5 will provide a full historical overview of fiscal governance within 
EMU, and this chapter will also provide justifications for the key time-frame and 
institutional locations within which the discourse analysis will take place. In short, 
though, it will be charted as part of the historical overview chapter how the SGP 
remained relatively unchanged up until the intensification of the financial and 
economic crisis in Europe around mid-2010—a period which saw investor 
confidence collapsing and bond yields on weaker Eurozone countries diverging 
markedly with the core states. Two separate phases of the crisis will then be 
identified: an ‘immediate crisis period’ and what will be termed as a ‘post-crisis 
period’. And it is the legitimising discourses to emerge during these two phases of 
the crisis reform debate that are of principle concern to the researcher when applying 
the CDA approach being operationalised for this analysis. The precise qualities that 
define this period as one of ‘crisis’ for European policymakers will also be further 
developed at this point, although in short it was the considerable ‘risk’ elements that 
made it so—with an added ‘timing’ element stemming from market pressures that 
were often seen to move quicker than Europe could legislate for. 
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In setting out the specific institutional settings that makeup the focus of the 
analysis of discourse, three key policy settings will also be identified in chapter 5: 1) 
the intergovernmental settings, including the European Council, ECOFIN Council 
(shadowed by the Eurogroup), as well as the various deliberations which take place 
at committee level; 2) the Commission setting as the Unions foremost supranational 
actor; 3) and finally, the European Parliamentary setting as a more marginal, 
although not inconsequential, policy actor within EMU. And notably, a separate case 
study chapter is devoted to exploring the legitimising discourses being produced 
within each of these three institutional settings when tackling the fiscal governance 
reform issue. Also, following the CDA framework as set out by Fairclough, a 
separate chapter is also allocated at the end of the analysis for carrying out a much 
broader exploration (from a historical perspective) of the institutional, situational and 
societal context that surrounds the discourse at the level of social practice.  
 
The data collection techniques employed during the undertaking of this 
research, as well as a summary of the various stages that will constitute the CDA 
analysis, will be outlined in full in due course. However, first a classification of the 
key patterns of legitimising discourse that will be explored in the context of the 
ongoing debate over EU fiscal governance reform will be reiterated here—following 
on from the findings made during the undertaking of the critical literature review. It 
was found that two separate explanations exist as to why the crisis erupted with such 
added intensity within the Europe and the single currency area: 1) the neoliberal 
interpretation of events which places fiscal discipline, or the lack of, at the heart of 
any account of the crisis; 2) and the Keynesian view, with the crisis being understood 
more as a balance-of-payments crisis than a public-debt issue. It was also 
discovered that stark policy implications result from the particular crisis diagnosis 
elected for. For example, those who were seen to adopt a neoliberal interpretation of 
the crisis were more likely to focus on limited measures to strengthen fiscal discipline 
under the pre-existing SGP instrument. However, those who accepted the Keynesian 
version of events were inclined to advocate a more far-reaching integration leap in 
the direction of a far deeper level of fiscal union where neo-Keynesian type solidarity 
mechanisms play an enhanced role. Finally, it was also found to be well established 
in the literature that deeper fiscal integration will require parallel integration steps in 
the direction of a deeper political union, i.e.no taxation without democratic 
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representation. These key patterns of discourse have been presented below as part 
of a table (see Table 4.2) that corresponds with the two-dimensional framework for 
legitimacy already provided for. 
 
Table 4.2 Key Patterns of Discourse 
 
 
 
Input legitimacy Output legitimacy 
Model of Fiscal 
Federalism 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
1 
 
Reliant on at best indirect 
legitimacy via 
representative of member 
states in the Council and 
European Council 
settings. 
 
Inspired by a neoliberal 
interpretation of the crisis as 
a public debt crisis 
 
Involving building on, 
rather than replacing, the 
rules-based SGP 
framework for budgetary 
surveillance as a means to 
secure fiscal discipline and 
broader objectives related to 
price stability and securing 
economic growth potential. 
 
 
 
 
Limited model 
of fiscal 
federalism: 
rules-based 
fiscal discipline 
with indirect 
channels of 
legitimisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
2 
 
Calls for more channels of 
direct legitimacy via a 
strengthening of the 
European Parliament as 
the only directly elected 
representative of the 
citizens of Europe as a 
whole. 
 
Most commentators also 
envision a role for 
(indirect) national 
parliamentary involvement 
in European economic 
affairs here-although 
there is need to ensure 
that nationally elected 
bodies do not encroach 
on, the European 
Parliament 
 
 
 
Inspired by a Keynesian 
view of the crisis as a 
balance-of-payments 
crisis 
 
Centred on a commitment to 
endowing the single 
currency with enhanced 
neo-Keynesian solidarity 
mechanisms involving debt 
mutualisation/financial risk 
sharing instruments and/or 
the development of a EU 
fiscal capacity (EU budget) 
with redistributive and/or 
stabilisation functions. 
 
EU level supervision, 
including a possible veto 
over national budgets also a 
possibility here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Far reaching 
model of fiscal 
federalism: full 
fiscal union 
with flanking 
political union 
aspect. 
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In the context of the reform debate over EU fiscal governance reform, there 
are two overarching patterns of legitimising discourse that need to be explored. The 
first is an output oriented neoliberal discourse that is centred on the securing of 
strengthened fiscal discipline within EMU under the SGP framework, with input 
legitimacy being left to be conferred largely indirectly. As a model of fiscal federalism 
this represents the point of minimum departure from the status quo. The second 
discourse brings together both the input and output dimensions as part of a 
synergising relationship with the prospect of making a qualitative integration leap 
within EMU towards full fiscal and political union. As a model of fiscal federalism, this 
discourse represents a significant departure from the current status quo. Of course, 
there are possibilities for integration models that rely on alternative legitimising 
mechanisms. Most notably, you could have a series of integration steps in the 
direction of a deeper fiscal union (i.e. with neo-Keynesian solidarity mechanisms) 
without the corresponding political integration. However, in accordance with the 
deeply embedded political standard of no taxation without democratic representation, 
such integration steps would seem highly unlikely in the EU context.  
 
It is important to reiterate at this point that, for reasons expanded upon at 
length during the undertaking of the critical literature review, a position in favour of 
the second and more far reaching pattern of discourse has been adopted for the 
purposes of this research. This in recognition of the inherent deficiencies that have 
been understood to have been present from the beginning within the EMU 
framework (i.e. the lack of a fiscal union)—deficiencies which ultimately have been 
seen to play a crucial role in bringing about the intensification of the financial and 
economic crisis in Europe (De Grauwe 2013). By implication, such positioning does 
mean that in this research context the nature of the legitimising discourses being 
developed within the various EU institutional settings is of added importance. After 
all, failing to move towards a deeper level of fiscal and political union would be failing 
to adequately tackle the key weaknesses revealed by the crisis.  
 
Adopting such a position also helps direct the analysis in a more critical 
direction. There is now more of a motivation to ask which dominant legitimising 
discourses are guiding the current fiscal governance reform debate—and from within 
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which of the various institutional settings. It is also vital to establish if the policy 
responses being adopted at the European level result from a misguided 
interpretation of the crisis in the first instance. Also relevant here is ascertaining if the 
discourses guiding the reform agenda have long been present at the European level; 
or alternatively whether these narratives have in fact arisen as a direct response to 
the crisis events in Europe. Of course, if a limiting neoliberal discourse is found to be 
dominant in the context of the EU fiscal governance reform debate, then a series of 
additional research questions inevitably arise. In particularly, the question will need 
to be posed as to what is preventing an integration leap towards a deeper level of 
fiscal and political union in Europe. As already discussed at length in the critical 
literature review, this could be where sensitive issues related to sovereignty and 
moral hazard will need to be factored into the analysis, in a policy area which after all 
has historically remained deeply embedded at the national level. There is also a 
need to establish if reliance on indirect legitimacy mechanisms is enough to ensure 
the effective functioning of a neoliberal rules-based fiscal governance model. And 
finally, at the level of social practice, the theoretical and methodological tools already 
outlined would need to be employed in this instance in order to explore the historical 
roots of this constraining discourse environment that Europe has found itself in when 
confronting the topic of fiscal governance reform.  
 
 
Data Collection Techniques 
 
 
The data collection phase is guided by the development of a mixed method 
approach, involving data collected through a series of interviews with senior level 
policy-makers and the sourcing of official EU policy documents—speeches given by 
EU level officials will also be drawn on occasionally as a supplementation device. 
The adoption of such a mixed method approach is understood to be particularly 
relevant in this research context given that Fairclough’s CDA approach is itself 
hinged upon a broad understanding of discourse—one which encompasses both 
written and spoken texts. Of course, whether written or spoken, the primary unit of 
analysis for CDA is still the text itself. A further distinction can, however, be made 
between what can be termed as ‘formal’ and more ‘informal discourse’ types.  
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The official policy documents (and speech acts), for example, represent more 
formal discourse. After all, these data sources are sourced from the individual 
institutional settings making up the analysis chapters, and are representative of the 
official public expression of the intent of the policy actors located within the institution 
in question. This official discourse can be interpreted as more of a collective voice 
that has been controlled and designed in such as a way as to legitimise EU policy-
making or governance. In this sense, the official discourse on the subject of EU fiscal 
governance reform is useful for grasping the overarching ideological position that is 
being utilised within a particular policy setting to legitimise policy action in that area. 
Of course, analytically speaking the informal discourse is still valuable as a 
reinforcement device for the more formal public orientated discourse. The interview 
data can, for example, be analysed with a view to seeing if there is a high degree of 
ideological overlap with the public discourse released from within a particular 
institutional setting over the issue of EU fiscal governance reform. Key here is 
assessing if the modes of argumentation and reform strategies being advanced 
contain irregularities, or not.  
 
However, arguably the most beneficial use of the informal discourse that is 
not available to the public is for tracing the underlying, often concealed, reasons that 
led to the final release of an official EU policy document in its particular format. This 
is particularly relevant in a fiscal governance policy environment that has already 
been found to be highly complex (with multiple veto points), with a diversity of 
opinion and interests being reflected within it (from member state actors, officials and 
other stakeholders who may need to be taken into consideration). Informal discourse 
could also prove invaluable when posing the all-important counterfactual questions. 
It is hard to ascertain from official discourse, for example, why a particular policy 
document may have avoided a certain reform path or strand of argumentation 
altogether. The informal discourse, therefore, provides an important opportunity to 
see how some of the more sensitive issues already raised in the critical literature 
review concerning sovereignty concerns and issues moral hazard may be impacting 
upon the debate over EU fiscal governance reform. For obvious reasons, within 
documents designed for public consumption, it would be much harder to provide an 
adequate analysis of these potentially limiting factors. 
68 
 
 
In terms of the technicalities of the data collection process, two separate 
phases of the crisis will be identified in chapter 5: an ‘immediate crisis period’ 
(spanning approximately from early 2010 through to mid-2012) and what will be 
termed as a ‘post-crisis period’ (from late 2012 onwards). As will be demonstrated, 
some of the more immediate risks posed by the crisis events subsided by the middle 
of 2012 (following a series of unconventional policy intervention by the ECB), and the 
reform debate began to switch to the additional measures that need to be taken over 
the longer term in order to reform EU fiscal and broader economic governance (see 
in particularly the remarks by European Council President Herman Van Rompuy 
following the European Council summit at the end  of June 2012 where he laid down 
a ‘longer-term vision’ for strengthening EMU; Van Rompuy 2012). In keeping with 
these observations, the key policy documents discussing fiscal governance reform 
released between the two dates presented above have been drawn upon. And again, 
in setting out the specific institutional settings that make up the focus of the analysis 
of discourse, three key policy settings will be identified as part of chapter 5. In short, 
these are: 1) the intergovernmental setting, including the European Council, ECOFIN 
Council (shadowed by the Eurogroup); 2) the Commission setting 3) and finally, the 
European Parliamentary setting. While the intergovernmental settings constitute 
several overlapping institutional domains, during the crisis the same policy 
documents were often discussed at several levels of decision-making at once before 
being presented to the public (usually under the direction of the European Council 
President Herman Van Rompuy).  
 
Moving on to interview data collection procedure, 20 in depth interviews have 
been carried out with senior level officials located within all of the relevant 
institutional settings mentioned above. This list includes senior members of DG 
ECFIN involved in fiscal policy coordination (including members of the secretariat 
who are represented within the Eurogroup and further down at committee level); 
senior officials located within the Council Directorate for Economic Policy; senior 
members of the Cabinet for the European Council President; ministers of the 
Permanent Representation for Economic, Financial and Monetary Affairs; and finally, 
members of the European Parliament. Due to the seniority and expert knowledge of 
the interviewees, their individual views on the process of fiscal governance reform is 
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invaluable for both contextualising and adding to the more formal discourse collected 
from official EU policy documents. 
 
The interviews were set up on a one-to-one basis at a location of the officials 
choosing (with most interviews taking place in an office environment during work 
hours). The interviews were semi-structured in format, with the interviewees being 
permitted a considerable degree of leeway on how to reply to questions. This was 
useful because the emphasis was very much placed on how the interviewees 
themselves framed and understood the key issue surrounding fiscal governance 
reform. A semi structured format also meant that questions could be adjusted or 
deleted during the course of the interview according to the researcher’s judgement 
as to flow of the interview and as to the topics that the interviewee was keen to 
address (see appendix for an overview of the interview questions posed). The 
interview questions themselves were also formatted specifically to suit each 
interviewee’s role and knowledge area so as to be sure that the questions facilitated 
a deeper understanding of the material contained within the relevant policy-
documents—policy documents that were in many cases drawn up within the same 
institutional setting from where the interviewee themselves were located.  
 
At a more general level, every interview guide contained questions located 
around the key patterns of legitimising discourse already identified as being of key 
importance to the EU fiscal governance reform debate (as already demonstrated in 
table format above). Key questions were developed (but not restricted to by any 
means) around topics related to the causes of the crisis events in Europe; the key 
reform measures necessary to overcome the challenges posed by the crisis for both 
the immediate future and over the longer term; and finally the flanking political 
integration measures, if any, that may be necessary as an accompaniment to any 
integration on the fiscal side. The interviews were then recorded and the recordings 
were transcribed verbatim. Subsequently, following a preliminary reading of the 
interview transcripts, sections of the interview were then siphoned off in preparation 
for the application of Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA analytical framework. This 
siphoning phase was conducted in accordance to the data judged most relevant to 
the topic area at hand. Such a process was required because at times the 
interviewees strayed on to broader topics related to EMU reform (e.g. economic 
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union, banking union, ECB reform etc…)—topics which while important are not of 
immediate relevance to this analysis.   
 
 
Data Analysis 
 
 
Following the generation of the relevant data sources, Fairclough’s three-
dimensional model of CDA (see Figure 2) can then be applied. Just to recall, this 
involves a description of the linguistic make-up of the text (text analysis); then the 
relationship between the productive and interpretative processes of discourse 
practice and the text is interpreted (process analysis); and finally the wider 
relationship between discourse practice and social practice is explained (social 
analysis). While an analysis of the methodological and theoretical foundations 
underpinning the application of this approach has already been carried out, the more 
precise linguistic, interpretative and explanatory analytical techniques that will be 
used need to be further expanded upon. In accordance with the approach set out by 
Fairclough (1992), the text analysis stage proceeds under four key headings: 
‘vocabulary’, ‘grammar’, ‘cohesion’ and ‘structure’ (see Table 4.4). The table in 
question sets out the linguistic categories in a kind of acceding formation. The 
formation starts with grammar at the micro level and proceeds all the way up until an 
altogether larger unit of analysis is factored in at the level of text structure. Due to 
space requirements and the large selection of texts being drawn upon for CDA, the 
linguistic analysis being carried out in research context is more focussed on the 
categories that can be positioned at the latter end of the scale, i.e. categories related 
to ‘cohesion’ and ‘text structure’. 
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Table 4. 4: Dimensions of Fairclough’s Text Analysis  
 
   
 Source: Locke (2004:46) 
 
 In terms of cohesion, it is important to include an assessment of the 
argumentative (or rhetorical) structure of the text, before it is linked to the 
overarching ideologies that are being constructed within the text at the level of text 
structure. Key here is uncovering the basic causality within the text to see if any of 
the key patterns of input and output oriented legitimising arguments already set out 
are present. The analysis concerning cohesion does overlap significantly with that 
demanded for text structure, although the latter category does include a more explicit 
overview of the text’s coherence, structure and format as a whole. In the context of 
this research process, this involves illustrating in what way the patterns of discourse 
are bought together to form a coherent whole. This exercise could include exploring 
the neoliberal or more solidarity focussed reform discourses that may be guiding the 
reform agenda for fiscal governance contained within the text. Of course, just as 
relevant here is accounting for the arguments, perhaps related to sovereignty 
concerns or issues of moral hazard, that may be impeding integration in the fiscal 
domain. Also important is exploring which interpretation of the crisis is dominating at 
the text level, i.e. a neoliberal or Keynesian account. And, with reference to the input 
side, there is need to establish if such output oriented discourses are balanced with 
arguments involving the taking of parallel integration steps in the direction of a 
deeper political union, or not. The analysis at the level of text structure should leave 
an impression of an overarching meta narrative for EU fiscal governance reform. 
This overarching narrative of the text may, for example, be promoting a series of 
integration steps within EMU towards what could be a limited or more far reaching 
model of fiscal federalism. 
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After the linguistic analysis, a connection between the text event and more 
abstract social practices can be made by uncovering the interpretive and productive 
qualities of the text at the level of discourse practice. The distinction made by 
Fairclough (1992) between ‘manifest intertextuality’ and ‘interdiscursivity’ (otherwise 
referred to as ‘constitutive intertextuality’) is relevant at this point. While 
Intertextuality refers to the ‘explicit juxtapositions of texts within each other’, 
interdiscursivity is suggestive of the broader mix of discourse categories upon which 
the text draws upon (Fairclough 2003:218-219). By factoring into the analysis the 
concepts of intertextuality and interdiscursivity, it enables a drawing upon texts 
outside of the immediate data being analysed. In this research context, this facilitates 
an analysis of what patterns of legitimising discourse a text may have incorporated 
from earlier texts or policy-documents. It could be, for example that neoliberal 
discourses or discourses emphasising neo-keynesian solidarity within EMU are 
being drawn upon from earlier periods.  
 
Finally, central to Fairclough’s third level of analysis is expanding on the 
interface between the ‘micro’-perspective of the individual texts and the ‘macro’-
perspective at the level of social cultural-practice (Fairclough 1989, 1992, 1995b). 
Empirically, this demands a much broader exploration of the institutional, situational 
and societal context surrounding the legitimising discourse uncovered during the 
prior stages of the analysis at the level of social practice. It is also important to recall 
that discourse at the level of social is ‘socially constituted’ as well as ‘socially 
conditioned’ (Fairclough & Wodak 1997): that is, it is constrained by institutional, 
situation and societal context but at the time it has an important role in changing it. 
As already discussed at some length during chapters 3 and 4, with a view to 
increasing the explanatory potential of a CDA approach that is well suited to 
interdisciplinary research generally (Woodak & Meyer 2001), it is combined at the 
level of social practice with a selection of broader theoretically informed ideas and 
power concepts. Central here are the insights drawn from the new institutionalist 
literature bases, with particular attention being focused on the historical and 
discursive institutionalist perspectives. It was also noted that these new 
institutionalist strands of thought are combined with some more explicit concepts of 
power in the form of ‘structural power’ as theorised by Susan Strange (1989). 
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Together such theorising provides a powerful explanatory framework with which to 
explore, from a historical perspective, the broader social context surrounding the 
current debate over EU fiscal governance reform. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
 
The research takes place under the direction of Fairclough’s three-
dimensional framework for CDA in which discourse is analysed as a text, as 
discourse as practice, and as a form of social practice. This CDA approach is 
underpinned by the philosophy of critical realism, which combines ontological realism 
with a form of epistemological relativism. While such an approach is receptive to the 
power of discourse, it is only moderately socially constructivist in outlook and rejects 
any tendency for the study of the social world to be reduced to discourse.  The data 
collection phase is guided by the development of a mixed method approach, 
involving in the main data collected through a series of interviews with senior level 
policy-makers and the sourcing of official EU policy documents. The 
operationalisation of such methods facilitates the collection of discourse on fiscal 
governance reform expressed both formally and informally. 
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Chapter Five: Contextual Overview—Fiscal Policy 
Coordination within EMU 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Fiscal policy coordination within EMU takes place under the rules-based SGP 
framework which sets upper limits on member states debt and deficit values. First 
introduced in 1997, the pact is far from an automatic sanctioning mechanism, with 
finance ministers operating within the ECOFIN Council enjoying considerable 
political discretion in advancing decision making procedures under both the 
preventative and corrective arms of the pact. The SGP remained relatively 
unchanged up until the intensification of the financial and economic crisis in Europe 
around mid-2010—a period which saw investor confidence collapsing and bond 
yields on weaker Eurozone countries diverging markedly with the core states. 
Despite the Union being faced by a crisis of potentially existential proportions, the 
reform agenda spearheaded during the immediate crisis period was still largely 
limited to measures building on the original SGP framework. It is no surprise, 
therefore, that while market sentiment was seen to have improved significantly by 
the latter end of 2012 (owing in large part to unconventional monetary policy action 
taken by the ECB), there has been a broad acceptance amongst EU level officials 
that additional measures need to be taken to strengthen the EMU framework over 
the longer term.  
 
It is against this backdrop of crisis, then, that the legitimising discourses are 
being considered in the context of the ongoing fiscal governance reform debate. 
Finally, in setting out the specific institutional settings that make up the analysis of 
discourse in the context of this research, three key policy settings have been 
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identified as dominating fiscal policy coordination within EMU: 1) the 
intergovernmental settings, including the European Council, ECOFIN Council 
(shadowed by the Eurogroup), as well as the various deliberations which take place 
at committee level; 2) the Commission setting as the Union’s foremost supranational 
actor; 3) and finally, the European Parliament setting as a more marginal, although 
not inconsequential, policy actor within EMU.  
 
 
A Historical Perspective 
 
 
The Eurozone currency area was set up in 1999 on the basis of a profound 
asymmetry between a centralised monetary policy and a decentralised fiscal policy. 
As a consequence of this asymmetry, while monetary policy decision making 
remained firmly under the control of the stability-orientated ECB, ultimate fiscal 
sovereignty was left to reside with member states at the national level. The 
peculiarity of this set up, however, did raise the issue of possible ‘negative spill-
overs’, resulting from member states with excessive deficits biases transferring 
negative costs on neighbouring member states in the form of inflation or high interest 
rates (Feldmand 2003, Heipertz & Verdun 2004). As such, with the intention of 
limiting such punitive inconsistencies arising within the EMU framework, the EU 
sought to uphold fiscal discipline by aligning national fiscal policies along a common 
set of principles or rules. At the heart of the EU’s efforts to coordinate the fiscal 
policies of its member states was the 1997 adopted SGP, which is a rules-based 
framework for the coordination of what remained national fiscal policies (Begg et al. 
2003, Fatás et al. 2003). 
 
The SGP was a product of a memo put forward in 1995 by Theo Waigel, the 
then German Minister for Finance, partly in response to domestic concerns from the 
Bundesbank and the public more generally (Heipertz & Verdun 2011:41-63). Yet the 
final legislation to emerge did deviate significantly from the German Finance 
Ministers originals suggestions: It did not include, for example, some of the 
controversial elements proposed by German representatives, such as purely 
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automatic fines under the supervision of a newly to be established independent 
Stability Council (Heipertz & Verdun 2011:5). As such, while the European 
Commission was charged with monitoring compliance under the original SGP 
framework by making assessments of the Member States’ stability and convergence 
programmes, it was the intergovernmental ECOFIN Council, acting on Commission 
recommendations, that was ultimately to be held responsible for issuing budgetary 
opinions or advancing sanctioning procedures under the pact (the latter only 
applying to euro area member states). It is of little surprise, then, that since its 
inception, the SGP has been far from an automatic budgetary surveillance 
mechanism, with ministers working within the ECOFIN Council being left with 
considerable political discretion over the implementation of the procedures 
envisioned for the SGP—particularly with regard to the advancement of sanctioning 
procedures under the EDP. 
 
Under the original SGP framework that was adopted in 1997, member states 
were obliged to observe two key benchmark values laid down in the preceding 
Maastricht Treaty that together represent the nominal anchors of the pact: 1) budget 
deficits should not be allowed to exceed 3% of GDP; 2) and public debt should not 
be seen to exceed 60% of GDP (Eichengreen & Wyplosz 1998, Baily & Kirkegaard 
2004). The relevant legal acts on which the SGP was originally adopted in 1997 
consisted primarily of two key Council regulations (Council regulation No 1466/97 
and of No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997), although these were also accompanied at the 
same time by a politically significant ‘Resolution of the European Council on the 
Stability and Growth Pact’ (see European Council 1997). The two Council 
regulations are, in accordance with their objectives and operational procedures, 
often labelled as making up the ‘preventative arm’ (the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the coordination of economic policies) and ‘corrective arm’ (based on 
the EDP that is enacted primarily with reference to the 3% of GDP deficit ceiling 
reference value). It is also worth noting that the preventative and the surveillance 
arms of the pact were in fact provided for within the original Maastricht Treaty (see 
Article 99 and Article 104 and their equivalent protocols for their application in 
primary legislation), although by building on secondary legislation the SGP added 
significantly to the provisions laid down at Maastricht, which provided only limited 
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capacity for enforcing fiscal discipline once member states entered the third stage of 
EMU.  
 
In its original form, the emphasis on the preventative arm was on soft 
procedures that foster fiscal discipline and joint policy coordination through 
multilateral surveillance and peer pressure. This was in some contrast to the 
corrective arm where formal procedures were in place leading up to the possibility of 
financial sanctions. Under the preventative arm, EU member states were obliged to 
submit annual stability and convergence programmes to the European Commission 
and ECOFIN Council explaining how they intend to meet their ‘medium-term 
budgetary objective’ (representing a budgetary position that safeguards against the 
risk of breaching the 3% deficit threshold). If instructed to do so following a 
Commission assessment, the ECOFIN Council could then issue an early warning to 
member states at risk of breaching the 3% deficit value. As already observed, at the 
heart of the corrective arm was the EDP, which had the potential to be triggered 
wants a member state’s planned or actual deficit is found to be in breach of the 3% 
threshold (with the 60% of debt to GDP rule being de facto non-operational at this 
time).  
 
Essentially, if the ECOFIN Council came to a decision, on the basis of a 
commission recommendation, that the deficit was excessive it could issue its own 
recommendations to the member state concerned and a timeframe for correcting the 
excessive deficit. In the case of non-compliance with the recommendations, then 
financial sanctions had the possibility of being enforced. Again though, because 
automatic sanctions were considered inappropriate by member states, the EDP did 
not operate as an automatic sanctioning mechanism. Instead, the ECOFIN Council 
enjoyed ultimate decision making power over the operationalisation of sanctions (as 
was the case with the issuing of recommendations and notices under the EDP), 
leaving the Commissions power restricted to the right of initiative. The table below 
provides a brief overview of the key reference values guiding the SGP framework as 
originally adopted in 1997, many of the features of which remain up until the present 
day.  
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Table 5.1 Overview of the 1997 Adopted SGP Framework 
 
 Objective Specification Adjustment 
Path 
Enforcement 
Mechanism 
Preventative 
Arm 
Medium term 
budgetary 
objective that 
is close to 
balance or 
surplus 
Designed 
round the 3% 
deficit value 
- - 
Corrective 
Arm 
Correct gross 
policy errors 
Occurs if there 
is a breach of 
the rule for a 
deficit of 3% of 
GDP or 
sufficiently 
diminishing 
debt to GDP 
ratio of 60% 
(later non-
operational) 
The EDP 
follows a step-
by-step 
procedure that 
is outlined in 
detail in Art. 
126 of the 
Treaty 
Sanctions 
coming at the 
very end for 
euro area 
member states 
 
 
In placing the  SGP in historical context, it is significant that a  number of 
challenges very quickly threatened the credibility of the EU’s fiscal governance 
framework, including widespread non-observance with key SGP rules, the 
momentary suspension of the EDP by the ECOFIN Council in 2003 with reference to 
France and Germany, and the subsequent decision of the Commission the following 
year to bring these countries before the ECJ for failing to uphold their treaty 
obligations (a move which resulted in a  ECJ judgement challenging ECOFIN’s 
decision to suspend the EDP while in effect failing to force the institutions 
compliance) (Heipertz & Verdun 2011, 2005, Hallerber & Birdwell 2008). The fact 
that such challenges were facing the SGP so early in its existence led to the 
European Council endorsing a ECOFIN Council report on the reform of the SGP in 
2005 on the basis of a Commission proposal. The subsequent reform agenda that 
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was operationalised was centred on the rationale of constructing an SGP more 
sensitive to the prevailing economic conditions and individual countries economic 
circumstances (Berger & Moutes 2007, Flipek & Schreiber 2010), although many 
policymakers (including the ECB) and academics (Coeuré & Pisani-Ferry 2005, 
Calmfors 2005a, Buiter 2006) interpreted the reforms as representing a substantial 
weakening of the pact, not entirely without justification. For apart from providing for a 
more flexible interpretation of the rules, the reforms failed to fundamentally alter the 
procedures, rules-based nature or two-pronged structure of the pact (Morris et al 
2007, Crowley & Rowley 2008). Yet, while the instruments capacity to secure a 
sustainable level of fiscal discipline within EMU remained as questionable as ever, 
the subsequent emergence of a benign macroeconomic environment in Europe 
served to ease, albeit temporarily, the anxiety building up over the SGP. 
 
 
Crisis and Reform  
 
 
The benign macroeconomic environment prevailing in Europe was shattered 
in 2007-08 come the arrival of the global financial crisis and the economic turbulence 
that followed it. With the onset of the crisis, government balance sheets deteriorated 
significantly across the EU as a result of the severity of the cyclical downturn and 
owing to the large sums of financial support provided to prop up the financial sector. 
In fact, within the Eurozone in particularly, budget deficits rose to reach an average 
of 6% of GDP by 2010 and average public debt levels climbed 85% over the same 
period (Schuknecht, L. et a. 2011:5). And, more alarmingly, five countries saw their 
debt ratios approaching or exceeding 100% of GDP (ibid). As a matter of course, 
therefore, 24 EU member states were seen to enter the EDP during the 2009-10 
period (Commission 2010b:2). This steadily deteriorating macroeconomic 
environment was then compounded by the onset of the European sovereign debt 
troubles in 2010 as investor confidence collapsed and bond yields on weaker 
Eurozone countries started to diverge markedly with the core states. By this stage 
the epicentre of the crisis had shifted firmly from America to Europe as the continent 
found itself mired in a protracted financial and economic crisis.  
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As was outlined during the critical literature review, there are two separate 
explanations as to why the crisis erupted with such added intensity within the Europe 
and the single currency area—with stark policy implications arising in accordance with 
the particular diagnosis elected for. The first is the neoliberal interpretation of events 
which places fiscal discipline, or the lack of, at the heart of any account of the crisis 
(see von Hagen et al 2009). Here, certain member states are blamed for pursuing lax 
fiscal policies in breach in breach of the SGP rules. The second explanation is the 
Keynesian view, with the crisis being understood more as a balance-of-payments 
crisis (see Buiter et al 2011, Alessandrini et al 2012, Merler and Pisani-Ferry 2012, 
De Grauwe 2013, amongst others). Rather than focussing on the build-up of public 
sector debt, this interpretation focuses on the role of macroeconomic imbalances, 
particularly those related to the current account positions of member states within 
EMU. Again, for reasons expanded upon at length during the undertaking of the 
critical literature review, a position in favour of the latter Keynesian version of events 
is adopted for the undertaking of this research. In short, here, in adopting this 
position the researcher is paying recognition to the inherent deficiencies that have 
been present from the beginning within the EMU framework (i.e. the lack of a fiscal 
union), which ultimately have played a crucial role in bringing about the 
intensification of the financial and economic crisis in Europe (De Grauwe 2013). This 
has been seen to be in some contrast to those who adopt a neoliberal interpretation 
of the crisis, who are more likely to focus on measures to strengthen fiscal discipline 
under the pre-existing SGP instrument. It has also been seen to be well established 
in the literature that deeper fiscal integration will require integration in the political 
realm, i.e. no taxation without democratic representation.  
 
In expanding upon what warrants the use of the term ‘crisis’ in this context, it 
is important first to point out some of the risks that were (and still are to a lesser 
degree) confronting policymakers in Europe as result of the financial and economic 
turmoil were of potentially ‘existential’ proportions: that is, not only as existential risk 
to the single currency area but also to the Union itself (see Interview Extract O 
2014:1 with a Senior Spokesman for the European Council President). In elaborating 
on some of the more specific risk factors, there was a concern that a periphery 
country—most notably Greece—could default on its outstanding debt obligations. 
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This was then linked with contagion fears resulting from the negative that could 
result following a disorderly default as investors re-assess the fragilities of the 
Eurozone. The activation of the so-called ‘doom loop’ was also an important 
consideration here, with the negative feedback loop between banks and their 
sovereigns having the potential to spread systematic risk throughout the currency 
area and wider Europe. The risks were also not limited to Europe alone. After all, 
with the euro area being the world’s largest economy after the United States (as a 
share of world GDP), the risk of financial and economic turmoil in Europe causing a 
crisis of more global proportions was very real. And, even assuming that a major 
crisis could be averted, the potential for the Eurozone to act as a dampener on 
global growth figures had to be taken very seriously. 
 
 Of course, aside from the economic and financial risks associated with the 
crisis, there was also the destructive social and political impact to consider. This 
included the impact of mass unemployment, extreme poverty, and loss of public 
expenditure on broader society and human wellbeing, not to mention the political 
implications that could result from a possible citizen backlash against incumbent 
governments or to the Union itself (as evidence in the domestic and European 
election results). As well as the considerable risks associated with the crisis period, 
there was also a profound ‘timing’ element to the crisis. As a senior member of the 
Cabinet for the European Council President argues, this was born out of the fact that 
European policy-makers ‘were also responding directly to external market pressures 
that have the capacity to react quicker than decision makers’ (Interview Extract 
2014:2). So, in effect, policy-makers (both at domestic and supranational level) were 
battling to stem market forces that could react at a far greater speed that than they 
could legislate for. Overall, then, in reflecting on what the term ‘crisis’ actually 
represents in this context, it would appear to reflect primarily the considerable ‘risk’ 
element associated with sovereign default and contagion, with an added crucial 
‘timing’ dimension resulting from the need to keep up with market forces. As one 
would expect, with the Union being faced by a financial and economic crisis of 
potentially existential proportions, the EU was forced to embark quickly on a program 
to reform the EU’s existing fiscal governance arrangements. This necessity to act led 
to the emergence of an initial reform debate taking place during what could be 
termed as the more immediate crisis period, which spanned approximately from 
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early 2010 through to mid-2012. This debate was spearheaded by the Commission 
in tandem with a task force that was established by the European Council and 
chaired by its President Herman Von Rompuy. Chief amongst the reforms initiatives 
to have materialised out of this debate included an economic legislative six-pack 
(adopted December 2011), a related legislative ‘two-pack (adopted March 2013) an 
intergovernmental ‘Euro Plus Pact’ (adopted in March 2011) and finally a fiscal 
compact (adopted by intergovernmental treaty in March 2012) (Commission 2012). 
For ease of understanding, the table presented below provides an overview of the 
main changes introduced by this package of fiscal governance reform measures 
(see table 5.2). As will be revealed in due course, by the fall of 2012 market 
sentiment towards the Eurozone had improved significantly (not in small part owning 
to rhetoric and unconventional monetary policy actions taken by the ECB under the 
leadership of Mario Draghi) and attention turned in Europe to the longer term reform 
measures required to strengthen EMU. 
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Table 5.2: Immediate Crisis Response —An Overview 
 
 
Source: Commission (2013a) 
 
Six-Pack (co-decision) Key Changes To Whom it Applies 
Strengthened preventative 
arm 
 Member states are required to work towards a 
Medium Term Budgetary Objective (MTO). 
 
 Financial sanctions in case of repeated non-
compliance (interest-bearing deposit of 0.2% of 
GDP). 
 
 
Surveillance measures apply to EU 27. 
 
 
Sanctions apply to non-compliment euro 
area member states only. 
Strengthened corrective 
arm 
 
 Launch of Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) can 
now result from government debt as well as from 
government deficit criteria (60% debt to GDP for 
the former and a 3% deficit limit for the latter). 
 
 Failure of a euro-area country to comply with debt 
or deficit recommendations for corrective action will 
result in a fine (interest-bearing deposit of 0.2% of 
GDP). 
 
 
 
 
Surveillance measures apply to EU 27. 
 
 
 
Sanctions apply to non-compliment euro 
area member states only. 
 
 
 
Minimum requirements for 
national budgetary 
frameworks 
 
 Member States should ensure that their fiscal 
frameworks are in line with minimum quality 
standards.  
 
 National fiscal planning should adopt a multi-
annual perspective, so as to attain the MTO. 
 
 Numerical fiscal rules should also promote 
compliance with the Treaty reference values for 
deficit and debt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EU 27 (with the UK securing a opt out on 
the directive pertaining to national fiscal 
rules. 
Two-Pack (co-decision) Key Changes To Whom it Applies 
 
Enhanced monitoring 
(preventative arm) 
 
 
 Member states publish draft budgetary plans to the 
Commission for an opinion. The Commission can 
request a draft if it contains a serious breach of EU 
rules. 
 
 National independent bodies’ setup to monitor 
national fiscal rules.  
 
 Closer monitoring for countries under the EDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
All euro area member states, with special 
provisions for those in EDP. 
Enhanced surveillance 
(preventative arm) 
 
 Closer fiscal monitoring, including stress tests, 
detailed data on financial institutions, and a 
assessment of supervisory capacities 
 
 Council can recommend, on a Commission 
recommendation, that a country adopt a 
precautionary programme or prepare a draft 
programme  
 
Euro-area member states experiencing 
severe difficulties, i.e. with regard to 
financial stability, receiving financial 
assistance, or subject to a full 
macroeconomic programme. 
Fiscal Compact 
(intergovernmental 
treaty) 
Key Changes To Whom it Applies 
Balanced budget rule 
 Member states commit to implementing in their 
national legislation a ﬁscal rule which requires that 
signatory’s budgets are in deficit or in surplus, i.e. a 
balanced budget rule of at least-0.5% of GDP 
(structural terms). 
 
 This must be accompanied by an automatic 
correction mechanism in the national legal order 
monitored by a independent institution. 
EU 27 (with the exception of the UK and 
the Czech Republic who are non-
signatories). 
Strengthened corrective 
arm 
 Reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV) applies 
to all stages of the EDP. 
EU 27 (with the exception of the UK and 
the Czech Republic who are non-
signatories). 
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As is evident from the table presented above, the major reform initiatives 
introduced during what has been termed as the more immediate crisis period were 
largely limited to strengthening fiscal discipline within EMU by building on, rather 
than replacing, the pre-existing SGP framework. Both the two-pack and six-pack, for 
example, introduced measures designed to significantly strengthen both budgetary 
surveillance and sanctioning procedures under the preventative and corrective arms 
of the SGP. The preventative arm, in particularly, was strengthened with more 
rigorous ex ante surveillance, including an early assessment of draft budgetary plans. 
This means that if the Commission were to assess in the future that a draft 
budgetary plan shows serious non-compliance with the SGP rules, the EU executive 
can request a budgetary revision. Moreover, for the first time the possibility of 
applying sanctions under the preventative arm of the pact was provided for. And, on 
the corrective side, the previously obsolete threshold limiting the debt to GDP ratio of 
member states to 60% was operationalised. Also, qualified majority voting (RQMV) 
was introduced for most sanctions as a means to decrease the chances that a euro 
area member state will be able to escape sanctioning procedures in the future. As for 
the fiscal compact, this intergovernmental treaty in fact mirrored many of the 
initiatives contained within the six-pack and two-pack building on the SGP framework. 
However, it did lay out provisions that require signatory member states to incorporate 
into their constitutions a so-called ‘golden rule’, i.e. a balanced budget rule 
(overlapping with those already contained within the SGP) that limits member states 
to a structural deficit of at least - 0.5% of GDP.  
 
The EU Commission also put in place a yearly cycle for economic policy 
coordination referred to as the European Semester, which was approved by member 
states in November 2010 (see figure 4.3. below for an overview of the Semester 
cycle). Within the framework of the European Semester all policy areas, including 
both fiscal and broader economic and financial issues, are now analysed under one 
coherent framework on an annual basis. The cycle begins with the Commission 
publishing a general Annual Growth Survey and with the individual member states 
submitting their draft budgetary plans to the Commission for an opinion. The findings 
documented within this report should then feed into fiscal and broader decision 
making at the national level. Member States are then required to detail these 
changes in their Stability and Convergence Programmes and National Reform 
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Programmes later in the year. The former programmes also include the all-important 
medium-term budgetary objectives of each Member State as well as the steps 
foreseen as necessary to attain adequate progress towards this objective. These 
programmes then form the basis for the European Commission's proposals for 
country-specific recommendations (CSR’s), which are adopted in by the European 
Council following discussion in the ECOFIN Council. Importantly, the CSR’s can act 
as a trigger for further procedural steps either under the preventive arm or the 
corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact. Space prevents us from 
documenting stage by stage the various decision-making stages as they now 
progress under the preventative and corrective arms of the SGP (see figure 1 and 
figure 2 in the appendix for a complete breakdown of decision-making stages under 
the pact). However, as has historically been the case within EU fiscal governance 
sphere, it is the intergovernmental ECOFIN Council that is still generally responsible 
for progression under the pact, with ministers working within this setting acting on the 
basis of recommendations from the Commission.   
 
 Figure 5.3: European Semester Cycle of Policy Coordination 
 
 
 Nov Dec Jan Mar Apr May June July Sep 
European 
Commission 
Annual Growth 
Survey (AGS) and 
opinion on Draft 
Budgetary Plans 
 
In depth reviews 
of countries with 
potential 
economic risk 
Country Specific 
Recommendations 
for budgetary, 
economic and social 
policy 
  
 European 
Council/ 
ECOFIN 
Council 
Discussion of EC 
opinions on Draft   
Budgetary Plans & 
ministers study the 
AGS and adopts 
conclusions 
 
EU leaders adopt 
economic 
priorities based 
on AGS 
 
EU leaders endorse 
the Country Specific 
Recommendations 
 
 
Member 
    States 
 
 
 
 
Member 
States adopts 
national 
budgets 
  
Stability or 
Convergence 
Programs and 
National Reform 
Programmes 
 
Draft Budgetary 
Plans and 
Economic 
Partnership 
Programmes 
European 
  Parliament 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic 
Dialogue 
Economic 
Dialogue 
  
Economic 
Dialogue 
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Source: Commission (2013) 
 
While the reforms enacted through secondary legislation and by 
intergovernmental agreement during the more immediate crisis period were 
portrayed as a ‘game changer’ by the Commission (Commission 2011a), there was a 
broad acceptance amongst EU level officials that additional measures needed to be 
taken to strengthen the EMU framework. As such, spearheaded from within the 
Commission and the European Council settings (with input being provided from 
across the EU’s institutional spectrum), a secondary debate emerged around the 
middle of 2012 over the additional measures that need to be taken over the longer 
term in order to reform EU fiscal and broader economic governance (see in 
particularly the remarks by President Herman Van Rompuy following the European 
Council summit at the end  of June 2012 where he laid down a ‘longer-term vision’ 
for strengthening EMU; Van Rompuy 2012). Although overlapping, this debate can 
be identified as having materialised during the transition to what can be identified as 
a ‘post-crisis’ phase (i.e. an environment characterised by a substantially reduced 
degree of immediate risk and timing pressure from market forces), with the intensity 
of the crisis in Europe seen to have diminished significantly by the latter end of 2012. 
A key turning point was when the President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, issued a 
statement in July 2012 that he would do ‘whatever it takes [within the ECB’s 
mandate] to save the euro’. This rhetoric, along with the release of technical details 
by the ECB concerning the launch of an ‘outright monetary transactions program’ 
(OMT), was enough to pull the yields on periphery nation debt downwards towards 
more sustainable levels. And certainly, the immediate threat of a Eurozone break up 
had lessened in the eyes of investors by this point. 
 
Of course, this is certainly not to suggest that many of the financial, economic 
political and social risks resulting from the crisis were no longer a factor by this 
point—many clearly were and still are, albeit in a reduced form. For example, as late 
as May 2014 De Grauwe & Ji (2014:4) observed that ‘the sharp decline of the 
spreads since OMT is totally dissociated from changes in fundamentals’ (eg.. 
government debt, external debt, competitiveness, growth, etc….). Moreover, with the 
foundation of the EU’s legislative response so far being limited to building the SGP 
framework (i.e. through the six-pact, two-pact and intergovernmental fiscal compact), 
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it therefore follows that only minimal progress has so far been made in addressing 
some of the deeper structural deficiencies inherent within EMU related to the lack of 
a fiscal union aspect. This is also despite the fact that it was precisely these 
deficiencies that have ultimately have been seen to play a key role in bringing about 
the intensification of the crisis in the first instance (De Graewe 2013). It is set against 
this rather uncertain backdrop, then, that an overlapping debate has emerged in the 
post-crisis period with a view to pinning down a longer term reform agenda for EU 
fiscal governance. 
 
At this point, it is important to reflect that two separate, albeit overlapping, 
phases of the crisis have been identified: an ‘immediate crisis period’ and what has 
been termed as a ‘post-crisis period’. And it is the legitimising discourses to emerge 
during these two phases of the crisis that are of principle concern to the researcher 
when applying the CDA approach being operationalised for this analysis. However, 
in order to frame the specific institutional settings making up the focus of the analysis 
of discourse in context, it is important to expand further on the key institutional actors 
and their responsibilities when it comes to the management of fiscal policy 
coordination within EMU.   
 
 
The Management of Fiscal Policy Coordination 
 
 
 Decision-making responsibilities within EMU have always had a strong 
intergovernmental dimension due to the asymmetrical nature of the single currency 
area, i.e. with a centralised monetary policy and a decentralised fiscal policy. After all, 
with formal economic policy competencies remaining under national control, the 
coordinating of national fiscal policies along a common set of principles European 
wide has been conductive to the development of a set of decision making structures 
in which member state representatives played a major role. The most important 
decision-making institution within the fiscal realm is the ECOFIN Council, which 
brings together once a month the national ministers of finance from across the 
member states. As Puetter (2006:11) remarks, ‘The Council is a place for the 
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articulation and formation of competing national interests as well as the common 
interests of the member states’; or alternately, it can be said to be reflective of the 
so-called ‘balancing act’ between the national and European level dimensions 
(Sbragia 1993) Therefore, while highly intergovernmental in structure, the common 
European interest would seem to be a feature in this setting. 
 
As already observed, the ECOFIN Council is integral to the budgetary 
surveillance procedures for both the preventative and corrective arms of the pact. 
Not only does the ECOFIN Council play a key monitoring role, alongside the 
Commission, in assessing progress towards the budgetary objectives set out under 
the preventative arm of the pact; but the body also has the deciding role in 
determining compliance with debt and deficit rules on the corrective side and 
ultimately in the advancement of sanctioning procedures under the EDP (as well as 
for the newly installed sanctioning procedures put in place on the preventative side). 
Fundamentally, therefore, it is the ECOFIN Council, acting on the basis of 
Commission recommendations, who is responsible for advancing procedures under 
the SGP framework by qualified majority voting (QMV) or reverse qualified majority 
voting (RQMV). Of course, the ECOFIN Council is also very prominent in legislative 
terms, acting in co-decision or consultation alongside the European Parliament, 
according to the specific area involved. Overall, owing to the significance of the 
body’s dual executive and legislative role, the ECOFIN Council can be said to lie at 
the heart of the workings of EU fiscal governance. 
 
The Eurogroup, whose informal deliberations play a crucial role in fiscal policy 
coordination within the single currency area, is also relevant here. First initiated in 
1997, the Eurogroup effectively mirrors the ECOFIN Council set-up, although it is 
attended exclusively by ministers of finance from member states participating in the 
single currency area. The Eurogroup typically assembles prior to ECOFIN Council 
meetings to discuss the all-important issues relevant to the euro-area dimension. 
While the Lisbon Treaty insists on the essentially ‘informal’ character of the 
Eurogroup, it has undergone a significant institutionalisation in recent years with the 
body possessing significant de fact decision making power (Puetter 2004, Pisani-
Ferry 2006, Hodson 2011). In fact, Pisani-Ferry observes that, ‘The Eurogroup has 
been transformed from a mere talking shop into what increasingly looks like a 
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policymaking institution’ (Pisani-Ferry 2006:840). The informal Eurogroup now not 
only, for example, de facto ‘pre-agree all critical Council decisions with relevance for 
the Eurozone member states’, but it also provides a forum where ministers ‘decide 
on the overall orientation of economic governance in the euro area and establish 
common interpretations of EMU’s core policy instruments’ (Puetter 2004:854). What 
is clear, then, is that through its more informal working practices, the Eurgroup finds 
itself in a strong position to influence the fiscal policy-making direction advanced 
within EMU. And, as with the ECOFIN Council, while its form is strongly 
intergovernmental, there is a sense in which representatives of the member states 
do work collectively towards forging a consensus in the European interest. 
 
The various deliberations which take place at committee level should also not 
be overlooked. Central here is Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) which is 
represented by senior finance officials from national administrations and central 
banks—with representatives from the ECB and the Commission in attendance as 
well. The EFC can also, however, meet in a special configuration known as the 
Eurogroup Working Group (EWG) in which only representatives from the Member 
States belonging to the single currency area are involved, again alongside 
Commission and ECB officials. In this configuration, the EFC is responsible for 
preparing the work deliberated on by the Eurogroup. In view of its unique institutional 
positioning, the EFC is able to make the important connection between the Council 
and the Commission. And also, owing to the committees mixed representation, it is 
also able to provide a bridge between the ‘political ministerial level’ and ‘technical 
level’, as put by one member of the Commission provided secretariat who 
contributes to the EFC (Interview Extract E 2013:1-2). When discussing how 
decision making process functions within this Committee, the same official also 
reveals:  
 
‘‘There are national interests of course. But they are policy experts 
who come to serve European interests.  So they have to act in a 
constructive way and provide their expertise to help solve the 
substance points which then should be technically sound. But then it 
is up to the higher level to decide politically whether they agree with 
it or not’’ (Interview Extract E 2013:1). 
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Clearly, as in the ECOFIN Council and Eurogroup settings, it is too simplistic 
to label these deliberations taking place with the EFC as being purely 
intergovernmental, for there is a sense within the Committee that the European 
interest is being served. Also, as the official cited above observes, while politics is 
always a feature no matter what the decision making level, the Committee is a forum 
where crucial technical matters can be sorted, with more political issues being left to 
be agreed further up the decision-making chain amongst ministers or Heads of State 
or Government.  
Finally, amongst the more intergovernmental institutions there is the 
European Council, which functions as a forum bringing together Heads of State or 
Government at the highest political level with a view to impacting upon the state of 
European integration. While the formal evolution of these meetings (or ‘summits’) 
can be traced back to 1974, it was not until the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 
2009 that the body was fully recognised as an EU institution in legal terms. Under 
the provisions set out in the Treaty, summits are to be convened as a matter of 
course twice every six months; however, an extraordinary meeting of the European 
Council may be called if a situation arises that demands it. The Lisbon Treaty also 
further clarifies the role of the European Council as defining the ‘general political 
directions and priorities’ of the Union (TEU art. 15, para. 1). In view of its defined role 
and high level representation, the European Council has historically operated from 
the side-lines with regard to EMU matters, with its role being restricted to defining the 
broad orientations of fiscal and economic policy making for the Union. After all, it 
would be left to the ECOFIN Council (shadowed by the Eurogroup) and various 
committees groups to interact as part of the regular fiscal policy coordination 
processes. 
 
However, as will be discussed at greater length in chapter 6, 
intergovernmental policy coordination, particularly at the highest level amongst 
Heads of State or Government, became even more pronounced as a response to the 
challenges presented by the financial and economic crisis. In short, from a reading of 
interview extracts collected from EU officials working within DG ECFIN, the Council 
Directorate for Economic Policy and within the Cabinet of the European Council 
President, there was a conviction amongst key EU policy makers that only the 
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European Council was able  to respond adequately and in a timely fashion to 
implement the measures that needed to be taken to respond to the existential crisis 
threatening Europe and the single currency area (see, in particularly, Interview 
Extract B 2013:1-2, C 2013:1-2, D 2013:1-2, G 2013:1-2, O 2014:1-2). Although 
even in this ostensibly most intergovernmental of settings it has been observed that, 
while member states are of course aware and mindful of their own self-interests, 
there is awareness of the common European interest (Van Middelaar 2013:25-
117)—an observation that is in itself quite a remarkable feature of decision making in 
this setting. 
 
While intergovernmental policy coordination is clearly a strong feature of EMU 
governance, the supranational EU Commission is also integral to the workings of EU 
fiscal policy coordination. By tradition understood as the supranational expression of 
the EU collective interest, the Commission has been endowed with a vital dual 
legislative and executive role that renders it one of the key decision-making organs 
within EMU. It has already been observed, for example, that the Commission plays a 
key role in organising collective budgetary surveillance under both the preventative 
and correctives arms of the SGP framework, with the ECOFIN Council generally 
acting on the basis of Commission recommendations. The Commission also has 
representatives (often in the form of members of the secretariat located inside DG 
ECFIN) within both the European Council, ECOFIN council and informal Eurogroup 
decision making forums, as well as further down at Committee level through various 
channels. Lastly, the Commission also benefits greatly from its ability to mobilise 
economic and technical expertise on EMU matters. So it follows that the Commission, 
through a range of formal and informal channels, is a very important actor 
overseeing fiscal policy coordination within EMU.  
 
There is also the more marginal role played by the European Parliament to 
consider. Despite the Parliamentary body increasing its influence across many areas 
of EU policy-making under the co-decision procedure, its role within the confines of 
EU fiscal governance is in fact largely limited to supervisory and consultation roles. 
After all, as already observed within the context of the European Semester cycle of 
policy-coordination, decision-making under the SGP framework is largely the 
preserve of various intergovernmental forums (including the European Council, 
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ECOFIN Council and Eurogroup) as well the Commission institutional setting as the 
EU’s executive arm. Although, with the European Parliament’s legislative role within 
EMU being enhanced post-Lisbon, it does mean that in the future the parliamentary 
body could play a far more enhanced role over EU fiscal policy coordination, despite 
its role at present remaining secondary to that of other actors. Finally, there is scope 
in the legislation for national parliaments to debate on various budgetary surveillance 
steps under the SGP, as encapsulated under the European Semester. At present, 
though, involvement for most national parliaments is highly limited (see Interview 
Extract A 2013:2 with a senior official located within DG ECFIN for confirmation as to 
the inadequacy of national parliamentary involvement at present). 
 
In setting out the specific institutional settings that make up the focus of the 
analysis of discourse in the context of this research, three key policy settings have 
been identified: 1) the intergovernmental settings, including the European Council, 
ECOFIN Council (shadowed by the Eurogroup), as well as the various deliberations 
which take place at committee level; 2) the Commission setting as the Unions 
foremost supranational actor; 3) and finally, the European Parliamentary setting as a 
more marginal, although not inconsequential, policy actor within EMU. And a 
separate analysis chapter is devoted to exploring the legitimising discourses being 
produced within each of these three institutional settings. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
At the heart of fiscal policy coordination within EMU is the SGP framework 
which sets upper limits on member states debt and deficit values. Throughout its 
history the pact has never functioned as an automatic sanctioning mechanism, with 
there being considerable room for political maneuver. In fact, except for a limited 
reform initiative implemented in 2005, the rules-based nature and two-pronged 
structure of the pact largely remained up until the intensification of the financial and 
economic crisis in Europe around mid-2010. Yet, despite the crisis threatening the 
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survival of the single currency area and even the larger Union itself, the immediate 
reform agenda was still largely limited to measures building on the original SGP 
framework. As such, while investor confidence was seen to have improved 
significantly by the latter end of 2012, there has been a broad acceptance amongst 
EU level officials that additional measures need to be taken to strengthen the EMU 
framework over the longer term. It is within such a crisis context, then, that the 
legitimising discourses being produced in the context of the ongoing fiscal 
governance reform debate are being considered. Finally, as set out above, in 
considering the specific institutional settings that constitute the focus of the analysis 
of discourse, three key policy settings have been identified as dominating fiscal 
policy coordination within EMU: 1) the intergovernmental settings; 2) the 
Commission setting; 3) and finally, the European Parliamentary setting. 
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Chapter Six: Intergovernmental Institutional Setting 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
With Europe and the single currency area being confronted by a crisis of 
existential proportions, intergovernmental decision-making—which was already very 
pronounced within the EMU set-up generally—has become of heightened 
importance. Perhaps most important here is the European Council which, 
strengthened by the institutional reforms provided for under the Lisbon Treaty, has 
evolved to become the natural default crisis forum. This is because only Heads of 
State or Government have been able to respond adequately and in a timely fashion 
to the particular challenges that befell the Union come the onset of the financial and 
economic crisis. With the European Council taking on an increased executive role 
within EMU, the body has been placed in a stronger position to set the reform 
agenda for fiscal and broader economic governance—as reflected in the ascendency 
of the task force, chaired by the then European Council President Herman van 
Rompuy. Of course, intergovernmental modes of decision making further down the 
decision making hierarchy have also had a crucial role to play during the crisis period, 
within the ECOFIN Council (shadowed by the Eurogroup) and various committees 
also taking on an increased workload as they have deliberated on the technical 
details concerning the reform agenda for EU fiscal governance.  
 
During the course of this ongoing reform debate a consistent legitimising 
discourse has been articulated from within these more intergovernmental settings, 
for both the immediate and post crisis period. This discourse type has been a 
neoliberal one and at its core there has been a firm commitment to strengthening 
fiscal discipline on the output side through building on the pre-existing SGP 
framework. Such a policy response has resulted in part from a neoliberal 
interpretation of the crisis events in the first instance, with it being framed in these 
settings as resulting primarily from fiscal laxity as member states failed to comply 
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with the Union’s budgetary surveillance rules. And, in this context, it is primarily 
Germany (alongside the other core states within EMU) that has been pushing the 
advancement of this neoliberal reform agenda as response to the challenges 
confronting the Union as a result of the financial and economic crisis. In relation to 
the reform agenda over the longer term, it is significant that a series of constraining 
discourses amongst key member states (including between Germany and France), 
concerning in particular sovereignty concerns and issues of moral hazard, have 
served to steer the reform agenda away from more far reaching integration steps 
that would be required to realise a qualitative integration leap within EMU towards a 
deeper level of fiscal union with a flanking political union aspect.  
 
It would seem probable, therefore, that the reform agenda within these more 
intergovernmental settings is likely to continue to remain tied to a neoliberal narrative 
that dictates the centrality of rules-based fiscal discipline—with at best indirect 
channels of democratic legitimation and accountability on the input side. Clearly, as 
a model of fiscal federalism such a reform blueprint, if implemented, would represent 
the point of minimum departure from the status quo within EMU. And, given the 
highly intergovernmental nature of the institutional architecture governing EMU, the 
entrenchment of such a limiting discourse could serve to constrain any fiscal 
governance reform process to at best incremental change.  
 
 
Contextual Overview 
 
 
As discussed in chapter 5, decision-making responsibilities within EMU have 
always had a strong intergovernmental dimension due to the asymmetrical nature of 
the single currency area, i.e. with a centralised monetary policy and a decentralised 
fiscal policy. However, in reflecting on the institutional adaptations that have taken 
place within EMU in response to what has been labelled as constituting a ‘existential 
crisis’ by a senior spokesman for the European Council President (Interview Extract 
O 2014:1), it is notable that intergovernmental policy coordination, particularly at the 
highest level amongst Heads of State or Government, has become even more 
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pronounced—a fact confirmed by many of our interviewees working within DG 
ECFIN, the Council Directorate for Economic Policy and within the Cabinet of the 
European Council President (see, in particularly, Interview Extract B 2013:1-2, C 
2013:1-2, D 2013:1-2, G 2013:1-2, O 2014:1-2). It is also a coincidence that the 
reforms introduced under the Lisbon Treaty to formalise the European Council have 
in many senses reinforced many of the characteristics which have rendered the 
European Council as the default manager of the EU during the recent crisis period. 
One senior official located within the Council Directorate for Economic Policy 
touches on this issue when discussing the evolution of the European Council’s role 
during the recent crisis period: 
 
‘‘It has certainly become a new animal, but this was already through 
the Lisbon Treaty. After all, it was only in December of 2009 that we 
got Von Rompuy appointed as permanent President; that was really 
a shift. […..] It coincided with important years of the crisis, as in the 
beginning of 2010 we shifted into the most serious stages of the 
crisis. So it is difficult to say how the European Council would have 
evolved without these crisis subjects on their agenda’’ (Interview 
Extract G 2013:1).  
 
Clearly, then, it is difficult to say exactly how the institutional balance between 
the EU’s institutions would have played out following the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty if it were not for the financial and economic turmoil which confronted the 
Union not long after. Nevertheless, the Treaty undoubtedly has placed the European 
Council in a strong position to help guide the Union through the subsequent crisis. In 
reflecting on why the European Council in particularly has taken on a far more 
pronounced role during the recent crisis period, two main explanations are given 
during interview proceedings with President Van Rompuy’s spokesman: First the 
situation confronting the Union is said to be ‘unprecedented and we needed new 
rules’, and ‘the European Council basically is the rule setting body or the constituent 
power’ (Interview Extract O 2014:1-2). On this first point, the official also adds at 
some length here:  
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‘The Commission and some of the other institutions cannot do that 
because they exist on the basis of the rules. Or in the more official 
language, it’s on the basis of delegated competencies’ (Interview 
Extract O 2014:1).  
 
The second reason given is that ‘so much money was involved; and, 
according to the official, if you ’talk about engaging tax payer’s money for such 
amounts, then this requires the Heads of Government to step in (Interview Extract O 
2014:2)’. The official also raises a similar point when discussing the economic reform 
programs and austerity measures which were enacted around the same time: ‘So we 
are talking here for some countries about potentially the very survival of their own 
economy and of their own government. And that is something which is really a 
matter for Heads of State to deal with’ (ibid). Another factor intimately interconnected 
to these two points—even if not explicitly dealt with by the official cited above—is 
one of timing. This issue, for example, is highlighted by a senior member of the 
Cabinet for the European Council President who argues forcefully: ‘Of course, it was 
absolutely imperative that we responded in an urgent and often adhoc manner in 
order to contain contagion risks and prevent a sovereign default or at worse a 
disorderly exit by a periphery member state from the Eurozone. (Interview Extract Q 
2014:1). From a reading of these statements, it is evident that key EU policy makers 
have consistently supported a strengthened role for the European Council during the 
crisis period as the only institution equipped with the tools necessary to respond 
adequately and in a timely fashion to the existential challenges threatening Europe 
and the single currency area.  
 
In expanding on what specific powers the European Council has taken on 
during the crisis, several of our interviewees comment that the body has seen a 
marked increase in its role as top executive power (Interview Extract B 2013:1-2, C 
2013:1-2, D 2013:1-2, G 2013:1-2, O 2014:1-2). Moreover, while the Commission 
has been observed to have preserved de jure it role as the initiator of legislation 
within the confines of the Community method, it is also confirmed that at times during 
this period the Commission has functioned more as a implementing arm of the 
European Council on key legislative matters (Interview Extract D 2013:1-2). Of 
course, at other times integration has been pursued firmly outside of the Community 
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method by way of intergovernmental agreement amongst Heads of State or 
Government (as was the case for the intergovernmental fiscal compact treaty, for 
example). Without question, therefore, it can be said that the European Council has 
found itself in a strengthened position to set the agenda over the emerging debate 
concerning the reform of the EU’s fiscal and broader economic governance 
arrangements during this recent crisis period. It is pertinent question to ask at this 
point whether the ascendency of this more intergovernmental body will be a 
permanent feature of EU governance. And according to a senior spokesman for the 
European Council President the answer to this question is a nuanced one: ‘So I think 
the European Council will be a bit more in retreat than in the heat of the crisis—I 
think you can already see that. But it will not be as before because of the experience 
of the crisis itself’ (Interview Extract O 2014:2).   
 
Of course, as noted by our interviewees cited above, other intergovernmental 
forums located further down the political hierarchy have also seen a substantial 
increase in their working methods during this time. Perhaps the most prominent 
example here are the informal Eurogroup sessions attended by euro area finance 
ministers which are then followed up by the more formal ECOFIN Council meetings. 
Together, these meetings have increased in frequency and duration during the crisis 
period as ministers have focussed their attention on the adequate policy responses 
to be taken (see Puetter 2012a). And often deliberations amongst ministers have 
been very informal with discussions taking place over breakfast, for example. Also, 
as would be expected, various technical deliberations also take place at committee 
level within the EFC amongst policy experts and representatives from the various 
member states. It is a feature here,  as a senior official within the Council Directorate 
for Economic Policy comfirms, that the ‘the more political issues have ended up right 
at the top with Heads of State’ (Interview Extract G 2013:2; see also Interview 
Extract E 2013:1, B 2013:1); or alternatively, the process has been ‘re-inversed’ 
during the crisis period so that ‘sometimes you had decisions made at the Head of 
State level which were not always prepared at a technical level’ (Interview Extract E 
2013:2). Either way, though, while forums further down the political hierarchy often 
deliberate on crucial technical details, the more politicised or controversial issues 
have been regularly left to be solved by finance ministers or even by Heads of State 
or Government within the European Council setting. This form of governance has 
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been conceptualised by Puetter (2012a) as representing a form of ‘deliberative 
intergovernmentalism’. 
 
The extension of intergovernmental decision making has also been 
strengthened considerably by the setting up in March 2010 of a task force which was 
chaired directly by the European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and 
composed of the finance ministers of what was at the time 27 member states. In 
many ways the task force was representative of the ECOFIN Council—although it 
had a more diverse membership which included, alongside the representatives of the 
member states, officials from the ECB, Eurogroup and of course the Commission 
(European Counicl 2010:13-14). The task force was charged with the objective of 
exploring the options for a ‘improved crisis resolution framework and better 
budgetary discipline’ (European Council 2010:2), and ultimately there was seen to be 
a lot of coming together between the recommendations advanced by the task force 
and the six-pack of legislative proposals put forward by the Commission as an 
immediate response to the looming crisis. Hence, while the Commission and the 
European Council initially embarked on apparently separate reform paths—and inter-
institutional rivalry may have been an issue here at times in view of the latter’s 
sudden ascendency—in the end there was a reasonable degree of convergence 
between the two actors, which is predictable given the overlapping forums for debate. 
  
With key representatives from the member states being relied upon to play a 
key management role during the immediate crisis period, it is no surprise that they 
were also keen to set the terms of the debate for a more ambitious reform of the EU 
fiscal and broader economic governance framework over the longer term. 
Accordingly, with a view to going beyond the immediate crisis resolution measures 
(as set out in the legislative six-pack, two-pact and intergovernmental fiscal compact), 
the President of the European Council was invited to develop at the June 2012 
European Council a ‘specific and time-bound road map for the achievement of a 
genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ (see European Council 2012), in 
coordination with key stakeholders from the adjoining institutions. The report entitled 
Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union proposes to move, over the next 
decade and beyond, towards a stronger EMU architecture based on an integrated 
framework for the financial sector, for budgetary matters and for economic policy. 
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Moreover, as would expected in view of our previous analysis, the report was also 
extensively deliberated on both within the European Council setting and further down 
the decision making hierarchy amongst ministers with the ECOFIN Council and 
Eurogroup sessions, as well as at Committee level.   
 
To conclude this section, the Union has adapted to the challenges presented 
by the financial and economic crisis through yet a further extension of 
intergovernmental modes of decision making within EMU. This is because, with 
Europe being faced by a possible existential threat, policy-makers have felt that 
national ministers—and often ultimately only Heads of State or Government at the 
highest level—have the capacity to advance a suitable reform agenda and take 
decisions in quick time concerning economic and budgetary matters under pressure 
from the markets. Of course, this is not to say that the adjoining institutions, including 
the Commission and the Parliament, have not been very much present within the 
ongoing reform debate over fiscal governance reform. Nevertheless, it does follow 
that policy makers working within these more intergovernmental settings may 
potentially have been able to exercise even more of an agenda setting role over the 
EU fiscal governance reform process than historically may have been the case. And 
it is in this context that the legitimising discourses being produced from within these 
settings during the ongoing fiscal governance reform debate need to be considered.     
 
 
Legitimising Discourse Activity 
 
Discourses of Crisis 
 
As already documented, amid a worsening of the sovereign debt situation 
within the Eurozone periphery, the European Council made the decision to set up in 
the Spring of 2010 a Task Force with the cooperation of the Commission with the 
aim of establishing by year’s end the ‘measures needed to reach the objective of an 
improved crisis resolution framework and better budgetary discipline’ (European 
Council 2010:3). The Task Force, which was chaired by the European Council 
President Herman Von Rompuy, was instructed to go about this task with the 
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intention ‘to exploit to the maximum all the possibilities that EU secondary legislation 
can offer within the existing legal framework of the European Union’ (ibid). Following 
six meetings of the task force the European Council President then presented the 
group’s final report at a European Council summit on the 28 and 29 October 2010 
entitled Strengthening Economic Governance in the EU. The table presented below 
provides a brief summary of the key patterns of discourse contained within the report. 
 
 
Table 6.1: Key Patterns of Discourse  
 
 Input orientated  
discourse 
Output orientated 
discourse 
As a Model of Fiscal 
Federalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Final 
Report 
of the 
Task 
Force 
 
Measures to improve 
democratic legitimacy and 
accountability of decision 
making on the input side not 
considered here. 
 
Therefore the potential to 
increase the role of the 
European Parliament or its 
national level counterparts 
within what would be a 
strengthened fiscal 
governance framework is not 
addressed—even in the 
context of the European 
Semester where there is 
scope for increased 
parliamentary oversight.  
 
Neoliberal interpretation of 
the crisis events dominates, 
with it being framed as 
resulting primarily from fiscal 
laxity as member states failed 
to comply with the Union’s 
budgetary surveillance rules 
(with no recognition of deeper 
structural flaws).  
 
 
Neoliberal reform agenda 
advanced which is concerned 
with securing fiscal discipline 
under the SGP framework 
through 
strengthened surveillance 
and reinforced compliance 
with the key budgetary rules. 
 
Ideas for an improved an  
emergency bailout 
mechanism are raised 
tentatively, yet more far 
reaching neo-Keynesian 
solidarity mechanisms (i.e. 
debt mutualisation and/or the 
development of a more 
substantial EU fiscal 
capacity) are not. 
  
 
 
Limited model of 
fiscal federalism: 
rules-based fiscal 
discipline with 
indirect channels of 
legitimisation. 
 
Point of minimum 
departure from the 
status quo. 
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One overarching meta-narrative dominates the final report of the task force. 
This narrative concerns the reform measures required within EMU in order to 
respond to the challenges presented by the financial and economic crisis. This is 
expanded upon as part of the text introduction:  
 
‘‘The financial crisis and the more recent turmoil in sovereign debt 
markets have clearly highlighted challenges in the European Union’s 
economic governance. To address these challenges, a fundamental 
shift in European economic governance is needed, commensurate to 
the degree of economic and financial integration already achieved 
through the monetary union and the internal market’’ (European 
Council 2010:1). 
 
Yet, while the report proceeds to set out the reforms identified as necessary to 
address the challenges presented by the crisis, it is reiterated several times within 
the text that the intention is to go about this task while ‘preserving national  
responsibilities on fiscal and economic policies’ . As such, even though the reform 
agenda is presented in the citation above as representing a ‘fundamental shift’ in 
European economic governance, any prospect of making a qualitative integration 
leap within EMU towards a deeper level of fiscal union is in fact been disregarded 
from the outset. 
 
Before moving on to address more specifically what is in fact a rather limited 
set of reform proposals as laid out by the task force, it is important to elaborate on 
how the crisis itself is constructed within the report—not least because the manner 
by which the crisis is constructed and framed through discourse could itself be 
crucial to formulating a better understanding as to the nature of the eventual policy 
responses that were arrived at. Most fundamentally, here, the crisis is framed within 
the text as stemming from a failure of fiscal discipline, with member states seen to be 
failing to comply with the Union’s budgetary surveillance rules as laid down under the 
SGP framework:  
 
‘‘The recent economic crisis has proved the need for enhancing the 
credibility and effectiveness of EU fiscal rules through stricter 
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enforcement mechanisms in order to increase incentives for applying 
EU rules and recommendations and to prevent undesirable fiscal 
developments in Member States’’ (European Council 2010:4). 
 
Thus, while the pre-existing SGP framework is said to have remained ‘broadly 
valid’, the key lesson resulting from the crisis is that ‘it needs to be applied in a better 
and more consistent way’ (European Council 2010:1).  More specifically, there is 
seen to be a need for a ‘greater focus on debt and fiscal sustainability, to reinforce 
compliance and to ensure that national fiscal frameworks reflect the EU's fiscal rules’ 
(ibid). As the report remarks though, ‘The global crisis has demonstrated that 
compliance with the SGP is not enough’ (European Council 2010:2). Therefore, it is 
observed that ‘action to address macroeconomic imbalances and divergences in 
competitiveness is required’ in the form of a new surveillance mechanism running 
parallel to the SGP (European Council 2010:8).  Yet, the framing of fiscal discipline 
as the key policy challenge revealed by the crisis is reflected in the observation that 
over just under half the report explicitly falls under a heading entitled ‘Towards 
Greater Fiscal Discipline’. Numerically, fiscal discipline is also portrayed as the 
number one priory to be tackled. And, while macroeconomic issues are mentioned, 
some of the more fundamental structural design flaws related to the lack of a deeper 
level of fiscal union within EMU since the outset (as discussed in chapter 2) are not 
identified as contributing factors here. 
 
 Such a reading of the crisis is clearly, following on from observations made 
during the formation of the critical literature review, synonymous with a neoliberal 
interpretation as to the causes of the crisis in the first instance. It is of little surprise, 
therefore, to see that the majority of the policy innovations recommended by the task 
force follow ideologically in the same direction, with the key reforms being guided by 
an output oriented neoliberal legitimising discourse type—one concerned with 
building on, rather than replacing, the rules-based SGP framework with a view to 
securing strengthened fiscal discipline within EMU. As hinted at above, then, at the 
heart of the report are a series of proposals designed to ‘strengthen budgetary 
surveillance and reinforce compliance with EU budgetary rules’, under the original 
SGP framework (European Council 2010:3). First, for example, the report 
recommends implementing a series of provisions to ensure that the ‘criterion of 
104 
 
public debt be better reflected in the budgetary surveillance mechanism’ (and made 
operational under the EDP (European Council 2010:4). Such changes are also quite 
significant when discussing the preventative arm of the pact for it would entail ‘a 
faster adjustment path towards the medium-term objectives  (MTO) should be 
required for Member States faced with a debt level exceeding 60% of GDP’—or for a 
member state with ‘pronounced risks in terms of overall debt sustainability’ (ibid). 
The second set of reforms recommended are concerned with ‘enhancing the 
credibility and effectiveness of EU fiscal rules through stricter enforcement 
mechanisms’ (under both the preventative and corrective arms) (ibid). These themes 
are expanded upon below:  
 
‘‘To increase their effectiveness in the future, a wider range of 
sanctions and measures, of both financial and reputational/political 
nature, should be applied progressively in both the preventive and 
the corrective arms of the SGP, starting at an earlier stage in the 
budgetary surveillance process’’ (European Council 2010:1). 
. 
Finally, on top of the measures suggested for stricter enforcement of the pact, 
are a series of recommendations proposed with a view to ‘enhancing national fiscal 
rules and frameworks’. Key here is a set of agreed minimum requirements’ to be 
incorporated into national frameworks to ensure improved compliance with the 
SGP’s budgetary rules (European Council 2010:7-8).  
 
However, while the mainstay of the recommendations advanced within the 
final report of the task force are guided by a neoliberal ideology and an overarching 
concern with the deliverance of rules-based fiscal discipline within EMU, it is worth 
noting that the requirement for ‘deeper and broader coordination under the European 
Semester’ cycle of policy coordination is also endorsed as a response to the crisis 
events (European Council 2010:10). Then again, the provisions set out for reinforced 
coordination under the newly configured European Semester is in fact strongly linked 
within the text to the attainment of ‘fiscal discipline’ and improved EU budgetary 
surveillance under the SGP framework (as well as to broader economic surveillance 
involving the targeting of macroeconomic imbalances within EMU). Key here is 
earlier ex ante budgetary coordination as provided for under the European Semester: 
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‘‘This cycle of reinforced ex-ante coordination will cover all elements 
of economic surveillance, including policies to ensure fiscal discipline, 
macroeconomic stability, and to foster growth, in line with the Europe 
2020 Strategy […..] Stability and Convergence Programmes and 
National Reform Programmes will be submitted by Member States at 
the same time in the spring and assessed simultaneously by the  
European Commission. This earlier discussion at EU level will 
contribute to ensure that the EU/euro area dimension is better taken 
into account when countries prepare budgets and reform 
programmes, and will therefore contribute to a higher degree of 
policy coordination among Member States’’ (European Council 
2010:10). 
 
Following this logic, the European Semester is understood as complimenting, 
or even adding to, the pre-existing coordination frameworks in place for securing 
fiscal discipline. It is also worth observing that beyond vague observations by the 
Task Force that more work needs to be done exploring the prospects of setting up a  
more robust ‘ex ante crisis scheme’ (i.e. an intergovernmental emergency bailout 
mechanism)—one ‘capable of addressing financial distress and avoiding  
contagion’—any prospect of taking more far reaching integration steps with a view to 
setting up neo-Keynesian solidarity mechanisms within EMU (i.e. debt mutualisation 
and/or the development of a more substantial EU fiscal capacity) does not figure 
here (European Council 2010:10-11). Hence, in an overarching sense, it can be said 
that the task force is advancing a model of fiscal federalism within its final report that 
would represent a minimum departure from the status quo. 
 
With neoliberal ideas concerning the deliverance of fiscal discipline on the 
output side dominating the recommendations of the task force, it is of little surprise 
that input oriented discourses remain conspicuously absent throughout the text. In 
fact, while a series of recommendations are made with a view to strengthening 
European budgetary surveillance, at no point are accompanying measures to 
improve democratic legitimacy and accountability of decision making on the input 
side considered. As such, the potential to increase the role of the European 
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Parliament or its national level counterparts within what would be a strengthened 
fiscal governance framework are not addressed.  Even in the context of the 
European Semester, for example, where opportunities abound for both the European 
Parliament and the national parliaments to play a far more active role over EU fiscal 
policy (see Interview Extract A 2013:2 with senior level official from DG ECFIN for 
confirmation of this fact), the report only affirms the need for governments to 
increase ‘national ownership’ by ensuring the inclusion of recommendations by the 
Council and the Commission when submitting draft budgetary plans to parliament 
(i.e. before parliamentary approval) (European Council 2010:10). Clearly, while this 
may provide for increased European input over national budgets, how to ensure 
adequate levels of democratic input legitimacy within the European Semester cycle 
of fiscal and broader economic policy coordination—perhaps through the setting up 
of increased mechanisms for democratic participation and representation involving 
parliamentary oversight from both the national and European level—is a topic not 
even engaged with during the final report of the task force. Instead input legitimacy 
appears to have been left to be incurred indirectly, via national ministers and Heads 
of State or Government within the Council and European Council, with the priority in 
the wake of the crisis being strengthening the Union’s pre-existing arrangements for 
fiscal discipline.  
 
The discourse findings of the final report of the task force can be reinforced 
through a reading of more informal discourse sourced from EU level officials working 
within the European Council setting and by those located further down the decision 
making hierarchy at ministerial and committee level. First, when commenting on the 
reform priorities advanced in the immediate wake of the crisis, a member of the 
secretariat located within DG ECFIN is absolutely clear which actors were most 
influential in guiding the initial neoliberal policy response:  
 
‘‘Germany, alongside several other core countries, were influential in 
pushing for strengthened fiscal discipline as a prior to any movement 
towards enhanced solidarity measures, yes. However, I think there 
was a big consensus that a number of things went wrong; the 
Commission identified these. Then there was a big discussion on the 
details themselves: on the balance of power between the Council 
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and the Commission, how intrusive they should be, and what the 
different steps should be’’ (Interview Extract E 2013:4).  
 
Separately, when questioned if it was Germany that was keen to push a fiscal 
discipline agenda from early on in the crisis, a senior member of the cabinet for the 
European Council President answers along similar lines, albeit with some important 
caveats concerning the role of the ECB: ‘Yes on the whole you are right, but the ECB 
also played a big role over this. And the Nordic countries were influential here too. 
They are all more in favour of rules-based fiscal discipline—certainly for as long as it 
does not affect any of them’ (Interview Extract Q 2013:2). When speculating on the 
observed leading role played by Germany over the reform agenda for EU fiscal 
governance reform, another senior official located within the Council Directorate for 
Economic policy comments on the inevitably of Germany’s leading role: ‘But of 
course Germany takes a leading role here in view of its economic size. So Germany 
automatically was seen to take on a leading role, whether it wanted it or not’. 
(Interview Extract G 2013:6). It follows, then, that it is Germany that is seen to be at 
the forefront of efforts to push a neoliberal reform agenda for EU fiscal governance 
revolving around a strengthening of the SGP instrument. 
 
Moving on, in accounting for the lack of discussion by the task force 
concerning the possibility of taking heightened integration steps towards a 
qualitatively deeper level of fiscal union (i.e. one endowed with neo-Keynesian 
solidarity mechanisms), the broader constraining discourses abounding amongst the 
member states are also of some significance. As one official working within the 
European Council Directorate for Economic Affairs observes when discussing the 
prospects for pooling of budgetary resources and/or joint issuance of debt: 
 
‘‘Yes. It would be the next stage of fiscal integration. But it effectively 
means the transfer of sovereignty, at least up to some extent. That is 
the biggest obstacle: that is what it is all about. In the end it comes 
down to sovereignty and money […..] The whole debate is carried 
out along the lines of states foreseeing the amount of money that 
they might end up paying’’ (Interview Extract G 2013:4). 
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Clearly, the official in question is of the view that ‘sovereignty’ concerns will be 
key here, and this central point is also picked up on forcefully by two senior members 
of the Cabinet for the European Council President (Interview Extract O 2014:2-3, Q 
2014:3). 
 
 In expanding further on the nature of the disagreements that have arisen over 
the issue of pooling fiscal or budgetary sovereignty, the significance of the Franco-
German relationship (as well as the broader relationship between core and periphery 
states) is framed as key by several of our interviewees (see Interview Extract F 
2013:2, G 2013:3, O 2014:3). A senior spokesman for the European Council 
President expands on the nuances of this disagreement:  
 
‘‘I mean the Germans want to have more commitment on the French 
side to fiscal discipline. This is because it very easy to say for France 
lets mutualise our debt, but the Germans are saying but guys you 
haven’t had a budget in equilibrium for 40 years. So obviously the 
French are keen to pool debt, yes. It’s a bit like living in an apartment 
block where you have all different house owners of the individual 
apartments and everyone takes care of their own space. But maybe 
to mend the roof they will agree to work together and pool 
resources—that can be done. Yet such a pooling cannot be done for 
the individual mortgages as it were’’ (Interview Extract O 2014:3). 
 
From a reading of the above, the nuances of this debate can be 
conceptualised as follows then: France (along with the periphery states) calls for 
more solidarity but is unable to stomach the other side of the German (and core 
states) bargain, i.e. heightened rules on fiscal discipline. This is a significant 
observation because it renders any qualitative integration leap in the fiscal realm 
particularly challenging. In fact, when discussing the probability of moving towards a 
qualitatively deeper level of fiscal union (i.e. a model in which neo- keynesian 
solidarity measures play an enhanced role), the official remarks tersely: ‘I think it not 
very probable because of state sovereignty concerns’ (ibid). Also, as hinted at above, 
the issue of moral hazard also features prominently alongside the debate which 
revolves around the pooling of budgetary sovereignty at the EU level. For example, 
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when asked if sovereignty concerns are the main hurdle preventing further fiscal 
integration, a senior member of the cabinet for the European Council President gives 
the following reply: 
 
‘‘Yes, but also concerns of moral hazard amongst the core countries. 
The core countries want to be able to influence things. That is, if they 
are liable for someone else’s debt then you want to be able to 
influence their debt situation. And, for as long as that is the case, I 
don’t see any major moves towards a deeper level of fiscal union 
taking place’’ (Interview Extract Q 2014:3).  
 
In sum, it has been identified how a series of constraining discourses amongst 
member states (though particularly amongst Germany and France as the most 
powerful member states) concerning primarily sovereignty concerns, but also the 
issue of moral hazard, have configured to limit any discussion by the task force to 
the neoliberal measures required to strengthen fiscal discipline on the output side. 
And, as witnessed, German preferences have been absolutely key here in guiding 
the neoliberal agenda of the task force. 
 
Of course, the task force report has also been seen to eschew any 
substantive deliberations concerning the possibilities of taking steps towards a 
flanking political union aspect—with a view to reinforcing legitimacy on the input side. 
And again, in this context sovereignty concerns are raised as a major constraining 
issue by the interviewees. For example, when discussing the merits of the term 
political union, a senior level official working within the European Council Directorate 
for Economic Affairs comments: 
 
‘‘Well, the term is being used often but no one has pinned down 
exactly what it means. [….] People have different interests and 
different concepts of what a political union would be and as to what 
sovereign powers should be transferred. But this is not even 
discussed at sufficient length—so we are not even discussing this. 
But transferring more powers to the European Parliament would 
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seem to be an element of political union’’ (Interview Extract G 
2013:5). 
 
Clearly, with sovereignty concerns posing a major hurdle to jump over on the 
path towards any kind of political union, the prospect of accompanying any fiscal 
integration process with sufficient steps to ensure legitimacy on the input side has 
been side-lined for the foreseeable future.  In fact, even in reference to the possibility 
of transferring of powers over the longer term to the European Parliament, the official 
remains adamant that ‘it is going to be very hard to make that step’ because 
fundamentally ‘it would imply that the national parliaments lose out while the 
European Parliament would gain’ (Interview Extract G 2013:6). 
 
Similar observations are made by a member of the Commission provided 
secretariat who works alongside national officials within the informal Eurogroup 
setting. For example, with particular reference to the possibility of setting up a 
democratically elected ‘European Chamber’, the official remarks that ‘no one was 
really interested even though there has been a trend to give more power to the 
European Parliament’ (Interview Extract F 2013:5). Equally, when discussing the 
need to balance any reforms with ‘democratic legitimacy’, a separate member of the 
secretariat who works alongside member state representatives at committee level is 
equally pessimistic in arguing that ‘it is a development that will not go extremely 
quickly because it is something that did not exist so much before the crisis’ (Interview 
Extract E 2013:5). Again, therefore, sovereignty concerns amongst member states, 
as well as different conceptions of what political union might entail, go some way to 
accounting for the task force’s decision to skip over challenging questions 
concerning the reforms that might be required to inject increased input legitimacy 
into the EU’s fiscal governance arrangements. 
 
The dominant neoliberal orders of discourse uncovered within the final report 
of the task force can be intertextually located within a series of earlier texts produced 
within the Council and European Council settings. However, in the modern period 
these narratives are supplemented with discourses of crisis which link strengthened 
rules-based fiscal discipline with a overcoming of the challenges presented by the 
financial and economic crisis. To begin with, for example, as part of one of the initial 
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two 1997 ECOFIN Council resolutions from which the integrated SGP budgetary 
rules was founded upon, fiscal discipline (or so called ‘sound government finances’) 
was, in accordance with a neoliberal logic, portrayed as a vital condition for securing 
‘price stability’ and ‘strong sustainable growth’ on the output side—objectives which 
were in turn linked with increased ‘employment creation’ (Council 1997a:6). And 
again, a similar link between fiscal discipline and a series of broader macroeconomic 
outputs was made within the text of the ‘Resolution of the Amsterdam European 
Council on the Stability and Growth Pact’ that same year, which was approved in 
order to establish the political basis for the founding of the SGP within EMU 
(European Council 1997:1-2). 
 
Moving forward, while the 2005 European Council endorsed reform agenda 
for the SGP increased the flexibility of the rules and procedures (see Council 2005 
and 2005a for a full overview of the provisions contained within the two ‘amending 
regulations’), the Heads of State or Government did reaffirm here their commitment 
to the overarching ‘rules-based system’ as the ‘best guarantee for commitments to 
be enforced and for all Member States to be treated equally’ (European Council 
2005:22). It is also significant that within the European Council produced text the 
securing of fiscal discipline under the SGP was linked with a series of familiar 
macroeconomic policy outputs, including the overarching goal of ‘macroeconomic 
stability’, which was presented in a hierarchal fashion as being ‘essential’ 
contributors to ‘economic growth and job creation’ (ibid) From a intertextual analysis 
of the connectivity between the final report of the task force and a series of earlier 
texts, it can be concluded then that analogous neoliberal orders of discourse have 
remained fairly constant within the European Council setting—notwithstanding calls 
for increased flexibility led by a chiefly Franco-German core throughout the 2003-05 
period. However, while in earlier periods rules-based fiscal discipline was typically 
linked with the securing of price stability, economic growth, and employment creation 
on the output side, in the immediate crisis period these narratives have been 
supplemented by discourses of crisis.  
 
To conclude, through an analysis of the final report of the task force—in 
conjunction with more informal discourse from senior EU level officials—it has been 
shown how during the immediate crisis period a neoliberal reform agenda was 
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pushed hard by the ‘core’ member states and particularly Germany. Also key were 
the series of constraining discourses abounding amongst member states, concerning 
sovereignty concerns and issues of moral hazard, which ensured that the reform 
debate shied away from any talk of realising a qualitative integration leap within EMU 
towards a deeper level of fiscal union (i.e. one in which neo-Keynesian solidarity 
mechanisms play an enhanced role) with a flanking political union aspect. Instead, 
the reform discourse being articulated within these settings remained entrenched 
during this period around a neoliberal ideology and a model of fiscal federalism 
which represents the point of minimum departure from the status quo: a model 
centred on the securing of rules-based fiscal discipline on the output side, with input 
legitimacy being left to be incurred largely indirectly via national ministers and Heads 
of State or Government. 
 
 
Post-Crisis Discourse 
 
 
The Task Force was influential in informing the key pieces of Community 
legislation advanced in the immediate aftermath of the financial and economic 
crises—including the so called six-pact legislation, which was then built on and 
complimented by the legislative two-pack. But, as already noted, with a view to going 
beyond the legislation introduced during the immediate crisis period, the President of 
the European Council was invited to develop, at the June 2012 European Council, a 
‘specific and time-bound road map for the achievement of a genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union’ (European Council 2012a:2). This set of developments resulted in 
the drawing up of a potentially far reaching report released in December 2012 
entitled Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which proposes a 
series of integration steps to be taken over the short, medium to long term. The 
actions laid out over the different stages are said to be ‘required to ensure the 
stability and integrity of the EMU’, and the report ‘calls for a political commitment to 
implement the proposed roadmap’ (European Council 2012a:2). The table presented 
below provides a brief summary of the key discourse patterns contained within the 
report. 
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Table 6.2: Key Patterns of Discourse  
 
 Input orientated 
discourse  
Output orientated 
discourse 
As a Model of 
Fiscal Federalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Towards 
a genuine 
Economic 
and 
Monetary 
Union 
 
Both the European 
Parliament and national 
parliaments understood as 
having some kind of role to 
play in developing the 
democratic and 
accountability of decision 
making on the input side. 
 
The precise balance to be 
struck between the two 
levels, and the nature of the 
democratic mechanisms 
that would need to be set 
up, is left ambiguous. 
 
Challenging questions 
concerning the 
development of a flanking 
political union aspect have 
been side-lined for now.   
 
Prioritisation of a neoliberal 
reform agenda over the short 
term involving the full 
implementation of the six-
pack, two-pack and fiscal 
compact initiatives building 
upon the SGP framework for 
fiscal-discipline.  
 
Over the longer term the 
prospect of setting up 
contractual arrangements 
and a strictly ‘limited’ 
European fiscal capacity 
capable of absorbing 
country-specific economic 
shocks is put forward.  
 
There is a notable absence 
of any further policy 
recommendations exploring 
even the possibility of 
implementing limited debt 
mutualisation mechanisms 
within EMU (e.g. a debt 
redemption fund or t-bills) 
with a view to rectifying 
EMU’s more deeply rooted 
structural deficiencies.  
 
Model of fiscal 
federalism of only 
limited ambition:  
 
Continued 
centrality of rules-
based fiscal 
discipline, with only 
‘limited’ solidarity 
measures.  
 
Decisions on 
concrete 
integration steps 
towards a flanking 
political union 
aspect left for the 
future.    
 
 
In terms of the recommendations themselves, the short term priority 
measures have been, as one would expect given our previous discourse findings 
from the immediate crisis period, strongly linked to a familiar neoliberal output 
orientated legitimising discourse type. Key here is building upon the SGP framework 
for fiscal discipline, this time through the ‘completion and thorough implementation of 
a stronger framework for fiscal governance’ as laid out in the ‘six-pack’ ‘two-pack’ 
and ‘Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance’ (i.e. the intergovernmental 
fiscal compact) (European Council 2012a:4). As made clear within the report, it is 
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hoped that the ‘new governance  framework will provide for ample ex ante 
coordination of annual budgets of euro area Member States’ while at the same time 
serving to ‘enhance the surveillance of those experiencing financial difficulties’ 
(European council 2012a:8). The priority here is to make the SGP more effective on 
the output side through improved ex ante coordination of member states annual 
budgets and enhanced surveillance for those states experiencing excessive deficits 
(European Council 2012a:8). As you would expect, the ‘sound management of public 
finances’ (a term synonymous with fiscal discipline) is the key policy objective at this 
point—the failure of which is presented as ‘one of the root causes of the sovereign 
debt crises’, in accordance with a neoliberal logic (European Council 2012a:4). 
 
As a balance to these short-term neoliberal measures designed to secure 
strengthened fiscal discipline within EMU, it is envisioned that structural reforms 
could be supported though ‘limited’ targeted economic incentives of a contractual 
nature. Such measures, it is foreseen, could then act as a prelude to the third and 
final stage of the integration process: ‘establishing a well-defined and limited fiscal 
capacity, through an insurance system set up at the central level’ (European Council 
2012a:5). It is acknowledged within the report that ‘the exact conditions and 
thresholds for the activation of transfers would need to be studied carefully’ 
(European council 2012:11). However, while the precise form that any fiscal capacity 
would take is left ambiguous, a common European budgetary framework is framed 
here as having the potential to ‘improve the absorption of country-specific economic 
shocks’ within EMU on the output side (European Council 2012a:5).  
 
So, therefore, with reference to the reform agenda set out by the report for the 
medium to longer term time period, there can be said to be a slight variation in the 
discourse structure away from neoliberalism towards more of an emphasis on neo-
Keynesian solidarity measures. However, the extent to which the report text deviates 
from the historically embedded economic ideas of neoliberalism should not be 
overstated. Firstly, as hinted at above, while the precise form of any fiscal capacity is 
left unambiguous, it is emphasised several times within the report that such a 
solidarity framework would be of a strictly ‘limited’ nature. Furthermore, it is also 
clarified within the report that any European fiscal capacity would be made strictly 
conditional on compliance with the rules enshrined under the SGP framework for 
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fiscal discipline and on the implementation of the reforms set out in the contractual 
arrangements (European Council 2012:12). And certainly, the absence of any policy 
recommendations exploring the possibility of implementing even limited debt 
mutualisation mechanisms within EMU (e.g. a debt redemption fund or t-bills) is also 
telling. In general, the report can therefore be said to have barely addressed some of 
the more fundamental structural design flaws related to the lack of a deeper level of 
fiscal union within EMU (as identified in chapter 2) with the model of fiscal federalism 
being advanced here being one of only limited ambition. 
 
Finally, it can be observed that legitimising discourses emphasising the input 
dimension of legitimacy, and the democratic legitimacy and accountability of decision 
making within EU fiscal governance, are not totally absent from the report. For 
example, although the least well developed section of the report by far, ‘democratic 
legitimacy and accountability’ mechanisms are said to be ‘essential’ when moving 
towards a genuine EMU (European Council 2012a:3). While left vague, the guiding 
principal here is that ‘democratic control and accountability should occur at the level 
at which the decisions are taken’ (European Council 2012a:16). However, because it 
is recognised that ‘decisions on national budgets are at the heart of Member States 
parliamentary democracies’, the report makes a case for the ‘involvement of the 
European Parliament as regards accountability for decisions taken at the European 
level’ ‘while maintaining the pivotal role of national parliaments, as appropriate’ 
(European Council 2012a:16).  
 
Following this logic, within the report both European and national parliaments 
are understood as crucial to the development of the democratic and the 
accountability of decision making on the input side; yet crucially, the precise balance 
to be struck between the two levels, and the nature of the democratic mechanisms 
that would need to be set up to ensure that such principles are realised in practice, is 
left ambiguous. For example, in the context of the European Semester, the report 
has this to say regarding the setting up of democratic legitimacy and accountability 
mechanisms:  
 
‘‘New mechanisms to increase the level of cooperation between 
national and European parliaments, for example building on Article 
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13 of the TSCG and Protocol 1 of the Treaty, could contribute to 
enhancing democratic legitimacy and accountability. Their precise 
organisation and modalities are a responsibility of the European 
Parliament and national parliaments to determine jointly’’ (European 
Council 2012a:16).   
 
So clearly, while the potential to further increase the role of both the European 
and national level parliaments within the European Semester cycle of policy 
coordination is recognised, how such mechanisms would be developed in practice is 
not addressed. Likewise, while the report also recommends that ‘the creation of a 
new fiscal capacity for the EMU should also lead to adequate arrangements ensuring 
its full democratic legitimacy and accountability’, it is at the same time made clear 
that ‘the details of such arrangements would largely depend on its specific features, 
including its funding sources, its decision making processes and the scope of its 
activities’. In short, it would appear that challenging questions concerning the 
development of a flanking political union aspect have been side-lined in favour of 
more generalised observations concerning the more active participation of the 
European and national level parliaments over decision making in the fiscal 
governance sphere.  
 
The dominant discourse patterns uncovered within the President of the 
European Councils towards a genuine EMU report can be reinforced through a 
reading of more informal discourse sourced from EU level officials working within the 
European Council setting and by those located further down the decision making 
hierarchy at ministerial and committee level. First though, it is apparent that the 
informal discourse cited during the previous section covering the more immediate 
crisis period is again directly relevant here. For example, it has already been 
demonstrated how the core Eurozone countries, led by Germany, were at the 
forefront of efforts to push a neoliberal reform agenda for EU fiscal governance as an 
immediate response to the challenges presented by the crisis (see Interview Extract 
E 2013,G 2013, Q 2014.) And, once again, these discourse findings have been born 
out within the subsequent towards a genuine EMU report which again demands, as 
an immediate priority, the full implementation of the provisions building on the SGP 
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framework for fiscal discipline as provided for within the six-pact, two-pact and 
intergovernmental fiscal compact. 
 
 It was also demonstrated through informal discourse how the existence of a 
series of constraining discourses within the European Council setting concerning 
sovereignty concerns particularly, but also issues of moral hazard, served to ensure 
that the reform debate largely shied away from any talk of realising a qualitative 
integration leap within EMU towards a deeper level of fiscal union with a flanking 
political union aspect  (see Interview Extract F 2013, G 2013, O 2014:2-3, Q 2014). 
And,  of course, the significance of the Franco-German relationship was found to be 
of significant consequence here with France (along with the periphery states) being 
active in calling for more solidarity but being unable to stomach the other side of the 
German (and core states) bargain, i.e. heightened rules on fiscal discipline. These 
observations are of some significance because similar constraining discourses 
appear to have again been a factor during the drafting of thetowards a genuine EMU 
report, with only a very limited model of fiscal federalism being advanced at the text 
level. These conclusions can also be further reinforced by drawing again on the 
informal discourse sourced from EU officials located within the relevant institutional 
fora. To begin with, for example, when asked if state sovereignty concerns will stand 
in the way of progress towards a deeper level of fiscal integration within EMU, a 
senior spokesman for the European Council President answers candidly: 
 
‘‘Yes because a fully—fledged fiscal union with tax powers going to 
the European Union level would be completely turning upside down 
the way the Union is currently running. It would be the end of 
national democracies, and I think that will not happen.  It is one thing 
to say that in three or four years’ time we will have a one percent of 
GDP Eurozone budget—I mean that I think is not excluded. But to 
have a full federal budget or debt mutilation then the answer is no. In 
these current political circumstances such integration would require 
far more trust amongst member states than there currently is—
particularly trust in each other’s economic policies and trust in the 
sustainability of each other’s economic trajectories. And I do not see 
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that today between the Germans and the French’’ (Interview Extract 
O 2014:2-3).  
 
Clearly, a shifting of budgetary sovereignty to the Union level is perceived by 
the official as a step too far for most member states because of the implications for 
national democracy where, after all, taxation and spending powers have been 
historically deeply rooted in European states. Also, issues surrounding moral hazard 
are also hinted at indirectly again with ‘trust’ in each other’s commitment to pursue 
sustainable fiscal and economic policies identified as lacking. A member of the 
permanent representation of Finland to the ECOFIN Council also observes that ‘one 
underlying problem might be a level of mistrust amongst some of the countries’. But 
interestingly, the official adds: ‘This is under the surface; it is not admitted publicly’ 
(Interview Extract N 2014:4).  
 
It is also telling that the senior spokesman for the European Council President 
chooses to comment on the nature of the relationship between Germany and France 
in particularly, as the twin drivers of EU integration historically. Of course, the basic 
nuances of, what is at times, a fractious relationship between the two countries has 
already been expanded upon in the previous section with France (along with the 
periphery states) being seen to be active in calling for more in the way of fiscal 
solidarity but being unable to accept German (and core states) prior demands for 
heighted rules on fiscal discipline—due to the French harbouring deeply rooted 
reservations concerning any ceding of budgetary sovereignty. The significance of 
this conflict of interest between the two major EU powers in relation to the fiscal 
governance reform debate in Europe can be further expanded upon, however. For 
example, a member of the permanent representation of France to the ECOFIN 
Council draws attention to the extent to which budgetary sovereignty is a concept 
deeply ingrained at the national level in France.  
 
‘‘In France there is kind of a contradiction. We are supposed to be 
far more European than the UK. We are supposed to love European 
economic integration. But at the same time a large part of politicians 
and public opinion want economic decisions to stay at the national 
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level. This contradiction has not been solved yet’’ (Interview Extract 
P 2014:3).   
 
From the French perspective, therefore, the issue of budgetary sovereignty 
represents a major obstacle to furthering integration in the fiscal realm.  Also, when 
discussing the issue of budgetary sovereignty, a member of the permanent 
representation of Finland to the ECOFIN Council remarks that not only is it ‘important 
to our parliament’, but ‘in France, in Sweden in many countries it is a very important 
issue (Interview Extract N 2014:3). And certainly, the overall significance of these 
observations concerning the French, and numerous other EU member states, 
reservations over the issue of budgetary sovereignty is heightened by the fact that 
Germany demands, prior to any moves towards the setting up of solidarity 
mechanisms within EMU, assurances over member states commitment to the 
objective of fiscal discipline.  
 
In fact, the significance of the German (and other core states) positioning 
within the context of this debate is articulately expanded upon by a member of the 
permanent representation of France to the ECOFIN Council: 
 
‘‘Well the first step for Germany and many member states in the core 
is to have sound public finances; that is a key element. And after it 
may be possible to have a limited public mutualisation of debt.  Of 
course, it is very difficult to marry someone without knowing what 
they are doing. And here, from a German point of view, debt 
mutualisation is basically a way of saying that we will be engaged for 
paying for people whose expenditure and real economic situation we 
do not know’’ (Interview Extract  P 2014:2-3).  
 
In sum, it can be said that a series of constraining discourses concerning 
issues of sovereignty and moral hazard amongst the core and periphery member 
states, led by Germany and France as two of the most powerful EU member states, 
are severely limiting any debate concerning a qualitative integration leap towards a 
deeper level of fiscal union in which more far reaching neo-Keynesian solidarity 
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mechanisms play a role. Of course, this in turn helps ensure that the reform agenda 
remains very strongly tied to a neoliberal discourse in which the focus remains on 
securing strengthened rules-based fiscal discipline under the SGP instrument 
 
Similar constraining discourses also feature when discussing the input 
dimension and the possible steps that might need to be taken towards the 
development of some sort of political union aspect to accompany integration on the 
fiscal side. For example, a senior spokesman for the European Council President 
does not shie away from the significant challenges currently standing in the way of 
more meaningful integration on this front: 
 
‘‘On the democratic legitimacy side it is still a case of improvisation 
and there is not much movement. There is a bit of reluctance to deal 
with the problem because people know that you will not get 
agreement on anything politically and sovereignty concerns are an 
ever present issue. And I think amongst political leaders there is not 
magic wand to treat this kind of issue (Interview Extract O 2014:4)’’ 
 
Again, then, discussion over the development of any political union aspect, 
which could well involve the explicit transfer of key budgetary powers to the 
supranational level, is being clouded by the sovereignty and broader political 
concerns harboured by member states. In asking where this leaves the state of EU 
integration in the political realm, the same official points towards the EU’s unique 
capacity to ‘muddle through’, in what is a surprisingly optimistic tone. In the officials’ 
own words: 
 
‘‘[I] am looking at it more from a historic perspective and see that the 
EU is built to overcome some of these tensions and differences and 
to create a space where they can exist alongside each other—and 
this is where we have ended up. You can call this muddling through, 
but that is how Europe works. And, if it is muddling through, then I 
would say that it is each time muddling through at a higher level—
the fiscal and economic solidarity improvements are a good example 
of this. We are not going to abolish the existence of national 
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parliaments or even countries because we have a common currency. 
Nor are we going back the other way. My main thesis is, then, that 
we do not have a fateful choice between a breakup and a 
federation—no. Maybe in a way we are stuck but we are getting 
away from it’’ (Interview Extract O 2014:3-4). 
 
If this official’s analysis is accepted then the potential for integration on the 
political union front could well be limited to incremental change rather than any major 
integration leaps. This is because, fundamentally, political differences are 
understood as rendering any substantive debate on the topic of political union, and 
the particular steps that need to be taken towards such ends, highly challenging in 
an area where sovereignty remains deeply rooted at the national level. 
 
The dominant neoliberal reform discourses which have been seen to be 
prioritised within the towards a genuine EMU report can be intertextually located 
within a series of earlier texts produced within the Council and European Council 
settings. It should be recalled that it has already been established in the section 
covering the more immediate crisis period that overlapping neoliberal discourses 
have long been utilised in the European Council (1997, 2005, 2010) and Council 
(1997, 2005, 2005a) institutional settings for the purpose of legitimising the 
implementation and reform of the SGP as an essential framework for securing fiscal 
discipline within EMU. Yet, of course, while historically rules-based fiscal discipline 
was linked within the documents cited above with the securing of ‘price stability’, 
‘economic growth’, and ‘employment creation’ on the output side, such  narratives in 
the present day make more of a connection between strengthened fiscal discipline 
within EMU and an overcoming of the challenges presented by the financial and 
economic crisis. And, in terms of the more explicit intertextual process embedded 
within the towards a genuine EMU report, it is notable that the six-pack, two-pack 
and fiscal compact (or ‘Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in 
Economic and Monetary Union’) legislative procedures are also overtly cited within 
the text. As has already been established previously, all three of these initiatives 
citied introduce measures that are consistent with a neoliberal reading as to the 
causes of the crisis in the first instance and as to the adequate policy response 
demanded. In particular, central to the six-pack and two-pack legislation is building 
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on the preventative and corrective arms of the SGP framework for fiscal discipline. 
And, while the fiscal compact is slightly more nuanced in this respect, at the heart of 
the of the intergovernmental Treaty is the requirement for signatories to implement 
‘balanced budget rules’ at the national level, mirroring those already contained within 
the European level SGP framework.  
 
To conclude, the analysis of the towards a genuine EMU report—in 
conjunction with a reading of more informal discourse from senior EU level officials—
has revealed how the reform agenda moving forward from the crisis continues to be 
guided by neoliberalism and the overriding prioritisation of measures designed to 
strengthen fiscal discipline under the pre-existing SGP instrument. Nevertheless, 
over the longer term these neoliberal discourses for reform have been tempered to a 
degree by those emphasising the setting up of solidarity measures (i.e. a so called 
European ‘fiscal capacity’)—although, as demonstrated, this mechanism was always 
designed to be ‘limited’ in ambition and at no point were more far reaching measures 
concerning debt mutualisation or financial risk sharing considered. Fundamentally, it 
has been found here that a series of constraining discourses amongst member 
states concerning both sovereignty concerns and issues of moral hazard have 
largely served to limit the debate over the integration steps to be taken towards a 
deeper level of fiscal union, with the fractious relationship between France and 
Germany being found to be particularly potent here. And similar concerns over 
sovereignty have also seen to be a limiting factor in the debate over the possible 
measures that might be required moving forward to inject the EU’s fiscal governance 
framework with increased democratic legitimacy and accountability.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The more intergovernmental institutions have enjoyed a relatively pronounced 
role within EMU decision making historically— although this role has in fact become 
even more pronounced as the EU responded to a financial and economic crisis. 
Perhaps most striking here is the European council which, bolstered by the 
institutional reforms set out in the Lisbon Treaty, has become the natural default 
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manager of the EU in times of crisis. As to the question of whether this intensification 
of intergovernmentalism will be a permanent feature of EU governance, the answer 
is as yet unclear—although it seems likely that the EU’s institutional landscape has 
been changed forever by the crisis events that befell the Union. In alluding to the 
nature of the legitimising discourses being produced from within the 
intergovernmental settings, it is notable that a consistent reform narrative has been 
advanced during both the immediate and post crisis periods. This discourse type has 
been an output oriented neoliberal one, and its primary concern has been with 
securing strengthened fiscal discipline within EMU through building on the pre-
existing SGP framework. Such a policy response has resulted, in part, from a 
neoliberal interpretation of the crisis events in the first instance, with the crisis being 
framed as resulting primarily from fiscal laxity as member states failed to comply with 
the Union’s budgetary surveillance rules. In this context, it is also Germany above all, 
alongside the other core states, that has been seen to be in the driving seat pushing 
the advancement of this neoliberal reform agenda as response to the crisis events 
unfolding in Europe. 
 
  In terms of the reform agenda set out over the longer term, it is notable that 
these neoliberal reform discourses have been tempered, albeit to a marginal degree, 
by those emphasising more the setting up of solidarity measures. However, the 
measures being considered over the longer term are still strictly ‘limited’ in nature, 
with more far reaching neo-Keynesian solidarity mechanisms involving debt 
mutualisation or financial risk sharing not even being aired for consideration. This is 
because it has been found that the manifestation of a series of constraining 
discourses amongst key member states (with particular regard to Germany and 
France), concerning both sovereignty concerns and issues of moral hazard, have 
largely served to guide the reform debate away from any mention of realising a 
qualitative integration leap within EMU towards a deeper level of fiscal union (one 
endowed with neo-Keynesian solidarity mechanisms) with a flanking political union 
aspect. Also, similar constraining discourses concerning sovereignty issues in 
particular have also limited the discussion over the development of the political union 
aspect. In fact, challenging questions concerning the role and balance between the 
European and national level parliaments have largely been left to be answered at 
some point in the future.   
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Overall, the reform agenda being advanced for EU fiscal governance from 
within the more intergovernmental settings has remained strongly tied to a limiting 
neoliberal legitimising discourse which dictates the centrality of measures required to 
secure strengthened fiscal discipline within EMU on the output side. And, of course, 
within this discourse context input legitimacy has been left here to be incurred largely 
indirectly via national ministers and Heads of State or Government. As a model of 
fiscal federalism, then, such a model, if adopted, would represent the point of 
minimum departure from the status quo within EMU. And, in view of the 
intergovernmental institutions pivotal role over the governance of EMU, the 
entrenchment of such a limiting discourse may well ensure that the fiscal governance 
reform process comes to be defined by at best incremental change. 
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Chapter Seven: Commission Institutional Setting 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
As already outlined as part of earlier chapters, the intergovernmental logic of 
economic and fiscal governance within EMU long pre-dates the economic and 
financial crisis—although it is the case that more intergovernmental forms of decision 
making have been further extenuated in recent times in response to these crisis 
events. Despite this, the Commission, bolstered by its role as initiator of legislation 
and as executive authority, has worked hard to ensure that it has been in a position 
to provide substantial contributions to the reform debate for EU fiscal governance as 
it has developed. The dominant reform discourse articulated from within the 
Commission setting during the immediate crisis period was a neoliberal one, and it 
was centred on a commitment to securing strengthened fiscal discipline within EMU 
through building on the pre-existing SGP framework. Such neoliberal policy 
prescriptions have been seen to result, in part, from a neoliberal framing of the crisis 
in the first place, with member states failure to observe adequate levels of fiscal 
discipline in line with European rules being framed as being a key causal factor 
leading up to the crisis events that took place. Over the longer term time period, 
however, this reform discourse has shifted noticeably towards more of an emphasis 
on endowing EMU with far reaching neo-Keynesian solidarity mechanisms, which 
includes provisions for a an increased European fiscal capacity alongside substantial 
steps towards the mutualisation of euro area member states debt. It is significant 
though that a reading of more informal discourse from DG ECFIN officials has in fact 
revealed a high degree of scepticism concerning the actual desirability and political 
feasibility of making such a qualitative integration towards a deeper level of fiscal 
union.  
 
Following this logic, then, it would seem most likely that the reform agenda for 
EU fiscal governance being developed from within the Commission institutional 
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setting will continue to remain strongly tied to a well-established neoliberal discourse. 
And, of course, with the reform priority likely to remain centred on the  securing of 
fiscal discipline on the output side, it is no surprise to see that challenging questions 
as to how the political union aspect and the democratic legitimacy and accountability 
of decision making on the input side might be ensured have up until now been side-
lined. As a model of fiscal federalism, such a reform agenda, if implemented, would 
not represent a significant departure from the current status quo, with rules-based 
fiscal discipline and at best indirect channels of democratic legitimation and 
accountability remaining key features.  
 
 
Contextual Overview 
 
 
The Commission is the EU’s executive arm and it is responsible for 
implementing EU law as defined within the treaties. As well as being guardian of the 
treaties, the body is also responsible for advancing the collective interest of the EU, 
with the Commission enjoying powers of legislative initiative within EU law making 
process. Owing to the nature of its legislative and executive role, which it carries out 
independently from national governments, the Commission is widely perceived as 
the primary supranational institution within the EU context. As already noted, 
however, decision-making responsibilities within EMU have always had a strong 
intergovernmental dimension owing largely to the asymmetrical nature of the single 
currency area, i.e. with a centralised monetary policy and a decentralised fiscal 
policy. Nevertheless, as the key supranational institution working in pursuit of the 
collective EU interest, the Commission is endowed with a range of executive and 
legislative powers that have enabled the body to play a key role within EU fiscal and 
broader economic governance within EMU.  
 
It has already been observed, for example, that the Commission plays an 
integral role within the confines of the collective surveillance mechanisms employed 
under both the preventative and correctives arms of the SGP framework, with the 
ECOFIN Council generally acting on the basis of Commission recommendations. As 
would be expected, the Commission is also represented within both the European 
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Council, ECOFIN council and informal Eurogroup decision making forums, as well as 
further down at Committee level through various channels. Moreover, the importance 
of the Commission as a site for technical expertise and policy direction should not be 
underestimated in this context. And naturally, the Commission retains its powers 
within the confines of law relevant to the functioning of EMU over legislative initiative. 
Of course, in recent years there has been a further escalation of intergovernmental 
decision making within EMU as the EU sought to respond effectively to the 
potentially existential challenges facing the single currency area following the 
financial and economic crisis. However, despite the ECOFIN council (shadowed by 
the Eurogroup) and the European council being called upon at times to play a key 
leadership role during the crisis period, the EU’s executive body has worked hard to 
provide substantial contributions to the reform debate for EU fiscal governance.   
 
Within two communications released consecutively into the public sphere in 
the months of May and June in 2010, the Commission set out its initial policy ideas 
early for EMU reform (see Commission 2010, 2010a). The core ideas set out in 
these two communications were active, alongside the recommendations provided by 
the Van Rompuy led task force, in informing the six-pack legislative proposals put 
forward by the Commission in September 2011—a set of measures which together 
were said to comprise the ‘cornerstone’ of the EU’s immediate response to the 
economic crisis (Commission 2012). Subsequently, at the height of the market 
pressure, the Commission was also able to table yet more proposals for a legislative 
two-pack, building on the six-pack, in November 2011. Undeniably, with the signing 
of the intergovernmental fiscal compact treaty between Heads of State or 
Government at a European Council meeting in March 2011 the Commission was 
seen to be far more explicitly side-lined. Nevertheless, it is the case that many of the 
reforms implemented to date, including those introduced under the 
intergovernmental fiscal compact treaty, have in effect served to strengthen the 
supervisory power of the Commission within a strengthened SGP framework (see 
chapter 4: table 5.2).  
 
With the Commission continuing to be heavily relied upon on to provide a key 
supervisory role within EU fiscal governance—and given its already proven 
eagerness to provide substantive input to guide the Union through this crisis events 
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that confronted the euro area—it no surprise that the EU‘s executive body was once 
again keen to set the terms of the debate for a more ambitious reform of the EU’s 
fiscal and broader economic governance framework over the longer term. And key 
here was the reform agenda outlined in the Commission’s Blueprint for a deep and 
genuine Economic and Monetary Union published in November 2012 (see 
Commission 2012:b), which was designed with a view to ensuring a strong and 
stable EMU architecture over the longer term. It is also a demonstration of the 
Commissions desire to maintain a leading role in guiding the EMU reform process 
that the executive body felt it necessary to outline its own preferences for a more 
deeply integrated EMU at the same time as the European Council was active 
developing its own roadmap for the way forward in coordination with key 
stakeholders.  
 
To conclude, owing to a dual executive and legislative role within EMU 
governance, the Commission has always enjoyed a prominent position within what is 
otherwise a highly intergovernmental policy setting. And, while some of the 
institutional adaptations demanded as a response to the recent crisis events that 
befell the Union had threatened to challenge this role, the EU executive has worked 
hard to ensure it is in a position to exert influence over the ongoing reform debate 
over EU fiscal governance. It is also a notable feature of the crisis to date that many 
of the legislative measures, even those driven more explicitly from within the 
European Council setting, have in effect conferred additional powers on the 
Commission and have therefore served to cement its standing within EU fiscal 
governance over the long term. It is in this nuanced context, then, that the nature of 
the particular legitimising discourses being produced from within the EU Commission 
setting during the ongoing fiscal governance reform debate need to be considered.   
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Legitimising Discourse Activity  
 
Discourses of Crisis 
 
As part of a Commission Communication released into the public sphere in 
May 2010, the Commission set out its initial policy ideas for reforming fiscal and 
broader economic governance against a backdrop of escalating financial and 
economic turmoil in Europe. The Communication in question is entitled Reinforcing 
economic policy coordination (see Commission 2010), and the ideas set out within 
this text were, alongside those developed as part of the on-going Von Rompuy led 
Task Force initiated by the European Council in March 2010, influential in informing 
the subsequent package of six legislative proposals (the so called six-pack) that 
entered into force in December 2011—a series of legislative acts which together 
comprised the centrepiece of the EU’s immediate response to the crisis situation. 
The table presented below provides a brief summary of the key discourse patterns 
contained within the text of the Communication (see table 7.1) 
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Table 7.1: Key Patterns of Discourse  
 
 Input orientated 
discourse 
Output orientated 
discourse 
As a Model of 
Fiscal Federalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reinforcing 
economic 
policy 
coordination 
 
Beyond quite vague and 
highly limited reflections 
on encouraging 
parliamentary 
involvement in the 
context of the European 
Semester cycle, any 
substantive measures to 
improve democratic 
legitimacy and 
accountability of decision 
making on the input side 
not considered at any 
length here 
 
As such, the possibility of 
increasing the role of the 
European Parliament or 
its national level 
counterparts within what 
would be a strengthened 
fiscal governance 
framework is not 
addressed  
 
The crisis is framed, in 
accordance with neoliberal 
logic, as resulting from a 
failure to implement the SGP 
rules and observe adequate 
levels of fiscal discipline 
(with no recognition of more 
fundamental structural 
design flaws within EMU).  
 
 
The prioritisation of a 
Neoliberal reform agenda 
which is concerned with 
securing strengthened fiscal 
discipline through building on 
the preventative and 
corrective arms of the pre-
existing SGP framework  
 
The need to setup a limited 
intergovernmental 
emergency bailout 
mechanism  is also 
considered here, but more 
far reaching neo-Keynesian 
solidarity mechanisms (i.e. 
debt mutualisation and/or the 
development of a more 
substantial EU fiscal 
capacity) are not.  
  
 
 
Limited model of 
fiscal federalism: 
rules-based fiscal 
discipline with 
indirect channels of 
legitimisation. 
 
Point of minimum 
departure from the 
status quo 
 
 
 
 At the outset, it should be observed that one main meta-narrative can be 
identified as dominating the Communication: a narrative concerned with the reform 
measures that need to be enacted within EMU in order to respond to the challenges 
presented by the financial and economic crisis. As elaborated on in the introduction:  
 
‘‘The global economic crisis has challenged the current mechanisms 
of economic policy coordination in the European Union and revealed 
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weaknesses. The functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union 
has been under particular stress, due to earlier failures to comply 
with the underlying rules and principles. The existing surveillance 
procedures have not been comprehensive enough (Commission 
2010:2).  
  
In expanding on how the crisis itself is constructed within the text, it is notable 
that past failures to comply with the ‘rules and principles’ within EMU is attached 
primary importance here. After all, as outlined in the critical literature review, such a 
reading is strongly reflective of a neoliberal interpretation of the crisis events, with 
responsibility said to lie with the fiscal profligacy of certain member states that 
breached the budgetary rules.  
 
In fact, in identifying the key happenings leading up to the crisis, the 
Communication remains explicit: ‘Public debt was not sufficiently reduced over the 
past decade. There was not enough commitment to fiscal consolidation, in particular 
during good economic times’ (Commission 2010:3). And, of course, with the crisis 
being framed as resulting from a failure to observe adequate levels of fiscal 
discipline, it is unsurprising that the necessity of improving member states 
compliance with the overarching SGP framework is placed at centre stage here: 
 
‘‘The rules and principles of the Stability and Growth Pact are 
relevant and valid. But, despite the Pact, Member States failed to 
build up adequate buffers in good times. Reinforcing the preventive 
dimension of budgetary surveillance must be an integral part of 
closer coordination of fiscal policy. Also, compliance with the rules 
needs to be improved and more focus needs to be given to 
sustainability of public finances’’ (Commission 2010:4). 
 
 It is also revealing in this context that Greece is singled out for particular 
attention with the country said to ‘clearly highlight the vital importance of ensuring 
effective compliance with rules’ (Commission 2010:4). After all, Greece was arguably 
the only country within the single currency area where fiscal profligacy was the 
primary cause of a worsening financial, economic and sovereign debt situation (as 
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reflected in the countries high debt to GDP ratio and fiscal deficit since its adoption of 
the euro in 2001). As such, the example of Greece, while isolated, is useful in this 
instance for reinforcing the neoliberal reading of the financial and economic crisis 
upheld within the text. Yet, the contribution played by ‘macroeconomic and financial 
imbalances’ (beyond budgetary balances) generally is paid recognition to here, with 
these imbalances said to have ‘aggravated the vulnerability of the euro-area 
economy in particular’ (Commission 2010:3). But certainly, in moving the discussion 
back to the fiscal realm, there can be said to be no recognition at any point within the 
text as to the manner by which some of the more fundamental structural design flaws 
inherent within EMU since the move was made to adopt the single currency may 
have contributed to the crisis events which followed.   
 
With the discourses of crisis being found to be of a strongly neoliberal flavour 
within the Commission Communication, it is of little surprise to discover that the 
actual policy recommendations suggested within the text—with a view to overcoming 
the challenges uncovered by the financial and economic crisis—follow ideologically 
in the same direction.  At the heart of the recommendations, for example, are a 
series of measures concerned with ‘reinforcing compliance with the Stability and 
Growth Pact and deeper fiscal policy coordination’, with the key aim being to secure 
fiscal discipline (or the  or the so-called ‘sustainability of public finances’) 
(Commission 2010:4-6). More specifically, when addressing the preventative arm of 
the SGP, the text recommends that the frameworks ‘impact and effectiveness should 
be decisively strengthened by increasing the ex-ante dimension of the process, and 
by giving it teeth’ (with the later involving the possibility of ‘imposing interest-bearing 
deposits in case of inadequate fiscal policies when Member States make insufficient 
progress towards their budgetary Medium-Term-Objectives in good economic times’) 
(Commission 2010:4). Following on from this, in turning more to the corrective side 
of the pact and the functioning of the EDP specifically, it is observed that the 
enforcement mechanism ‘could be improved by speeding up the procedures’, 
especially for those Member States found to be in ‘repeated breach of the Pact’ 
(Commission 2010:5). And significantly, here, it is also suggested that: ‘The debt 
criterion of the excessive deficit procedure should effectively be implemented’, in 
order to better take into account member states in breach of the 60% of GDP 
threshold (ibid). Finally, member states are also encouraged to ensure their ‘national 
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fiscal frameworks better reflect the priorities of EU budgetary surveillance’ 
(Commission 2010:4). In considering this set of reforms together, it can be said that 
they are guided by an overlapping output oriented neoliberal legitimising discourse 
type: one concerned with building on, rather than replacing, the rules-based SGP 
framework with a view to securing strengthened fiscal discipline within EMU.  
 
It is worth observing that, alongside the core recommendations building on the 
SGP framework for fiscal discipline, a series of more general provisions are set out 
for achieving ‘integrated economic policy coordination for the EU’ (i.e. a so called 
‘European Semester’ cycle of policy coordination) (Commission 2010:8-9). However, 
while it is envisioned that the cycle will integrate the surveillance of macroeconomic 
policies across the board, the realisation of more effective budgetary surveillance to 
bring member states in line with SGP rules figures very prominently here. For 
example, with a view to future implementation within the confines of the European 
Semester cycle, the text draws attention to the benefits of better preventative 
budgetary oversight: ‘The currently missing ex-ante dimension of budgetary and 
economic surveillance would allow the  formulation of genuine guidance, taking into 
account the European dimension, and their subsequent translation into domestic 
policymaking’ (Commission 2010:8). And key here is said to be the ‘system of early 
peer-review of national budgets’, which would be responsible for uncovering 
‘inconsistencies and emerging imbalances’ (ibid). Moreover, for the euro area states 
in particular, it is envisioned that a ‘horizontal assessment of fiscal stance should be 
carried out’, with the possibility for revision recommendations to be issued in the 
case of ‘obvious inadequacies in the budget plans’ (Commission 2010:8-9). 
Following the logic of the text, then, it is clear that the European Semester is 
understood here as reinforcing SGP framework for fiscal discipline at the European 
level.  
 
Separate from the ideas outlined above involving the future development of 
the European Semester cycle of policy coordination, are a  series of 
recommendations involving moving towards a ‘robust framework for crisis 
management’ (Commission 2010:9-10). Essentially, this is understood to involve the 
setting up of a limited emergency bailout mechanism (via ‘intergovernmental 
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agreement’), with any financial disbursements being accompanied by strict 
conditionality and interest rate charges. As elaborated on in the text:   
 
‘At the heart of this euro-area crisis resolution mechanism are strict 
conditionality and interest rates that create incentives to return to 
market-based financing while ensuring the effectiveness of the 
financial support. When crisis prevention fails, and this is evidenced 
by an objective financing need, assistance would be activated as a 
last resort, to safeguard financial stability in the euro area as a whole’ 
(Commission 2010:9-10). 
 
It is telling, however, that beyond the setting up of an emergency bailout 
mechanism designed to provide as a last resort financial assistance to sovereigns 
facing a loss of market access, any prospect of setting in place an integration path 
towards the development of more far reaching neo-Keynesian solidarity measures 
within EMU does not feature here. Instead, the reform agenda set out within the text 
is built around a limited model of fiscal federalism—one which represents a minimal 
departure from the status quo—with debt mutualisation and/or the development of a 
more substantial EU fiscal capacity being left out.  
 
With the Commission Communication being dominated by neoliberal ideas 
revolving the securing of strengthened fiscal discipline on the output side, it is not 
unsurprising that discourses emphasising the democratic legitimacy and 
accountability of decision making on the input side remain consciously absent at the 
text level. And significantly, this observation even holds true up until the point when 
the European Semester framework for economic policy coordination is reflected on 
at some length, even though opportunities abound for the increased inclusion of both 
the national and European level parliament within the annual cycle (see Interview 
Extract A 2013:2 with senior level official from DG ECFIN for confirmation of this fact). 
In fact, any mentioning of additional parliamentary involvement is limited within the 
text to two vague sentences:  The first recommends that member states should be 
‘encouraged’ to consult national parliaments before submission of their Stability and 
Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes; and the second 
simply adds that the European Parliament should be ‘appropriately engaged’ during 
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the surveillance procedures envisioned to take place during the preparatory phrase 
of member states national budgets (Commission 2010:9). Overall, then, aside from 
the quite vague and highly limited reflections outlined above, how to ensure 
adequate levels of democratic input legitimacy within what would be a strengthened 
EU fiscal governance framework—perhaps through the setting up of increased 
mechanisms for democratic participation and representation involving parliamentary 
activity from both the European and national level—is a topic not really engaged with 
within the text of the Communication.  
 
These discourse findings from within the Commission Communication can be 
reinforced through a reading of more informal discourse sourced from EU level 
officials located within DG ECFIN. First, for example, in making reference to the six-
pack, two-pack and fiscal compact measures—measures which together build on 
and strengthen the SGP framework for fiscal discipline—one senior level official 
located within the Commission makes their feelings quite clear as to the reform 
priority in the wake of the crisis: ‘It is very important that these measures for 
reinforcing fiscal discipline within EMU are implemented for real and that all the 
players really take it seriously’ (Interview Extract A 2013:2). Similar sentiments 
prioritising the tightening of rules-based fiscal discipline within EMU are also echoed 
by a member of the secretariat located within DG ECFIN: ‘now, at least in the fiscal 
area, the priority is implementation in order to see if all these new reforms 
strengthening the SGP work well and that member states are convinced of the need 
to stick to them, that the Commission sticks to its role of pointing to the member 
states that do not do so, and to ensure that the new legislation are fully followed’ 
(Interview Extract E 2013:3).  
 
As in the Commission Communication, then, a reading of more informal 
discourse reveals the prioritisation of what is by and large a neoliberal reform 
agenda as an immediate response to the crisis events. And again, it is not 
unsurprising that the  necessity of such a policy response is seen to have resulted 
directly from a neoliberal interpretation of the crisis in the first instance, with a lack of 
fiscal discipline being understood to lie at the heart of events leading up to the 
financial and economic turmoil in Europe. As one policy advisor from DG ECFIN 
argues:  
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‘‘[T]he focus of course in the first years of the crisis was on the 
preventative side: that means strengthening the fiscal rules of the 
SGP, which is logical. I mean that is where it went wrong, right? That 
is why we got into this mess. So the natural response is to fix the 
gaps’’ (Interview Extract B 2013:3). 
 
From a reading of this analysis, there would appear to be a clear perception of 
a strong link between past implementation failures under the SGP and the 
subsequent onset of the crisis. In fact, a senior fiscal policy advisor working within 
DG ECFIN also comments that it would be useful to have ‘enhanced surveillance 
mechanisms’ because the ‘previous framework showed limitations in the monitoring’ 
(Interview Extract 2013 C:3). However, when further questioned if these measures 
will be enough to ensure the future cohesion necessary to sustain a future monetary 
union, then the policy advisor in question accepts that ‘the answer is probably no’ 
(ibid). And similarly, while a member of the secretariat located within DG ECFIN 
labels the initiatives designed to build on the SGP framework as being ultimately 
‘good’, the official does conclude by pointing out that ‘we have not solved one of the 
key issues which is the Commission restraining because it does not want to upset 
member states’ (Interview Extract 2013 F:3). Nevertheless, what is clear is that 
during the immediate crisis period the possibility of putting in sequence concrete 
integration steps towards a qualitatively deeper level of fiscal union (i.e. a model in 
which neo-keynesian solidarity measures play an enhanced role) does not figure 
here, with the strengthening of the Union’s pre-existing  arrangements for fiscal 
discipline being the priority.  
 
 
Of course, with the focus during the immediate crisis period being centred on 
the implementation of a neoliberal reform agenda, it is not unsurprising that 
measures to ensure adequate levels of democratic legitimacy and accountability of 
decision making on the input side are also presented within the more informal 
discourse under analysis here as a matter of secondary importance. For example, on 
the subject of the balancing act between responding effectively and quickly to the 
crisis to please financial markets on the one hand and the ensuring of the democratic 
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legitimacy of the process on the other, the response from a senior level official 
working within DG ECFIN to this dilemma is telling: 
   
‘‘You do things urgently, but you do that within the existing legal 
framework. See, I am completely against the view that everything 
has to be consulted in all the parliaments of all the countries 
because that will never work-that is why we have representative 
democracies […..] So as long as you do emergency decision making 
within the existing legal framework that has been fixed by the 
legislator then this is okay’’ (Interview Extract 2013 A:4).   
 
In fact, on this topic the same official makes their feelings quite clear that it is 
only ‘if you really change the game’- ‘well then, you probably have to take more time 
and go through a more open consultation (ibid). Moreover, on the issue of decision-
making within the crisis period, one policy adviser located within DG ECFIN also 
comments along similar lines: ‘There has been a necessity in the crisis to act very 
quickly, and that often comes with the cost of limiting the people involved in this 
mission’ (Interview Extract 2013 B:4). With a view to the longer term, however, the 
same official does stress that ‘the emphasis must shift to accountability and 
legitimacy issues’ (ibid). Nevertheless, such a reading of the reform priorities only 
confirms our prior made point as to the neglect of the input dimension of legitimacy 
during the immediate crisis period. 
 
The dominant neoliberal discourses uncovered within the Commission 
Communication for Reinforcing economic policy coordination—and which were 
reinforced by a reading of more informal discourses sourced from officials located 
within DG ECFIN—can be intertexutually located within a series of earlier texts 
produced by the Commission. To begin with, it should be made clear that while the 
securing of legitimacy on the output side has always been a central feature of 
Commission discourse regarding EU integration generally (see, in particularly, 
Scharpf 1999 and Majone 1996), economic integration within EMU has historically 
been even more reliant on the quality of policy outputs for its legitimacy (Verdun & 
Christiansen 2000). In fact, the observation that the Commission is prepared to rely 
almost solely on the content of its policy outputs in order to sustain or promote 
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deeper integration towards EMU was made most apparent in 1990 following the 
release of the One Money, One Market report (see Commission 1990), which 
provided an evaluation of the cost and benefits of moving towards the adoption of a 
full EMU (also see Commission 1989 & 1991). Within the One Money, One Market 
report, and within the accompanying communications, an advancement towards the 
adoption of a single currency was linked to the following policy outputs: ‘efficiency 
and growth’, ‘price stability’, ‘adjusting to economic shocks’, ‘convergence’ and 
‘realising the full gains of a single market’. 
 
Following along this trajectory, you can also identify within a number of earlier 
texts produced by the Commission a series of familiar neoliberal patterns of 
discourse framed around the necessity of securing fiscal discipline within EMU on 
the output side. However, within these earlier texts discourses of crisis have been 
substituted for more of an emphasis on fiscal discipline as a facilitator of ‘price 
stability’ and in turn ‘economic growth’, in accordance with neoliberal economic 
theorizing. For example, as part of the EMU blueprint laid out in 1989 within the so-
called ‘Delors Report’ (a report which was compiled by the Committee for the Study 
of Economic and Monetary Union with representatives from the Commission), the 
need for ‘binding procedures and rules’ on member states fiscal positions was 
framed as ‘indispensable’ to the smooth functioning of EMU (see Delors Report 
1989). Notably, such a commitment to rules-based fiscal discipline within EMU has 
since been reaffirmed several times in later Commission communications, with the 
Union’s executive branch again drawing on a series of overlapping neoliberal 
arguments. In fact, even at a time when the credibility of the pact was at an all-time 
low point—following the 2003 ECJ ruling failing to force compliance with the 
Commission recommendations for a EDP—the Commission was quick to defend the 
necessity of maintaining an effective rules-based system of fiscal discipline (albeit a 
reformed version) within a subsequent Communication on the topic of SGP reform: 
 
‘‘The surveillance of fiscal discipline that has proven its effectiveness 
needs to be maintained and rigorous implementation be ensured 
[……].The objective is therefore to enhance the economic 
underpinnings of the existing framework and thus strengthen 
credibility and enforcement. The aim is not to increase the rigidity or 
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flexibility of current rules but rather to make them more effective’’ 
(Commission 2004: para. 1). 
 
On this basis, then, while greater recognition was to be paid to the economic 
circumstances within which individual member states found themselves (through the 
use of provisions already laid out within the existing surveillance procedures for 
‘exceptional’ circumstances), the overriding commitment to the SGP framework and 
the budgetary rules contained within were actually re-affirmed at this time. Moreover, 
in keeping with a neoliberal logic, the Commission was sure to proceed within the 
text of the Communication to link an effective SGP framework with the securing of 
several policy outputs, including the maintenance of ‘sound public finances’, the 
fostering of the ‘EU’s economic growth potential’ and ‘price stability’ (Commission 
2004). In a similar spirit, within the Commission’s 2004 Public Finances in EMU 
report released later that same year, the executive body again sought to link ‘fiscal 
discipline’ (or so called ‘sound public finances’), as secured through the SGP 
framework, as a key contributing factor to moving towards a ‘macroeconomic 
environment that fosters potential growth’ (Commission 2004a:4). 
 
Alongside the intertextual relations outlined above, it is also apparent that 
during the construction of the Commission Communication a more explicit 
intertextual appropriation of texts has also been made use of. Perhaps the most 
notable example of this practice, however, is the series of references made by the 
Commission to its landmark EMU@10 report, released in 2008 (see Commission 
2008). The Commissions rationale for citing this report within the more recent 
communication under analysis here was to demonstrate that it had in fact already 
made the case for strengthening the SGP framework in the past. After all, while the 
Commission was uncompromising within the EMU@10 report that the ‘key 
frameworks for fiscal policy surveillance and economic policy coordination are 
anchored in the Treaty and the SGP’, a case was put forward for ‘strengthening the 
preventive part of the SGP’ (Commission 2008:9)—a reform agenda which would of 
course, unbeknown to the Commission at the time, be given renewed impetus in the 
wake of the subsequent economic and financial crisis in Europe. And again, in not 
unfamiliar terms, a strengthening of the preventive arm of the SGP was framed 
within the report as not only essential for securing ‘budgetary discipline’, but also in 
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terms of helping ‘address broader issues which may affect the macroeconomic 
stability of a country and the overall functioning of EMU’ (ibid). Overall, from an 
intertextual reading of the connectivity between the Commission Communication and 
a series of earlier texts, it has been established that overlapping neoliberal orders of 
discourse have been consistently articulated within the Commission setting since 
before the introduction of the single currency area. Yet, while in the past fiscal 
discipline (or the securing of so called ‘sound’ or ‘sustainable’ public finances) was 
linked with a series of broader macroeconomic policy outputs related to price stability 
and the securing of the economic growth potential of member states in EMU, in the 
present day these narratives have been supplemented by discourses of crisis. 
 
To conclude this section, the analysis of the Commission Communication for 
reinforcing economic policy coordination—in conjunction with more informal 
discourse from senior EU level officials—has revealed how during the immediate 
crisis period a neoliberal reform agenda was prioritised for EU fiscal governance. 
This neoliberal agenda was focussed overwhelmingly on securing strengthened 
fiscal discipline within EMU on the output side through building on, rather than 
replacing, the pre-existing rules-based SGP framework. It is also worth observing, in 
this instance, that such neoliberal policy prescriptions resulted largely from a 
neoliberal framing of the crisis in the first place, with member states failure to 
observe adequate levels of fiscal discipline in line with European rules being framed 
as being a key causal factor leading up to the crisis events that have taken hold 
within EMU in more recent times. Within this discourse context, the reform debate 
has been observed to have largely steered clear from any talk of realising a 
qualitative integration leap within EMU towards a deeper level of fiscal union (i.e. one 
in which neo-Keynesian solidarity mechanisms play an enhanced role). And 
furthermore, with the focus firmly set around the measures required to secure 
strengthened levels of fiscal discipline on the output side, the possibility of making 
provisions to ensure the adequate democratic legitimacy and accountability of 
decision making on the input side escaped attention. Instead, the reform discourse 
remained entrenched during this period around an output orientated neoliberal 
ideology and a model of fiscal federalism which represents the point of minimum 
departure from the status quo. 
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Post-Crisis Discourse 
 
The neoliberal reform ideas set out in the Commission's May 2010 
Communication for Reinforcing economic policy coordination in turn helped to inform 
several key pieces of Community legislation advanced as an immediate response to 
the economic and financial crisis, including the aforementioned six-pact legislation 
and complimentary legislative two-pack. However, as witnessed as part of the 
historical overview, the Commission was keen to provide its own longer term vision 
for a stable EMU, beyond that required to resolve the more immediate crisis events, 
along with the policy steps to make this reform vision a reality. For example, as was 
made clear by José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, in late 
2012: 
 
‘‘We must counter this crisis of confidence by showing that we are 
ready to move ahead and strengthen cooperation and integration in 
the financial, fiscal, economic and also in the political field’’ 
(Commission 2012d).  
 
From the analysis made above, there would appear to have been an 
understanding amongst policy officials located within the Commission that market 
confidence could only be sustained if more fundamental in roads on the road to EMU 
reform are taken over a longer term time period. And central to this debate is was a 
potentially far reaching Communication adopted by the Commission on the 28 
November 2012 entitled, A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary 
union: Launching a European debate (see Commission 2012b). As the title implies, 
this Communication cited above was drafted by the Commission with the primary 
objective of outlining the series of integration steps that needed to be taken over the 
short, medium and longer term in order to ensure a ‘strong and stable’ EMU 
architecture. With this goal in mind, the blueprint considered measures across the 
financial, fiscal, economic and political domains, although here the analysis will 
centre on the aspects of direct relevance to the fiscal governance sphere. The table 
offered below provides a brief summary of the key discourse patterns contained 
within the blueprint in question. 
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Table 7.2: Key Patterns of Discourse  
 
 Input orientated 
discourse  
Output orientated 
discourse 
As a Model of 
Fiscal Federalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
blueprint 
for a deep 
and 
genuine 
EMU 
 
 
Argues the case that the 
Lisbon Treat has set the 
‘appropriate level’ of 
democratic input legitimacy 
for EMU-at least up until the 
point when treaty change is 
required. 
 
Some minor institutional 
adaptions considered over 
the longer term with a view 
to ensuring the 
‘commensurate 
‘involvement of the 
European Parliament in EU 
decision making as 
integration within EMU 
progresses. 
 
 
Overall, challenging 
questions concerning the 
development of a flanking 
political union aspect have 
been left for consideration at 
a future date.   
 
 
Prioritisation of a neoliberal 
reform agenda over the short 
term with the first concern 
said to be the full 
implementation of the six-
pack and the two-pack 
legislation building on the 
SGP framework for fiscal 
discipline. 
 
Over the medium to longer 
term there is more of an 
emphasis placed on the 
implementation of far 
reaching neo-Keynesian 
solidarity mechanisms, 
including an enlarged 
European fiscal capacity 
alongside substantial steps 
towards the mutualisation of 
euro area member states 
debt.  
 
There is also a recognition at 
least that in the initial design 
of EMU integration was 
lacking relative to other 
currency unions, 
i.e. It combines a centralised 
monetary policy with 
decentralised responsibility 
for most economic and fiscal 
policies. 
 
 
Far reaching model 
of fiscal federalism 
with far reaching 
integration steps 
towards a 
qualitatively deeper 
level of fiscal union  
 
Nevertheless, 
decisions on the 
integration steps to 
be taken towards a 
flanking political 
union aspect side-
lined.  
 
 
 
 
In terms of the policy initiatives contained within the text of the blueprint, the 
measures suggested for implementation in the fiscal domain over the short term as a 
‘priority’ are strongly neoliberal in character. Once again, here, a neoliberal 
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interpretation as to the crisis events is influential in dictating the advancement of 
such a  reform agenda, with the so-called ‘vulnerabilities’ arising during the recent 
crisis period framed as being at least ‘partly due to insufficient observance of and 
respect for the agreed rules underpinning EMU as laid down in the Stability and 
Growth Pact’—although ‘the lack of a tool to address systematically macroeconomic 
imbalances’ is again recognised as being a contributing factor here (Commission 
2012b:2).  
 
Nevertheless, with the failure to implement the SGP framework being singled 
out for particular attention, the Commission remains steadfast that ‘immediate priority 
should be given to the full deployment of the new economic governance tools 
brought by the six-pack as well  as rapid adoption of current Commission proposals 
such as the two-pack’ (Commission 2012b:12). Of course, this logic follows for the 
Commission because, covered as part of the contextual overview on EU fiscal 
governance, the legislation contained within these two initiatives is concerned 
overwhelmingly with realising strengthened fiscal discipline within EMU through 
building on the preventative and corrective arms of the SGP framework. And 
fundamentally, within this latest blueprint for EMU reform, ‘budgetary discipline’ is 
framed as an ‘essential safeguard of the stability of the euro area’ and as a 
‘necessary step towards a fully-fledged integrated budgetary framework’ 
(Commission 2012b:14). 
 
Over the medium to longer term there is a noticeable change in the pattern of 
discourse within the text of the blueprint away from neoliberalism towards more of an 
emphasis on taking integration steps towards a deeper level of fiscal union 
characterised by the implementation of enhanced neo-Keynesian solidarity 
mechanisms. And significantly, as a backdrop to these observed changes in the 
discourse there is recognition at least that, in the initial design of EMU, fiscal 
integration was lacking relative to other currency unions: 
 
‘‘EMU is unique among modern monetary unions in that it combines 
a centralised monetary policy with decentralised responsibility for 
most economic policies, albeit subject to constraints as regards 
national budgetary policies. Unlike other monetary unions, there is 
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no centralised fiscal policy function and no centralised fiscal capacity 
(federal budget)’’ (Commission 2012:b2). 
 
Yet, while recognising some of the more fundamental structural weakness in 
EMU as initially conceived (with fiscal policy remaining largely under the 
decentralised control of national governments), the Commission is careful to avoid 
linking these observed weakness explicitly with the crisis events that followed within 
the blueprint. However, this is not to say that the text is not attentive to the 
integration steps that could possibly be taken to rectify the structural deficiencies 
within the initial EMU model, with a series of integration steps being proposed here 
over the medium to longer time period in the direction of a qualitatively deeper level 
of fiscal federalism. 
 
Over the medium term the possibility is floated of making ‘steps towards the 
mutualisation of issuance of sovereign debt between the member states’—possibly 
through the setting up a ‘European Redemption’ Fund and/or through the issuance of 
a common European ‘short term’ debt framework (Commission 2012b:25-30). As 
elaborated on at the text level:  
 
‘‘The reduction of public debt significantly exceeding the Treaty 
criterion could be addressed through the setting-up of a redemption 
fund. A possible driver for fostering the integration of euro area 
financial markets and in particular to stabilise volatile government 
debt markets is common issuance by euro area Member States of 
short-term government debt with a maturity of up to 1 to 2 years’’ 
(Commission 2010b:29).  
 
For the Commission, then, a partial mutualisation sovereign debt is seen as a 
possible way to alleviate some of the more damaging legacies of the financial and 
economic crisis. When commenting on the debt mutualisation measures aired, 
however, it is recognised that ‘these possibilities would require amending the 
Treaties’ (Commission 2010b:26). 
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Ultimately, it is then envisioned that a dedicated ‘fiscal capacity’ (a term 
synonymous with ‘federal budget’) for the euro area could be set up over a longer 
term time period, building on a convergence and competiveness framework. As is 
acknowledged within the blueprint though, ‘How large this central budget would be 
will depend on the depth of integration desired and on the willingness to enact 
accompanying political changes’ (Commission 2010b:31). However, while the 
precise details of any future European fiscal capacity to be developed are left open 
for debate here, a case is made that such a framework could serve two main 
purposes:  
 
‘‘A common framework dedicated to macroeconomic stabilisation 
could provide an insurance system whereby risks of economic 
shocks are pooled across member states, thereby reducing the 
fluctuations in national incomes. Second, it may help improve the 
conduct of national fiscal policies throughout the cycle. In particular, 
it may encourage fiscal retrenchment during economic booms, while 
providing additional room for manoeuvre for a supportive fiscal 
stance in downturns’’ (Commission 2012b:32).  
 
From a reading of the above analysis, it is evident that the Commission is of 
the opinion that the development of an autonomous European fiscal capacity could 
deliver considerable gains compared with the fiscal arrangements as they currently 
exist. Finally, it is foreseen within the blueprint that, following the arrival of a more 
deeply integration fiscal governance framework within EMU, the conditions would be 
ripe for a more far reaching mutualisation of sovereign debt. And it is at this point 
that the possibility of introducing ‘Stability Bonds’ (also more commonly referred to 
as ‘Eurobonds’) is raised, with the frameworks being promoted within the text as a 
way to ‘create new means through which governments finance their debt’ while 
offering ‘safe and liquid investment opportunities for savers and financial institutions 
(Commission 2012b:13)’.  
 
The blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU would seem, then, to be reflective 
of a desire on behalf of the Commission to progress EMU in the direction of a more 
highly integrated model of fiscal federalism: one in which far reaching debt 
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mutualisation and an enlarged federal euro area budget are defining features. And, 
in doing so, this text can be said to represent a real attempt by the Commission to 
address some of the fundamental weakness identified in the original EMU model, 
which saw fiscal policy being left to be a formation of national governments. 
Nevertheless, it is worth observing that more traditional neoliberal economic ideas 
are far from an absent feature within the text over this more extended time period. 
After all, a key theme within the blueprint is the principal according to which ‘steps 
towards more responsibility and economic discipline are combined with more 
solidarity’ (Commission 2012b:11). 
 
 In effect, this means that the development of solidarity measures would have 
to be made strictly conditional on the adequacy of the prior steps taken to ensure 
adequate levels of fiscal discipline within EMU. And a number of specific avenues to 
achieve this goal are considered by the Commission , including ‘an obligation for a 
Member State to revise its (draft) national budget if the EU level so requires’; 
‘building upon the tighter monitoring and coordination process set up by the two-
pack’; or the setting up of ‘clear competence for the EU level to harmonise national 
budgetary laws’ (along the lines of the fiscal compact) (Commission 2012b:26-27). 
While these proposals are contrasting, it is clear that all of these suggestions serve 
the same neoliberal logic: to reinforce, to varying degrees, the commitments already 
made under the original SGP framework for fiscal discipline. Thus, while discourses 
emphasising solidarity are visibly more prominent over the medium to longer term 
within the blueprint (with neoliberal reforms taking clear priority over the short term), 
more traditional neoliberal justificatory discourses still feature over this longer term 
time period, albeit to a lesser extent.   
 
With the blueprint reviling a series of potentially far reaching integration steps 
to be taken over the short, medium to long term time period, it is not surprising that 
ideas related to how the democratic legitimacy and accountability of decision making 
on the input side can be ensured throughout this process is also addressed here. For 
example, the need to ensure the ‘democratic legitimacy and accountability of 
decision-making’ is raised several times within the communication under the heading 
of ‘political union’ (Commission 2012b:1-54). Yet the discourses which do concern 
the development of this political union aspect, as an accompaniment to integration 
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on the fiscal side, are addressed in rather tentative fashion largely as part of the 
Commissions longer term vision for EMU, i.e. following the period when the scope 
for carrying out economic governance reform through secondary legislation has been 
depleted and major reform of the treaties is required in order to cement further 
integration steps within EMU. It is also reflective as to the priorities of the blueprint 
that the section falling under the heading of ‘Political Union’ features numerically at 
the very end of the report.  
 
In rather vague terms, then, it is remarked that over the longer there will be a 
need to ensure that any strengthened role of EU institutions will be accompanied by 
the so called ‘commensurate involvement of the European Parliament in the EU’ 
(Commission 2012b:35). Although short on specifics here, some institutional 
adaptations are then put forward with a view to ensuring the democratic legitimacy of 
the process, including the establishment of a ‘euro-committee’ within the European 
Parliament; enhanced ‘political direction’ and ‘democratic accountability’ within the 
Commission; ‘reinforced powers to co-legislate’ for the European Parliament; and the 
provision by the European Parliament of the ‘necessary democratic scrutiny for all 
decisions taken by the EU's executive’ (Commission 2012b:28-40). Yet, most 
importantly in this context, is the observation that the Commission actually makes an 
attempt within the blueprint to argue the case for the adequacy of the current 
institutional setup for ensuring the democratic legitimacy of any reform process, at 
least up until the point treaty change may be required: 
 
 ‘The Lisbon Treaty has perfected the EU's unique model of  
supranational democracy, and in principle set an appropriate level of 
democratic legitimacy  in regard of today's EU competences’ 
(Commission 2012b:35). 
 
 Hence, although a limited number of measures are advanced within the text 
with a view to making progress over the long term (i.e. following a successful 
process of treaty change) towards some kind of political union aspect with 
‘commensurately stronger democratic accountability’, questions concerning the 
attainment of adequate levels of input legitimacy over the short to medium term are 
left largely unanswered here (Commission 2012b:35-41). And this observation only 
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serves to reinforce the impression that the Commission has prioritised the securing 
of legitimacy on the output side here, leaving the input dimension of legitimacy to be 
incurred largely indirectly via National Ministers and Heads of State or Government. 
 
The dominant discourse patterns uncovered within the blueprint for a deep 
and genuine EMU can be qualified somewhat through a reading of more informal 
discourse sourced from EU level officials working within DG ECFIN. To begin with 
though, it is apparent that the informal discourse cited during the previous section 
covering the more immediate crisis period is again of some relevance here. It has 
been demonstrated previously, for example, that Commission officials prioritised 
what was, by and large, the implementation of a neoliberal reform agenda as an 
immediate response to the crisis events that confronted the Union. And, once again, 
these discourse findings have been born out within the subsequent Commission 
blueprint under analysis here, which again demands, as an immediate priority, the 
full implementation of the six-pack and two-pack legislation building on the SGP 
framework for fiscal discipline. In relation to the medium to longer term period, 
however, it has been observed that the Commission is keen to provide within its 
Blueprint a fairly ambitious road map towards a qualitatively deeper level of fiscal 
union, i.e. one in which neo-Keynesian solidarity mechanisms would play a far more 
enhanced role. Yet, despite the Commission ostensibly harbouring ambitions to take 
a series of major integration steps towards a deeper level of fiscal union, it is 
significant that a reading of more informal discourse in fact reveals a substantial 
degree of scepticism amongst Commission officials concerning both the desirability 
and political feasibility of moving towards such an endpoint. 
 
For example, the most senior level official spoken to working within DG 
ECFIN expresses an altogether ambivalent attitude when discussing their opinions 
as to the necessity of moving towards a deeper level of fiscal union involving an 
increased pooling of budgetary resources and/or a joint issuance of debt: 
 
‘‘Are they necessary now, in three years’ time and in five years’ time-
are we all going to die all together if we do not have it: probably not. I 
think everyone agrees now that all the political capital should be put 
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towards banking union, which is sufficiently difficult’’ (Interview 
Extract A 2013:3).  
 
Notably, a similar sentiment was also expressed by a policy advisor working 
within DG ECFIN who differentiated between what represents a ‘needs-based 
approach’ and what you could picture as a ‘profitable way of going towards a stable 
Union’ (Interview Extract B 2013:3). And when applying this logic to the issue of 
fiscal integration the interviewee is quite clear: ‘So I think while debt mutualisation 
and fiscal transfers could be profitable, I do not think it is absolutely necessary’ (ibid). 
From these analyses, then, there would appear to be a sense that taking the 
minimum integration steps necessary to stabilise EMU is sufficient, in view of the 
political challenges arising when discussing deeper integration issues.  
 
The remaining interviewees working within DG ECFIN are equally vague 
when it comes to expanding upon their longer term vision for fiscal governance with 
EMU. For example, one senior Fiscal Policy Advisor is candid in this respect: ‘I think 
there needs to be some ingredients of fiscal union. It’s not entirely clear which ones 
and to what extent; there are different views and these are tricky questions’ 
(Interview Extract C 2013:3).  Also, wants again, political realities are raised as a 
possible hindrance to fiscal integration over the long term: 
 
 ‘‘[I]f you just talk of a large budget we will not get anywhere, so what 
we need to put some stones down in order to go in this direction. 
Although the end result may not be entirely clear or entirely pre-
determined at the beginning of the process’’ (Interview Extract C 
2013:3). 
 
Similarly, on the topic of future fiscal integration, an official working within the 
Directorate for Fiscal Policy notes that they were ‘reticent to have a full vision’ 
(Interview Extract D 2013:3). Their justificatory remarks are that ‘it’s not a pure 
economic decision—in that there is no right and wrong’ (ibid). The ‘subsidiarity’ 
principle is also raised as a particular issue here with the interviewee interpreting this 
norm as implying that member states need to ‘decide a lot for themselves’ as a 
matter of principal) (ibid). Interestingly, though, the official’s view is that ‘if you want 
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to be very strict on what countries can and cannot do then it’s helpful to have this 
other side as an added incentive’ (ibid). Clearly, therefore, from a reading of more 
informal discourse collected from Commission officials located within DG ECFIN, it 
would seem that, running contrary to the blueprint drafted for achieving a deep and 
genuine EMU, the actual desirability and political feasibility of moving towards a 
deeper fiscal union endowed with solidarity measures is in fact a prospect greeted 
with a high degree of scepticism amongst officials working within the Commission 
setting. This could have the important ramification that the more historically 
grounded neoliberal type reform discourses could remain paramount within the 
Commission setting, even over the medium to longer term. 
 
In discussing the steps that may need to be taken to ensure the democratic 
legitimacy and accountability of decision making on the input side, there are no such 
discrepancies between the Commission blueprint on the one hand and the informal 
discourse collected from officials located within DG ECFIN on the other. For example, 
when discussing ideas on how the political union aspect should be developed within 
a future EMU—with particular reference to the balancing act between the national 
and European level parliaments—the most senior level official spoken to working 
within DG ECFIN is only able to provoke more questions than answers:  
 
‘‘[T]here roles should be clear: are we talking about legislative power, 
are we talking about consultative power, are we talking about ex-
ante or ex-post. I think all that should be really clarified in the various 
policy areas. If a policy competency is moved to the European level, 
then it also has to be clear that this has been moved to the 
European level. And then, maybe, it is the European Parliament that 
could take on a role. Also, maybe experts could think of some kind of 
way to involve national parliaments-maybe a consultative role or 
something like this- but I do not know’’ (Interview Extract A 2013:3). 
 
The official is also quite clear that any discussion concerning political union 
will be inherently tricky because of the political sensitivities involved here: ‘I think it is 
challenging to come to a clear specification because that implies political trade-offs 
and in the end someone has to give up something’ (Interview Extract A 2013:3). 
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Separately, a policy adviser working within the Directorate for Fiscal Policy is 
equally short on detail when it came to expanding upon the nature of the political 
union they envision being developed as an accompaniment to integration on the 
fiscal side. This is because they reason, ‘It depends entirely on the steps we take on 
the road to further fiscal integration’ (Interview Extract B 2013:4). However, while 
short on detail, it is stressed that ‘any further steps taken towards increased EU 
integration should be accompanied by sufficient steps in the area of political union’ 
(ibid). Similarly, when discussing what form a future political union may take in 
Europe, a separate Commission official working within the Directorate for Fiscal 
Policy does comment that not only would the European Parliament ‘want to play an 
enhanced role’ but that ‘it would be very difficult not to give it a role’ (Interview 
Extract D 2013:4). Yet again, there is a lack of clarity regarding some of the 
fundamental questions that would concern any future advancement towards political 
union within EMU. For example, as the official makes clear, ‘The question is whether 
it has an advisory role or whether it is able to somehow, in part, set the totals within 
which countries are allowed to move’ (ibid). Finally, one senior fiscal policy advisor 
within DG ECFIN questions whether the debate should be centred on the European 
Parliament all. Instead, they argue, it is about ‘building a strong executive’ in order to 
‘steer decisions’ (Interview Extract C 2013:4-5). The advisors concluding statement 
is also telling in this respect: ‘So while I am happy to say democratic legitimacy and 
empower the parliament, I am worried about the executive. I think we need to think 
about having an executive that is really an executive in Europe’ (ibid). 
 
The dominant neoliberal reform discourses which have been seen to be 
prioritised within the blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU can be intertextually 
located within a series of earlier texts produced within the Commission setting. For 
example, the Commission cites the May 2010 Communication entitled Reinforcing 
economic policy coordination, as well as the subsequent six-pack, two-pack and 
fiscal compact (or ‘Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in Economic 
and Monetary Union’) legislative procedures which followed. Of course, as 
established in the previous section covering the more immediate crisis period, the 
Communication and the accompanying legislation prioritises the same neoliberal 
reform narrative: one which builds on the SGP framework for fiscal discipline. Also, 
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alongside the more explicit intertextual elements that factored in the production of 
the Commission’s blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU, similar overlapping 
neoliberal orders of discourse can also be intertextually traced far back before the 
economic and financial turmoil took hold in Europe (see, in particularly, Commission 
2004, Commission 2004a, Commission 2008 & the 1989 ‘Delors Report’). Of course, 
however, while the link between fiscal discipline (or the securing of so called ‘sound’ 
or ‘sustainable’ public finances) has been related within these more historical texts to 
a series of broader macroeconomic policy outputs related to price stability and the 
securing of the economic growth potential of member states within EMU, within the 
more recent blueprint fiscal discipline is linked more closely overcoming the 
challenges presented by the financial and economic crisis. 
 
To conclude this section, through the analysis of the Commission’s blueprint 
for a deep and genuine EMU—in conjunction with informal discourse from senior EU 
level officials located within DG ECFIN—it has been found that a neoliberal reform 
agenda building on the SGP framework for fiscal discipline has been prioritised 
moving forward from the crisis. Nevertheless, over the medium to longer term the 
blueprint does shift towards more of an emphasis on endowing EMU with reaching 
neo-Keynesian solidarity measures, including provisions for a an increased 
European fiscal capacity alongside steps towards the mutualisation of euro area 
member states debt. Yet a reading of more informal discourse from DG ECFIN 
officials has in fact revealed a high degree of scepticism concerning the actual 
desirability and political feasibility of making a qualitative integration towards a 
deeper level of fiscal union. And, of course, with the Commission’s overriding focus 
seen to be set on securing a neoliberal reform agenda for EMU, challenging 
questions concerning input dimension of legitimacy and the development of a 
flanking political union aspect have been found to be neglected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
153 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Although intergovernmental modes of decision making have become an even 
stronger feature of EMU governance since the onset of the financial and economic 
crisis, the Commission, bolstered by its dual executive and legislative role within 
EMU, has worked hard to ensure that it has been in a position to provide extensive 
input into the ongoing fiscal governance reform debate. During the immediate crisis 
period, the Commission demonstrated a strong commitment to a neoliberal reform 
agenda and a discourse which at its heart contained a commitment to securing 
strengthened fiscal discipline within EMU through building on the pre-existing SGP 
framework. Such neoliberal policy prescriptions resulted to a significant extent from a 
neoliberal framing of the crisis in the first place, with member states failure to 
observe adequate levels of fiscal discipline in line with European rules being framed 
as being a key causal factor leading up to the crisis events that took place. Over the 
longer term time period, however, this reform discourse has shifted noticeably 
towards the prospect of making an integration leap within EMU towards a 
qualitatively deeper level of fiscal union. As part of this discourse, a series of 
integration steps have been outlined for moving progressively towards the eventual 
adoption of very far reaching neo-Keynesian solidarity mechanisms within EMU, 
including a significantly enlarged European fiscal capacity and an extensive 
mutualisation of euro area member states debt. 
 
Yet it is an important finding that informal discourse from DG ECFIN officials 
has in fact revealed a high degree of scepticism concerning the desirability and 
political feasibility of moving towards a deeper level of fiscal union. With this in mind, 
it would seem that the most likely outcome would be that the Commission will 
continue to prioritise a reform agenda for EU fiscal governance defined strongly by a 
neoliberal logic. Of course, with the implementation of fiscal discipline on the output 
side remaining the overriding focus here, the observation that challenging question 
concerning the development of a political union aspect, as an accompaniment to 
integration on the fiscal side, have been side-lined is not unexpected. In fact, at 
present there would not seem to be even a vague idea as to the nature of the 
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mechanisms required to ensure the democratic legitimacy and accountability of 
decision making on the input side. Overall, then, it is probable that the Commission, 
inspired by a commitment to neo-liberalism, will remain committed to a model of 
fiscal federalism not too far removed from the current status quo. 
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Chapter Eight: European Parliament Institutional Setting 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Decision making within EMU has always had a strong intergovernmental 
dimension—although there has been an ongoing trend in recent years which has 
seen more powers and influence being won by the European Parliament over 
decision making within EMU. These reforms have not, however, prevented the 
European Parliament from being excluded from some of the key negotiations, 
particularly amongst Heads of State or government, that have taken place at various 
stages during the crisis. The parliamentary body has, though, had other opportunities 
to provide its own valuable input into the reform debate arising over EU fiscal 
governance reform—opportunity’s that it has taken enthusiastically. In identifying the 
key patterns of discourse arising from within the EU’s parliamentary setting during 
both the immediate and post-crisis period, it is notable that have in fact remained 
remarkably consistent. The reform discourse has, for example, always sought to 
address both the input and output dimensions of legitimacy as part of a synergising 
relationship with the prospect of making a qualitative integration leap towards full 
fiscal and political union 
 
On the output side the discourse has been set around the prospect of 
implementing far reaching neo-Keynesian solidarity mechanisms within EMU, 
including the prospect of an enlarged EU budget along with steps towards the joint 
mutualisation of sovereign debt over the longer term. And, while by no means absent, 
there has been altogether less of a focus on the measures required to strengthen 
fiscal discipline under the SGP. This can partly be attributed to the fact that the 
European Parliament has been seen to deviate significantly from more neoliberal 
interpretations of the crisis, which attach blame for Europe’s sovereign debt troubles 
almost solely on the fiscal profligacy amongst certain member states. Instead, the 
crisis was framed in close accordance with a Keynesian logic, according to which the 
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Eurozone crisis is seen as being as much of a balance-of-payments crisis as a public 
debt crisis.  
 
With reference to the input side of the reform discourse, it has been 
understood as vital in this context that any integration in the direction of a deeper 
level of fiscal union is matched by equal steps towards the setting up of a flanking 
political union aspect. The potential for a strengthened European Parliament has 
been the decisive factor here, with the Parliament being understood as the only body 
with the capacity to ensure the democratic legitimacy and accountability for decisions 
taken at the European level. However, this is not to suggest that the national 
parliaments, acting in coordination with their supranational equivalent, have not also 
been understood as having an important role to play in underpinning these 
legitimising mechanisms. As would be expected, though, the role of 
intergovernmental decision-making and structures has been flat out rejected as 
undemocratic and illegitimate—perhaps reflecting a preference for the European 
Parliament to be a fully active participant within the EU policy making framework. 
Finally, as a model of fiscal federalism, such a reform agenda would, if implemented, 
represent a significant departure from the status quo—although given the European 
Parliaments historically more marginal position within EMU, there are still doubts 
over its capacity to push it through to implementation.   
 
 
Contextual Overview 
 
The European Parliament is the only directly elected institution in the EU, with 
the Parliament being directly elected for the first time in 1979. As the only directly 
elected institution at the European level, the European Parliament is widely seen by 
EU officials as undertaking a crucial role in conferring democratic legitimacy and 
accountability onto supranational EU level politics. Of course, though, it would be 
wrong to suggest that opinions do not diverge widely when discussing the actual 
capacity of the parliamentary body to carry out this role effectively (as was discussed 
during the undertaking of the critical literature review). For the purposes of this 
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chapter, however, it should be observed that the European Parliament does in many 
respects function as a working parliament would at the national level. It is not, for 
example, divided along national lines and dominated by groups whose votes 
coincide with their respective member state affiliations. As is observed by Hix et al. 
for example, when discussing this topic: ‘Politics in the European Parliament is very 
much like politics in other democratic parliaments, dominated by left-right positions 
and driven by the traditional party families of domestic European politics’ by (Hix et al. 
2007:23). Instead of national groupings, however, there is a series of transnational 
party groupings (or Europarties) which serve to structure the vote of members sitting 
in the European Parliament along ideological lines. Nevertheless, these transnational 
political entities are intimately linked to domestic politics, with transnational party 
groupings being made up of numerous national political parties across Europe that, 
despite sometimes significant differences, share an overlapping ideology. 
 
 In the last Parliament, whose mandate ran from 2009-2014, a total of seven 
transnational party groupings were formed, although in practice the Parliament was 
often dominated by an informal ‘grand coalition’ between the centre-right European 
People's Party (EPP) and the centre-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats (S&D), with the centralist Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
(ALDE) also often contributing to making up a majority coalition (Hix 2009). The 
formation of a grand coalition was helped by the high rate of voter cohesion among 
the dominant European political parties. And, in the rare occurrence when the two 
largest groups did not vote together (i.e. the EPP and S&D), a centre-left or a centre-
right coalition involving the inclusion of several smaller parties was still a possibility 
for forming a majority (ibid). In relation to this chapter, then, it is significant that the 
workings of the European Parliament favour a winning coalition that, while differing 
on left-right issues, is ideologically close to the centre ground and (mildly) pro-
European when confronting the majority of integration issues. Meanwhile, it is worth 
pointing out that, while influential through various channels, a Eurosceptic coalition 
often does not, even if they vote cohesively, have enough seats to win votes. And, 
even though the rise of populist parities was a factor in the recent 2014 European 
Elections, sober analysis demonstrates that centralist pro-European parties are still 
able to dominate the process of coalition building. In fact, even before the elections 
some informed commentators concluded that ‘the ironic result of a popular upswing 
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will be to bolster the influence of MEPs in the mainstream political groupings’ 
(Bertoncini & Kreilinger 2013:22). 
 
In relation to the European Parliament’s actual role within EU governance, it is 
worth observing that during its early history it was largely consultative one, although 
since the mid-1980s the body has secured an altogether more expanded position. In 
fact, from this point onwards, the parliamentary body has been observed to have 
gained power in two main areas of authority: ‘to control the executive and to make 
legislation’ (Hix et al 2007:13). However, while the European Parliament has in fact 
enjoyed a considerable expansion of its influence across many areas of EU policy 
making, within the confines of EU fiscal governance specifically it’s role is largely 
limited to supervisory and consultation privileges. After all, policy making in this 
sphere has been, and still often is, the preserve of decisions taken in various 
intergovernmental forums (including the European Council, ECOFIN Council and 
Eurogroup) as well the Commission institutional setting as the EU’s executive arm. 
However, despite the European Parliament’s activities in this area being historically 
quite marginal compared with that of other institutions, there has been an ongoing 
trend in recent years which has seen more powers and influence being won by the 
parliamentary body over decision making within EMU.  
 
To begin with, it is a significant coincidence that the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty coincided not long after with a shifting of the epicentre of the financial and 
economic crisis towards Europe. After all, it can be recalled here that the adoption of 
the Lisbon Treaty provided a modest boost to the European Parliament’s role in 
relation to EU fiscal governance. This is because the parliamentary body was made 
‘co-legislator as regards the setting of detailed rules for multilateral surveillance’ 
(Article 121(6) TFEU), and it is now ‘consulted on secondary legislation 
implementing the excessive deficit procedure’ (Article 126(14) TFEU) (EP 2013a:4). 
The reforms introduced at Lisbon have therefore been highly influential in terms of 
dictating the particular role the European Parliament came to be play following the 
onset of the crisis events in Europe. A senior official located within the Council 
Directorate for Economic Policy reaches similar conclusions when discussing this 
topic:  
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‘‘Well the European Parliament has not been marginalised. On the 
contrary, it has also received more prominence through the 
legislative files (six-pack, two-pack). But there again there is a 
coincidence because of the Treaty of Lisbon introduced much more 
co-decision across the policy arears. This also coincided with the 
crisis, so the six pack measures that were prepared in 2010 and then 
negotiated went through co-decision, at least most of them did. […..] 
And the same goes for the two pack, which followed in 2012’’ 
(Interview Extract G 2013:2). 
 
Clearly, then, the reforms introduced at Lisbon have made it possible for the 
parliamentary body to amend key pieces of legislation introduced as a response to 
the crisis events that confronted Europe. However, the European Parliament’s role is 
still, on balance, often seen to be secondary relative to other more influential actors. 
Not only, of course, was the European Parliament excluded from much high level 
intergovernmental deliberation that took place at the height of the crisis, but the 
body’s tangible power to influence decision making on matters related to EU fiscal 
governance is still often decidedly limited. A member of the secretariat located within 
DG ECFIN reaches similar conclusions when discussing how the European 
Parliament has functioned throughout the crisis period:  
 
‘‘They [referring to the European Parliament] have been quite active 
considering their role in economic governance before the crisis was 
pretty small, with their role, visibility and impact being not that big. 
They have indeed worked through the six-pack and the two-pack 
and they really negotiated hard to get a bigger role. It is still a role 
largely restricted to dialogue though; it has little decision making 
power—although they do have co-decision making power over parts 
of the legislation. But, in day to day managing of the crisis, I would 
say their role has increased but not in the nature that it influences 
decisions directly’’ (Interview Extract E 2013:2). 
 
The role of the European Parliament during the crisis has been a nuanced 
one then: While it has utilised its increased power to influence fiscal governance 
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legislation to good effect, it has at other times found itself excluded as deliberations 
amongst Heads of State came to the fore. Also, its tangible decision making role 
over the day to day running of EU fiscal governance is still secondary, although 
Lisbon has made it possible for the Parliament to continue the trend of gaining more 
powers—a trend which, on balance, has probably been exacerbated by the crisis, at 
least over the longer term anyway (see Interview Extract J 2013:2 & K 2014:2 for 
MEP’s estimations as to the increased role acquired by the European Parliament 
since the crisis).  
 
Overall, it follows that the European Parliament has been in a position to 
influence, rather than dictate, the terms of the debate evolving over the process of 
fiscal governance reform in Europe. What’s more, the European Parliament, during 
the course of the financial and economic crisis, has been seen to have taken a 
number of deliberate actions with this ultimate goal in mind. To begin with, in 
response to the initial global financial crises of 2007-2008 (i.e. before the full scale of 
Europe’s economic and financial difficulties were revealed), the European Parliament 
established on the 7 October 2009 the ‘Special Committee on the Financial, 
Economic and Social Crisis’ (referred to as the ‘CRIS’ Committee in abbreviated 
form). In light of the subsequent sovereign debt problems that would soon follow in 
Europe, the Committee was inevitably obliged to focus at least some of its attention 
on the appropriateness of the EU’s fiscal governance arrangements and to the 
possible reform agenda that might follow. In fact, over the course of two years, two 
key reports key were produced by the CRIS Committee from which the plenary 
adopted two resolutions outlaying its key recommendations as to the fiscal (and 
broader economic and social) reform measures that need to be pursued in response 
to the economic and financial crisis: European Parliament resolution of the 20 
October 2010 based on the CRIS Committee’s mid-term report (see EP 2010) and a 
second European Parliament resolution of the 6 July 2011 based on the final report 
of the CRIS committee (see EP 2011). As such, while the parliamentary body 
significantly was not represented on the task force chaired by the European Council 
President Herman Van Rompuy, it was able to influence the reform agenda indirectly 
at least through various channels.   
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As you might expect, with the European Parliament seen to be keen to play 
an active role in influencing the terms of the reform debate during the immediate 
crisis period, it is of little surprise that the parliamentary body was also keen to make 
its mark over the emerging debate concerning the possibility of taking more 
ambitious integration steps within EU fiscal governance over the longer term. Again 
though, it is telling here that the President of the European Parliament was not 
directly involved in the drafting of the President of the European Council’s Towards a 
genuine Economic and Monetary Union report, which was developed in close 
cooperation with the President of the Commission, the President of the Eurogroup 
and the President of the ECB, before it presentation at the European Council 
meeting held in June 2012—a situation described in a subsequent parliamentary 
resolution as being ‘unacceptable’ both from a ‘democratic point of view’ and given 
the ‘provisions of the Lisbon Treaty’ (European Parliament 2012b:6). Again, however, 
while the European Parliament was not able to participate directly in the preparations 
for the road map Towards a Genuine EMU, it did issue a motion for a resolution with 
recommendations to the Commission in response to the report submitted by the 
President of the European Council (see European Parliament 2012). This resolution 
was adopted on 20 November 2012. It outlines in depth the European Parliament’s 
preferences, as voted on during plenary sessions, for fiscal governance and broader 
economic governance reform over the longer term following the crisis events in 
Europe. 
 
To conclude, it is clear that the European Parliament has been keen to utilise 
the additional powers extended to it through the Lisbon Treaty to maximum effect 
during the ongoing crisis period. This was reflected in the European Parliament’s 
efforts to fight for amendments to the six-pack and two-pack legislation where it was 
been keen to make its voice heard. Over the longer term the parliamentary body has, 
through the adoption of various resolutions following approval in plenary sessions, 
sought to provide a substantive vision as to how it envisions the fiscal governance 
reform process should proceed over the short, medium to long term. Of course, there 
is no denying that during the ongoing crisis there have been times when the 
European Parliament has found itself explicitly side-lined, particularly during periods 
when intense intergovernmental deliberation has taken centre stage. And, to its 
obvious disdain, the President of the European Parliament was not represented on 
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the influential Van Rompouy led Task Force or in the drafting of the President of the 
European Council’s towards a genuine EMU report.  
 
Perhaps more than anything, though, this marginalisation reflects the fact that 
the European Parliament’s role over decision making within EMU, while enhanced in 
recent times, is still largely limited to a supervisory and consultation role. However, 
following the provisions introduced under the Lisbon Treaty and the extension of co-
decision rights, there is an opening for the body to play a substantially increased role 
over EU fiscal governance moving forward. This could also be bolstered by the 
European Parliament’s self-made assertions as to its crucial role in conferring 
democratic legitimacy and accountability onto supranational EU level politics. While 
the latter point may be a contested one, what is clear is that the European 
Parliament’s capacity to influence, rather than dictate, the EU fiscal governance 
debate should not be underestimated—even if it is a role which it is often  forced to 
carry away from the core decision making and deliberative forums within EMU. It is 
from this rather fluid vantage point, then, that the nature of the particular legitimising 
discourses being produced from within the European Parliament setting are 
considered.   
 
 
Legitimising Discourse Activity  
  
Discourses of Crisis 
 
 
As hinted at above, in response to the global financial crises of 2007 the 
European Parliament established on the 7 October 2009 the ‘Special Committee on 
the Financial, Economic and Social Crisis’ (the so called ‘CRIS’ Committee), 
represented by 45 MEP’s selected from across the party groupings. As part of the 
Committees remit, it was directed to ‘analyse and evaluate the current 
implementation of Community legislation in all the areas concerned’ (CRIS 
Committee 2011:15). This briefing naturally led the Committee towards analysing 
and evaluating the appropriateness of Community legislation across a whole number 
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of policy areas related to the broader economic and social realm. And, as you might 
expect, the workings of EU’s fiscal governance arrangements figures prominently 
within the Committees remit. Following on from this, two key reports key were 
eventually drafted by the CRIS Committee from which the plenary adopted two 
resolutions outlaying its key recommendations: European Parliament resolution of 
the 20 October 2010 based on the CRIS Committee’s mid-term report (see 
European Parliament 2010) and a second European Parliament resolution of the 6 
July 2011 based on the final report of the CRIS committee (see European Parliament 
2011). Notably, this analysis will focus on the final parliamentary resolution here 
dated the 6 July 2011 because the extended time frame means the CRIS Committee 
was able to factor in to its analysis the events that led to the intensification of the 
crisis in Europe specifically—as market concerns heightened over periphery member 
states sovereign debt situation. The table presented below provides a brief summary 
of the key discourse patterns contained within the text of the parliamentary report 
(see table 8.1 
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Table 8.1: Key Patterns of Discourse  
 
 
 
 
 
Input orientated 
discourse 
Output orientated 
discourse 
As a Model of 
Fiscal Federalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parliamentary 
resolution 
based on the 
final report of 
the CRIS 
Committee   
 
Political integration is 
attached equal 
importance as 
integration on the 
fiscal side 
 
Calls are made for a 
deeper political union 
aspect—at the centre 
of which is a 
strengthened 
European Parliament.  
 
The resolution remains 
vague though when it 
comes too elaborating 
on the precise 
mechanisms that 
would be involved 
here. 
 
A firm stand is taken 
against 
intergovernmental 
modes of decision 
making that would 
work to exclude the 
European Parliament 
from actively 
participating. 
 
A Keynesian (as opposed 
to a neoliberal) view of 
the Eurozone crisis is 
taken, with the role played 
by balance-of-payments 
imbalances being 
emphasised over and 
above the build-up of 
public debt.  
 
The policy response 
extends far beyond the 
measures required to 
reinforce compliance with 
the SGP frame work in 
the direction of the 
implementation of neo-
Keynesian solidarity 
mechanisms within EMU. 
 
  
Calls for far reaching debt 
mutualisation (possibly 
through Eurobond 
issuance) and a 
significant shift of 
competences and 
spending towards the 
Union, i.e. in the direction 
of an enlarged EU 
budget. The prospect of a 
European Debt Agency 
also endorsed.  
 
Far reaching 
model of fiscal 
federalism: full 
fiscal union with 
flanking political 
union aspect. 
 
 
Significant 
departure from 
the current status 
quo 
 
 
 
When addressing the question of EU fiscal and broader economic governance, 
the resolution is dominated by a consistent narrative which emphasises the 
integration leap required within EMU in response to the challenges facing the Union 
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as a result of the financial and economic crisis. The resolution is quite clear in this 
respect:  
 
‘‘[T]he European Union is at a crossroads: either the Member States 
decide to join forces in deepening integration or, owing to stagnation 
at the decision-making level and divergences at the economic level, 
the EU could drift apart’’ (European Parliament 2011:16).    
 
The crisis, then, is depicted in existential terms as a threat not only to the 
single currency area but to the wider Union itself. And, as made explicit in the above 
citation, a deepening of integration within EMU is understood as the only adequate 
response to preventing a possible breakup of the EU. In expanding on how the crisis 
is framed within the text of the resolution, it is apparent that a Keynesian view 
dominates (as opposed to the neoliberal alternative), with the role of macroeconomic 
imbalances being afforded a prominent role. For example, the text: 
 
‘‘Underlines the fact that the sovereign debt crisis has revealed the 
risks posed by intra-European imbalances; stresses the need for the 
EU to react as one, to develop a much closer coordination of fiscal 
policies and, where appropriate, a common one with a sufficient EU 
budget funded partly through own resources, and to put in place 
adequate provisions for crisis management and economic 
convergence’’ (European Parliament 2011:4). 
 
As is evident, the imbalances revealed within the euro area are understood as 
providing enough justification for the taking of a series of integration steps within 
EMU towards a more far reaching model of fiscal federalism, with closer fiscal 
coordination and the development of enlarged fiscal capacity being key features here.  
 
The the issue of public debt is not left untouched, however. Yet, unlike more 
neoliberal interpretations of the crisis that attach blame for Europe’s sovereign debt 
troubles almost solely on the fiscal profligacy amongst certain member states, the 
resolution takes a far more nuanced position. For example, the text: 
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‘‘Recalls the triangle of inter-linked vulnerabilities, whereby the 
unbalanced fiscal policy of some Member States has amplified the 
pre-crisis public deficits and the financial crisis has contributed 
significantly to a further ballooning of those deficits, followed by 
tensions in sovereign debt markets in some Member States’’ 
(European Parliament 2011:3). 
 
In this respect, while it is accepted that fiscal profligacy is a contributing factor 
for selected member states within the euro area, it is recognised that it was the 
financial crisis itself, as well as ensuing problems in the sovereign debt markets, 
which ultimately compounded the Eurozone’s public debt problem. It is also telling 
that the SGP is only made reference to twice within the entire resolution, with 
budgetary discipline and the need to reinforce compliance with deficit and debt rules 
appearing to be just one of many objectives aspired to by the CRIS Committee. 
However, the issue of internal ‘imbalances’ is mentioned a total of eight times here, 
reflecting perhaps the heightened importance attached to the issue of 
macroeconomic imbalances in the context of the observed financial and economic 
turmoil in Europe. Finally, ‘credit rating agencies’ are attached a significant portion of 
the blame for the intensification of the crisis events in Europe, owing to what is 
termed as their ‘assignment of faulty ratings to structured finance instruments which 
had to be downgraded’ (European Parliament 2011:3).  
 
With the crisis being framed in close accordance with a Keynesian logic within 
the resolution, according to which the Eurozone crisis is viewed as being as much of 
a balance-of-payments crisis as a public debt crisis, it of little surprise to see that the 
policy response advanced within the same text also extends far beyond the 
measures required to reinforce compliance with the SGP framework for fiscal 
discipline to include a number of broader macroeconomic objectives. For example, it 
is observed that: 
 
‘‘[T]he crisis has made clear the need for progress towards 
establishing a genuine economic governance of the Union, 
consisting of a systematic set of policies designed to ensure 
sustainable growth, good stable jobs, budgetary discipline, the 
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correction of excessive macro-economic imbalances, 
competitiveness and productivity in the EU’s economy, and stricter 
regulation and supervision of financial markets, as well as a suitable 
mechanism for resolving the financial crisis’’ (European Parliament 
2011:2).  
 
As already hinted at above, the securing of such a broad range of objectives 
is seen to demand in the fiscal realm a qualitative integration leap within EMU 
towards a deeper level of fiscal union in which neo-Keynesian solidarity measures 
play an enhanced role. The European Parliament, for example, makes a request that 
the Commission should carry out an ‘investigation into a future system of Eurobonds’, 
with the primary aim being to determine the ‘conditions under which such a system 
would be beneficial to all participating Member States and to the eurozone as a 
whole’ (European Parliament 2011:4-5). Two overarching aims are suggested for the 
far reaching debt mutualisation measure: 1) ‘to reduce sovereign debt’; 2) and ‘to 
avoid moral hazard and prevent speculation against the euro’ (ibid). Notably, with a 
view to meeting these objectives consecutively, it is emphasised that issuance would 
be ‘limited’ to a debt to GDP ratio of 60%, with added so called ‘incentives’ being put 
in place to reduce member states sovereign debt to that level. It is no surprise, then, 
to see Eurobond issuance linked with increased ‘budgetary discipline and 
compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)’ (ibid). However, once again 
budgetary or fiscal discipline is not the primary objective here with Eurobonds being 
linked with a whole range of broader objectives, including their potential for fostering 
‘integration of the European sovereign debt market’, ‘lower borrowing costs’, 
‘increase liquidity’, ‘promote coordinated structural reforms’, and ‘make capital 
markets more stable’ (ibid).  
 
Following along this trajectory, the resolution also goes on to argue ‘that 
tackling the public debt crisis and increasing the EU’s competitiveness, convergence 
and solidarity require a shift of competences and spending towards the Union’, i.e. in 
the direction of an enlarged EU budget. In fact, the text is quite explicit as to 
significant integration steps that are seen to be required with this outcome in mind:  
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‘‘[I]n order to achieve political union and economic integration 
commensurate with monetary union, in line with the priorities agreed 
by the European Council, the EU needs a budget of sufficient size to 
accommodate the euro in a sustainable way, providing the currency 
with a relevant budget space on the level of political organisation at 
which it is issued’’ (European Parliament 2011:17). 
 
Evidently, there would appear to be a strong opinion that an enlarged EU 
budget is integral to the functioning of the single currency area as it currently stands. 
Yet, in terms of the specific redistributive and/or stabilisation functions that such an 
EU fiscal capacity could play, these are left largely untackled within the resolution. It 
is mentioned, however, that the ‘burden on national budgets would be considerably 
eased’ and that such provisions would allow for a more ‘optimal use and allocation of 
existing fiscal resources on all levels’ (European Parliament 2011:17). And 
furthermore, the influential McDougall report, which advocated the creation of a 
major European fiscal capacity with stabilisation functions of between 2.5 and 10 per 
cent of Union GNI, is also cited here (with the report envisioning a gradual increase 
over time) (ibid). Finally, calls are made for the intergovernmental European 
Stabilisation Mechanism to be converted into a more permanent and more far 
reaching ‘European Debt Agency’ that would be in charge of common debt issuance 
for Eurozone member states (European Parliament 2011:5).  
 
While the text of the resolution argues forcefully in favour of the 
implementation of far reaching neo-Keynesian solidarity measures on the output side, 
discourses calling attention to the political union aspect and the measures required 
to underpin the democratic legitimacy and accountability of decision making on the 
input side are addressed equally as part of a synergising relationship. For example, 
the text: 
 
‘‘Calls for a deeper democratic political Union in which the EU 
institutions are given a stronger role in both the design and the  
strengthening the democratic legitimacy and control of the Union’’ 
(European Parliament 2011:16)  
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Clearly, a strengthening of the European Parliament as the only directly 
elected EU institution would seem to be an integral part of this envisioned flanking 
political aspect, as an accompaniment to integration on the fiscal side. The text is 
quite vague though when it comes too elaborating on the precise mechanisms that 
would be required to ensure adequate levels of democratic participation and 
representation on the input side. Nevertheless, ‘the need for a stronger European 
Commission made more accountable to Parliament’, is highlighted for particular 
attention (European Parliament 2011:16).  
 
The text is absolutely clear, however, that fiscal and broader economic 
governance ‘must be organised using the Community method and steered by the 
Union institutions’ (although it is stressed that this processes would take place with 
‘national parliaments being fully involved’) (European Parliament 2011:16-17). The 
crucial point is though that the resolution stands firmly against intergovernmental 
modes of decision making that naturally would exclude the European Parliament 
from actively participating. Instead, as elaborated on within the text, there is a 
conviction that: 
 
‘‘[P]oltical decisions on economic governance should not endanger 
the commitments agreed at EU level reflecting the goals and 
interests of all Member States, and that such decisions should be 
anchored in the Treaty and be pursued with the full institutional 
involvement and scrutiny of the European Commission and of 
Parliament’’ (European Parliament 2011:18). 
 
As such, it is envisioned that the future development of any political union 
aspect needs to be firmly embedded within the Community Method as laid down with 
the EU treaties. This stance is to be expected, of course, because working within the 
confines of the Community Method ensures the full involvement of the European 
Parliament as co-legislator, compared with the intergovernmental method where the 
parliamentary body is at best only informed or consulted.  
 
The key discourse findings from the parliamentary resolution based on the 
final report of the CRIS committee can be further reinforced from a reading of more 
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informal discourse sourced from MEP’s who sit on the relevant Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON), where the bulk of the legislative work is done 
for matters concerning fiscal and broader governance. Of course, the individual 
MEP’s views are particular to their party affiliation and cannot be said to reflect the 
plenary a as a whole; nevertheless, together they add up to revealing picture as to 
the policy orientations of the parliamentary body during the recent financial and 
economic crisis. To begin with, while the MEP’s interviewed from across the political 
spectrum displayed varying degrees of support when questioned about the core 
legislative initiatives building on the SGP framework that were prioritised during the 
height of the crisis period (i.e. six-pack, two-pack and fiscal compact), there is a 
general consensus that reforms supporting neoliberal fiscal discipline should have 
been just one part of the solution to be pursued at this time—as opposed to the 
solution. For example, the former vice-president of the ECON Committee, MEP Mr 
Pablo Zalba Bidegain from the centre-right EPP group, expresses an altogether 
nuanced position when questioned on the balance between fiscal discipline and 
solidarity:  
 
‘‘I am a bit fed up with the austerity debate. I think the European 
Union needs to promote a growth friendly austerity and fiscal 
discipline policy […..] So it is clear that we need fiscal discipline, 
because we have seen how irresponsible fiscal policy by member 
states affects the rest of the euro area. So we need that discipline, 
but it needs to be applied in a clever flexible way in my opinion’’ 
(Interview Extract J 2013:2-3). 
  
From this analysis, the vice-president of ECON would appear to be of the 
opinion that the SGP needs to be implemented with more flexibility in order to 
support economic growth. Similarly, MEP Ms Danuta Maria HÜBNER, again from the 
centre-right EPP, argues that the SGP should be implemented with increased 
flexibility so as to ensure member states growth prospects are not hampered, 
alongside the need for various structural reforms:  
 
‘‘Of course, it is easy to talk in hindsight. But I think that some of us 
insisted from the very beginning the importance of having a growth 
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aspect to support the states going through fiscal consolidation under 
the SGP. I am not putting in question the need for all sorts of reforms, 
especially those of a structural nature. I was shocked that the 
Greeks, for example, didn’t have any structural reforms already in 
place like we in Poland did at the beginning of the 1990’s. So there 
was clearly a need for reforms and a level of fiscal consolidation, but 
there needs to be a degree of flexibility here and you cannot just do 
it by killing growth’’ (Interview Extract K 2014:3). 
 
Separately, MEP Ms Emilie TURUNEN from the centre-left S&D grouping 
criticises the effectiveness of the ‘internal devaluation’ and ‘fiscal contraction’ 
measures which have dominated the policy regime in Europe since the crisis for 
being ‘too one size fits all, too panic, too fast and too deep’—with ‘very little focus on 
macroeconomic imbalances is well and particularly the issue of current account 
imbalances’ (Interview Extract M 2014:1). The SGP framework is also singled out for 
particular criticism for being ‘very rigid’ and for ‘not really helping counterweight the 
economic cycle’ (Interview Extract M 2014:3). The interviewee finishes by adding 
that ‘there needs to be more clear provisions about exceptions in terms of defining 
more precisely the depth of a downturn’ (ibid). Finally, MEP Bas Eickhout from the 
centre-left Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance also cannot hide his 
frustration regarding what he perceives as Europe’s general misdiagnosis of the 
causes of the crisis in the first instance:   
 
‘‘Well I would say the emphasis placed on fiscal discipline is a 
deliberate misjudgement of where the crisis came from. It is also a 
deliberate political agenda. Ireland, for example, had a public debt of 
25%—so what the beep! Spain had a public debt of 40% and was 
running a budgetary surplus, at least up until 2008. So according to 
the SGP rules Spain and Ireland were doing great up until 2008. And 
these are countries that are no experiencing great problems. That is 
because the problems laid elsewhere’’ (Interview Extract L 2014:2). 
 
As to where the problems really lie, then the interviewee cites the now quite 
familiar issues concerning the build-up of ‘private debt’ and ‘trade balances’ within 
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the Eurozone as being the particular problems that need to be addressed with more 
vigour (Interview Extract L 2014:2). 
 
Overall, the informal discourse sourced from MEP’s representing a selection 
of the (admittedly relatively pro-European) transnational party groupings reveals 
varying degrees of disapproval with the neoliberal initiatives that have been 
perceived as dominating the European policy agenda in the wake of the crisis events. 
As witnessed, the bulk of the criticism is consumed by two key factors: 1) the lack 
flexibility in implementing the SGP framework; 2) and the lack of focus on broader 
macroeconomic imbalances, as opposed to debt and deficit criterion, where the true 
seeds of the crisis are perceived to lie. Of course, these informal discourse findings 
raise the issue of what alternative reform path the MEP’s would wish to see pursued 
for EU fiscal governance in the wake of the crisis—a question which will be analysed 
at greater length in the following section. However, in brief here, it is notable that the 
majority MEP’s interviewed are in favour of integration steps being taken within EMU 
towards a qualitatively deeper level of fiscal union in which far reaching neo-
Keynesian solidarity mechanisms play an enhanced role.  
 
For example, the former vice-president of the ECON Committee, MEP Mr 
Pablo Zalba Bidegain from the centre-right EPP group, is clear that deeper fiscal 
integration is a necessity, even if it may not be realised straight away:  
 
‘‘I think Eurobonds are not something to be ready in one or two 
years, but it is something that—together with a European Treasury—
will sooner or later will have to be implemented’’ (Interview Extract J 
2013:3). 
 
MEP Ms Danuta Maria Hübner, again from the centre-right EPP, argues along 
similar lines, although the interviewee is quite clear that such measures may in fact 
need to be set up with immediate effect in view of the heterogeneous nature of the 
single currency area:  
 
‘‘I think the reality is we have a very highly differentiated Eurozone. 
For example, those countries that will join in the coming years will be 
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probably for decades less developed in the sense of competiveness 
and technological competiveness, so we will continue to exist in a 
differentiated Eurozone. So what is important is to put in place 
urgently all sorts of mechanisms, including both fiscal transfer’s, debt 
mutualisation measures as well as enhanced surveillance measures, 
to reduce the risk of badly performing governments or irresponsible 
governments’’ (Interview Extract K 2014:4). 
 
It is also interesting here that those steps towards increased fiscal solidarity 
are envisioned as running in parallel with increased budgetary surveillance within 
EMU, presumably as a way to tackle concerns surrounding the issue of moral hazard 
concerns. This highlights that fiscal solidarity and fiscal discipline are not necessarily 
understood as totally opposing goals, although there would appear to be a clear 
understanding amongst many of the MEP’s interviewed that there needs to be a 
heightened focus on the former in view of the centrality of fiscal discipline objectives 
in the early stages of the crisis period .  
 
MEP Mr Olle Schmdt from the centralist ALDE reaches similar conclusions 
when questioned if some kind of debt mutualisation is necessary to make the 
currency union effective. However, the importance of basic structural reforms, 
alongside the fiscal integration process, was also bought attention to: 
 
‘‘I do think basic structurally reforms are necessary is well: look at 
Ireland, it is about getting back on track and doing your homework. 
But, of course, in view of the unemployment rate, especially amongst 
youth, we need to do much more in the way of fiscal solidarity in this 
transition period’’ (Interview Extract H 2013:3). 
 
And separately, MEP Bas Eickhout from the centre-left Group of the 
Greens/European Free Alliance is also absolutely clear as to how much deeper fiscal 
integration needs to be progressed within EMU in the coming years: ‘In the end it 
needs to go pretty deep. In fact, I find it difficult to go to see a halfway house solution, 
and I think that has to do with the fundamentals of a currency union’ (Interview 
Extract L 2014:3). In terms of specifics, a ‘mutualisation of debt’ as well as the 
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setting up of a ‘permanent or automatic stability transfer mechanism ties to the 
economic cycle of member states’ were suggested as crucial undertakings for 
realising a stable currency area (ibid). Finally, MEP Ms Emilie TURUNEN from the 
centre-left S&D grouping argues that ‘if one wants to make the single currency area 
stable we need more fiscal integration in terms of a larger budget, debt mutualisation 
schemes and even Eurobonds’ (Interview Extract M 2014:2).  
 
As in the parliamentary resolution based on the final report of the CRIS 
committee, while the informal discourse reveals MEP’s clear support for progressing 
towards a qualitatively deeper level of fiscal union in which solidarity mechanisms 
figure on the output side, there is an equal concern for the input side of the debate 
and the need to balance any integration in the fiscal realm with a series of parallel 
steps towards a flanking political union aspect. For example, the former vice-
president of the ECON Committee, MEP Mr Pablo Zalba Bidegain from the centre-
right EPP group is clear: ‘I think the key challenge we face in the coming years is the 
democratic legitimacy. I am really concerned about that’ (Interview Extract J 2013:1). 
As to what needs to be done to rectify this deficit, then a strengthened role for the 
European Parliament figures high up on the agenda:  
 
‘‘We have a more important role than before the entry of the Lisbon 
Treaty. I mean everything has changed dramatically in this 
Parliament. We have real power: we are a real co-legislator along 
with the Council. This has changed, but this has to change more’’ 
(Interview Extract J 2013:2).   
 
In fact, when discussing the future reform initiatives for EU fiscal governance 
that may be embarked upon in the wake of the crisis, the MEP is adamant that 
‘unless they are controlled politically by the European Parliament these will fail’. And 
significantly, the interviewee adds: ‘it is not just the reforms that will fail but the 
project’.  (Interview Extract J 2013:3). It is also no surprise to learn that the 
implementation of reforms through the ‘community method’ is the preferred route 
here because it is said to be ‘much more democratic’ (Interview Extract J 2013:1). 
Finally, one challenge is understood as central by the vice-president of the ECON to 
progressing successfully with the fiscal governance reform process: ‘to convince 
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member states to give sovereignty to the European Union, including crucially the 
European Parliament, to guarantee legitimacy like we have been talking about’ 
(Interview Extract J 2013:3). 
 
The necessity of strengthening the European Parliament is also emphasised 
by MEP Mr Olle Schmdt from the centralist ALDE, although the potential for national 
parliaments to play an enhanced role in conferring democratic legitimacy was 
discussed too:   
 
‘‘Yes, absolutely. There needs to be a marked strengthening of the 
European Parliament equal to the centralisation of powers at the 
central level that has taken place within EMU since the crisis. There 
also needs to be a much strengthened role for national parliament’s 
participation in scrutinising EU policymaking. Of course, such 
channels need to be set up more rapidly within the Eurozone group 
because they need it. The Euro group, for example, needs to be 
more accountable and responsible’’ (Interview Extract H 2013:2).   
 
A differentiation is also made between the euro and non-euro countries due to 
the fact that democratic mechanisms may have to be set up with greater hesitancy 
for the former group due to the greater centralisation of powers that has taken place 
subsequent to the crisis. In an overarching sense though the MEP is clear that there 
is only one path to be pursued when reforming EMU: ‘[T]he European Parliament, 
alongside national parliaments, have to be involved in decision making within EMU. 
And even if there is a backlash we have to live with that is well. But we cannot 
deviate from the democratic path—never’ (Interview Extract H 2013:3). 
 
MEP Ms Danuta Maria HÜBNER, again from the centre-right EPP, also points 
out that the recent crisis has bought about ‘shifting competencies from the national to 
the European level’—and it is at this point, it is argued, that the ‘whole issue of 
democratic legitimacy at the supranational level raises its head’ (Interview Extract K 
2014:2). The MEP expands upon the democratic challenges to be overcome and the 
key institutional reforms demanded in response, as she sees it:   
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‘‘[O]f course, if you go outside of the treaty, this issue is even more 
challenging. So we were complaining that this lack of legal basis and 
this reaching out to intergovernmental agreements in fact led to 
decision making that is to a greater extent forged behind closed 
doors. The way the European Council has been working, for 
example, is not very transparent. And that is why we believe that the 
European Parliament, secured by the treaty, should have been 
playing an active role in processing all those reforms already passed 
for building a deeper fiscal union. After all, as representative of 
citizens and not nations, the involvement of the European Parliament 
would have given more democratic legitimacy to the decisions’’ 
(Interview Extract K 2014:2). 
 
Clearly, a strengthened role for the European Parliament, as the only directly 
elected institution in the EU, is understood as being crucial in this context. However, 
in a similar manner to MEP Mr Olle Schmdt, the interviewee observes that we are 
currently in a so called ‘transition phase’ (i.e. between European and national level 
democracy) so we need to make an effort to ‘link the national parliaments to the 
European level’ (Interview Extract K 2014: 2-3).  
 
MEP Ms Emilie TURUNEN from the centre-left S&D grouping also questions 
the logic of progressing with fiscal integration in Europe without due consideration as 
to how the political union aspect might be developed. In the MEP’s own words:  
 
‘‘So if one wants to make the single currency area stable we need to 
have more fiscal integration in terms of a larger budget, debt 
mutualisation schemes and even Eurobonds—ultimately yes. But 
then the question arises do you have the democratic setup ready for 
that because you cannot have taxation without representation. And it 
is at this point that we need to consider how to develop an enhanced 
political union involving in particular a strengthening of the European 
Parliament within the workings of EMU’’ (Interview Extract M 2014:2).   
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MEP Bas Eickhout from the centre-left Group of the Greens/European Free 
Alliance also argues that we ‘need better democratic control in place’ as an 
accompaniment to the fiscal integration taking place—‘even if, in the MEP’s words, 
‘you can think of various fiscal integration measures that clever guys can push 
through secondary legislation without a treaty change’ (Interview Extract L 2014:3). 
When questioned further on the nature of the political union aspect that needs to be 
developed in order to ensure this democratic control the answer given is a definitive 
and radical one: ‘Well I do not see how you can do this without a more federal 
structure involving a clear separation of competencies between the European 
Parliament and its national level counterparts’ (ibid). Overall, then, all the MEP’s 
interviewed from across the political spectrum display a strong commitment to 
matching any integration in the fiscal domain with parallel steps towards the 
development of a flanking political union aspect and the reinforcing of democratic 
legitimacy and accountability on the input side. And here a vision of a markedly 
strengthened role for the European Parliament within EMU dominates, although the 
important role that national level parliaments would continue to play in this context is 
far from discounted.  
 
Many of the dominant patterns of discourse uncovered within the 
parliamentary resolution based on the final report of the CRIS committee can be 
intertextually located within a series of earlier texts produced by the European 
Parliament. To begin with, it is worth observing that the European Parliament has 
actively advanced arguments in favour of the implementation of neo-Keynesian 
solidarity mechanisms on the output side within EMU since before the single 
currency areas inception. For example, as part of a Resolution on the Commission’s 
Annual Economic Report for 1996, the European Parliament argued in favour of 
exploring the possibilities for developing an EU fiscal capacity, or so called ‘counter-
cyclical policy instruments at Community level’ (European Parliament 1996:70). 
Notably, similar utterings were heard again the following year as part of the 
equivalent Resolution on the Commission’s Annual Economic Report for 1997. 
Moreover, within this later text, the parliamentary body even called for, as a ‘priority 
task’, a form of ‘economic government’ at the EU level: one that is able to ensure 
‘enhanced co-ordination and concerted action’ within the ‘economic’, ‘fiscal’, 
‘structural’, ‘monetary’ and ‘income’ policy domains (European Parliament 1997:102).  
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That same year, as part of a Resolution on the coordination of fiscal and 
taxation policy in the Monetary Union, the European Parliament further clarified that 
a ‘substantially increased Community budget’ would be ‘theoretically the best way of 
dealing with economic crises’ (European Parliament 1997c:39). And the resolution 
contained a stark warning that the Community budget would ‘not enable fiscal and 
taxation policy to be used at Community level, nor would it permit substantial budget 
transfers as a means of stabilizing the economy in the event of difficulties by one or 
more Member States’ (ibid). Similar arguments are also made through discourse in 
the more recent time period. Most notably, as part of a 2008 resolution entitled 
EMU@10:The first 10 years of Economic  and Monetary Union and future challenges, 
the European Parliament requested that the ‘Commission examine the creation of 
European bonds’ and work to ‘develop a long-term strategy which enables the 
issuing of such bonds within the euro area’ (European Parliament 2008:10).  And 
finally, as part of a resolution on public finances in the EMU 2007-2008 passed the 
following year in 2009, the European Parliament reiterated its commitment for an 
enlarged ‘European public infrastructure investments policy’, funded through new 
European financial instruments such as a limited ‘Eurobond’, ‘European Investment 
Fund’ or through an enlarged ‘EU budget’ (European Parliament 2009:43).  
 
Also, as in the parliamentary resolution based on the final report of the CRIS 
committee under analysis here, the European Parliament has historically combined 
these output oriented discourses with an equal concern for strengthening democratic 
legitimacy and accountability of decision making on the  input side within EMU. For 
example, as part of a 1996 resolution discussing the changeover to the single 
currency, the European Parliament remarked, with particular reference to the 
prescribed budgetary deficit and government debt limits decided upon at Maastricht, 
that the ‘introduction of the euro cannot be carried out against the will of European 
citizens’ (European Parliament 1996:60). And it is in this context that European 
Parliament went on to reason that ‘open debate on the common currency must be 
intensified’ (ibid). Again, the following year, within a separate resolution passed on 
Economic Policy Coordination in stage 3 of EMU, the parliamentary body spoke at 
some length about how its ‘role’ in relation to the procedures set out in ‘Articles 103’ 
(multilateral surveillance) and ‘104c’ (Excessive Deficit procedure) of the EC treaty, 
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provisions that would later be put into effect under the SGP framework, should be 
‘strengthened’ (European Parliament 1997a:39). The same resolution also urged 
‘member states to offer their parliaments the best possible arrangements at the 
national level for participating in the discussions on the framing of the broad 
guideline of the economic policies of member states and the Community’ (ibid).  
 
The European Parliament’s concern with strengthening the input legitimacy of 
EU fiscal governance has been carried forward into the modern period.  For example, 
within the text of a 2006 parliamentary resolution on Public Finances in EMU, the 
European Parliament argued that a ‘public debate’ on matters concerning budgetary 
projections should take place in the European Parliament together with 
representatives of national parliaments (European Parliament 2007:783). Also, as 
part of the previously mentioned motion for a resolution concerning ‘EMU@10:The 
first 10 years of Economic  and Monetary Union and future challenges’, the 
parliamentary body outlined  an agenda for increasing the role of the Parliament in 
the set up for fiscal and economic policy coordination. The resolution in question also 
called for a ‘more regular and structured dialogue on macroeconomic issues 
between Parliament, Commission and the Eurogroup’, similar to that in the monetary 
policy domain (European Parliament 2008:19). And, more generally, the European 
Parliament put forward a case that all the major relevant EU institutions—including 
the Council, the Commission, the Eurogroup and itself as the only directly elected 
institution—should strive to ‘work together to strengthen the future working of the 
EMU as regards economic governance’ (European Parliament 2008:18). 
 
To conclude this section, through an analysis of the parliamentary resolution 
based on the final report of the CRIS committee—in conjunction with more informal 
discourse from MEP’s from across the political spectrum—it has been demonstrated 
how during the immediate crisis period the Europe Parliament advanced a pattern of 
discourse that attempted to bring together the input and output dimensions of 
legitimacy as part of a synergising relationship with the prospect of making a 
qualitative integration leap within EMU towards a full fiscal union with flanking 
political aspect. On the output side the discourse is set around the prospect of 
implementing far reaching neo-Keynesian solidarity mechanisms within EMU, 
including far reaching debt mutualisation through Eurobonds and a significant shift of 
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competences and spending towards the Union’, i.e. in the direction of an enlarged 
EU budget. In part, these policy prescriptions resulted from a Keynesian (as opposed 
to a neoliberal) view as to the causes of the crisis in the first instance—with the 
Eurozone crisis being understood as being as much of a balance-of-payments crisis 
as a public debt crisis. It is of little surprise, therefore, to see that the reform 
discourse extended far beyond any neoliberal measures required to reinforce 
compliance with the SGP, with fiscal discipline being one of many broader 
macroeconomic objectives.  
 
Of course, it was also understood as imperative in this discourse context that 
fiscal integration is matched without delay by adequate steps being taken towards 
the development of a flanking political union aspect in order to ensure the democratic 
legitimacy and accountability of decision making on the input side. Central to this 
discussion was providing for a strengthened role for the European Parliament over 
EMU decision making, with national parliaments also envisioned as making an 
important contribution too. In view of this, it is also of little surprise that the 
proliferation of more intergovernmental modes of decision making, as witnessed 
during the immediate crisis period, were also heavily criticised here for their 
exclusion of parliamentary involvement and perceived lack of democratic 
accountability. Instead, there was a commitment within the discourse to organising 
fiscal governance strictly according to the Community method, with the full 
involvement of the European Parliament as the only directly elected EU institution. In 
a general sense, then, the patterns of discourse being advanced from within the 
European Parliament setting for the immediate crisis period sought to combine the 
two dimensions of legitimacy, with a view to advancing a model of fiscal federalism 
that represents a significant departure from the current status quo: in the direction of 
a full fiscal and political union.  
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Post-Crisis Discourse 
 
 
The European Parliament was not directly involved in the drafting of the 
President of the European Council’s Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary 
Union report, which was developed in close cooperation with the President of the 
Commission, the President of the Eurogroup and the President of the ECB—before 
its presentation at the European Council meeting held in June 2012. Within a 
subsequent resolution the European Parliament made clear its feelings at being left 
out of the drafting process for this crucial report laying down a time-bound vision for 
EMU:  
 
‘‘[F]rom a democratic point of view and in the light of all the 
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty it is unacceptable that the President 
of the European Parliament, which is composed of elected Members 
representing more than 502 million European citizens, has not been 
involved in the drafting of the abovementioned report entitled 
‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’’  (European 
Parliament 2012:6) 
 
Yet, while the European Parliament was not able to participate directly in the 
drafting process for the road map towards a genuine EMU, the Parliamentary body 
was able to issue a motion for a resolution on a report containing key 
recommendations to the Commission in response to the proposals outlined within 
the report by the President of the European Council. This report entitled with 
recommendations to the Commission on the report of the Presidents of the 
European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the 
Eurogroup: Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union was adopted during a 
plenary session on the 20 of November 2012.  The report in question provided a 
valuable insight into parliamentary body’s preferences and vision for EMU reform 
over the longer term following on from the economic and financial crisis events in 
European. However, while the report considered a broad spectrum of measures 
across the fiscal, economic, financial and political domains, the analysis here will be 
confined to the aspects of direct relevance to the fiscal governance sphere. The 
182 
 
table presented below provides a brief summary of the key discourse patterns 
contained within the text of the parliamentary report (see table 8.2). 
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Table 8.2: Key Patterns of Discourse  
 
 
 
 
 
Input orientated 
discourse 
Output orientated 
discourse 
As a Model of 
Fiscal Federalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parliamentary 
report on: 
Towards a 
genuine 
Economic 
and Monetary 
Union’ 
 
Integration on the 
political side is 
understood as a 
necessary 
precondition to any 
further fiscal 
integration. 
 
A strengthened 
European Parliament 
viewed as the ultimate 
guarantor of the 
Union’s legitimacy 
here. And, as a rule, 
the report subscribes 
to a view that any 
centralisation of power 
should be matched by 
democratic control and 
accountability to 
parliament. 
 
National parliaments 
also seen as playing 
an important 
cooperative role with 
this schema, although 
it would be a 
secondary one for 
decisions taken at the 
European level. 
 
Intergovernmental 
decision-making 
structures are 
criticised for a severe 
lack of democratic 
legitimacy. 
 
 
 
Envisions the need for a  
integration leap towards a 
‘truly federal Europe’.  
 
Neoliberal discourses 
emphasising fiscal 
discipline are outweighed 
by those emphasising the 
principal of solidarity 
within EMU.  
 
One key priority here is 
an enlarged EU budget 
with an array of 
redistributive and 
stabilisation functions, 
with a gradual roll over to 
a debt redemption fund 
and the mutualisation of 
member state sovereign 
debt envisioned over the 
longer term. 
 
In order to tackle the 
issue of moral hazard 
though, these (neo-
Keynesian) solidarity 
mechanisms are linked 
with neoliberal fiscal 
discipline and member 
state compliance with 
their SGP budgetary 
commitments. 
 
The prospect of a 
European Treasury Office 
also put forward, which 
would have significant 
powers of revision of 
national budgets 
 
 
 
 
Far reaching 
model of fiscal 
federalism: full 
fiscal union with 
flanking political 
union aspect. 
 
 
Significant 
departure from 
the current status 
quo 
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In identifying the overarching vision for EMU reform contained within the 
report, it is made explicit early on the ambitious reform leap expected from European 
policymakers: 
 
‘‘[T[he time has come for the political leaders of and within the Union 
to demonstrate their determination, creativity, courage, resilience 
and leadership to remove  the remaining deficiencies that continue 
to hamper the proper functioning of EMU;  whereas the 
intergovernmental method has reached its limits and is not well 
suited for democratic and efficient decision-making in 21st century; 
whereas a leap should be made to a truly federal Europe’’ 
(European Parliament 2012:6).  
 
The report is unambiguous here that it anticipates nothing less than a 
qualitative integration leap within EMU towards what is termed as a ‘truly federal 
Europe’. In fact, such an integration leap is framed as the only option for 
policymakers wanting to ensure a ‘proper functioning’ EMU without so-called 
‘deficiencies’. The use of the ‘intergovernmental method’ moving forward is 
dismissed out of hand as undemocratic, perhaps hinting at the full participation 
expected of the European Parliament in the future within what would be a more 
highly integrated Union and single currency area. At this early stage, then, there can 
already be said to be a degree of overlap with the patterns of discourse that were 
observed to have been developed from within the European Parliament setting 
during the more immediate crisis period, with the report again being supportive of a 
series of far-reaching integration steps being taken within EMU towards a deeper 
level of fiscal union with a flanking political union aspect.   
 
In expanding upon the policy initiatives contained within the report for 
implementation over the short-term, there are some measures suggested for 
strengthening fiscal discipline within the EMU that can be identified as being strongly 
neoliberal in character. For example, the text argues that ‘the smooth functioning of 
the EMU requires a full and swift implementation of the measures already agreed 
upon under the reinforced economic governance framework such as the reinforced 
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SGP’ (notably through the implementation of the ‘Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and  Governance’—otherwise known as the fiscal compact) (European Parliament 
2012:11-12). As observed in previous chapters, the fiscal compact is primarily 
designed to reinforce the SGP framework for fiscal discipline, particularly by putting 
in place overlapping balanced budget rules in the national constitutions of signatory 
member states. It is qualified, however, that these reforms need to be ‘complimented 
with growth enhancing policies’ (ibid). Also on the topic of fiscal discipline, the report 
observes that ‘under the existing Treaties the coordination and surveillance of the 
budgetary discipline of the Member States whose currency is the euro could be 
made binding and subject to the control of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union on the simple basis of Article 136 TFEU in conjunction with Article 121(6)’ (i.e. 
without the need to recourse to a wholesale revision of the treaties)—although again 
there is a qualifying remark here that states that ‘this step should be taken into 
consideration only if it would substantially strengthen Parliament's role as far as the 
detailed implementation of Articles 121(3) and 121(4) TFEU is concerned’ (European 
Parliament 2014:19).  
 
Therefore, in the short term at least, some of the policy suggestions for fiscal 
governance reform are strongly neoliberal in flavour and centred by and large on the 
prospect of strengthening fiscal discipline within EMU. Nevertheless, these neoliberal 
discourses are more than balanced by a concern for increasing solidarity within EMU. 
For example, the report expresses a desire that: 
 
‘‘the growing divide between core and peripheral countries in the 
Union should not become chronic in nature; whereas a permanent 
framework must be created in which Member States in difficulty 
should be able to rely on solidarity-based support from other 
Member States’’ (European Parliament 2012:6).  
 
Here the contrasting situations between the core and periphery countries in 
Europe, which has become a defining feature of the crisis period, is presented as 
enough justification for the implementation of ‘solidarity based support’ within EMU 
(or what is termed here as neo-Keynesian solidarity mechanisms). Again, though, 
the report is clear in its conviction that ‘member States which desire solidarity should 
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be obliged to shoulder their responsibility for implementing all their commitments in 
the budgetary field’ (in a reference to their obligations in line with the SGP framework) 
(ibid). 
 
As to the nature of the solidarity mechanisms in mind, one key priority is an 
enlarged EU budget with an array of redistributive and stabilisation functions. The 
case for the setting up of such a fiscal capacity is made below:  
 
‘‘[The European Parliament] is of the opinion that a "genuine EMU" 
cannot be limited to a system of rules but requires an increased 
budgetary capacity based on specific own-resources (including an 
FTT) which should, in the framework of the EU budget, support 
growth and social cohesion addressing imbalances, structural 
divergences and financial emergencies which are directly connected 
to the monetary union, without undermining its traditional functions to 
finance common policies’’ (European Parliament 2012:19).  
 
It is also particularly revealing that the report is unambiguous in its conviction 
that a so called ‘Genuine EMU’ cannot be limited to a ‘system of rules’. After all, this 
is a direct reference to the SGP and the limits of having a fiscal union which at its 
centre is held together by a rules-based framework for fiscal discipline, absent any 
permanent fiscal solidarity mechanisms. The report also cites the ‘enhanced 
cooperation procedure’ as a way of demonstrating that ‘Member States whose 
currency is the euro can finance an increased EU budget in the framework of the 
own resources procedure by introducing specific taxes (i.e. without the need for a 
revision of the treaties) (European Parliament 2012:13).  
 
Over a longer term time period the report envisions that ‘a stronger and more 
integrated fiscal union should include a gradual roll-over into a redemption fund’ (a 
debt mutualisation instrument that would acquire euro area debt over and above 60% 
of GDP and fund it through a common bond issuance by the participating member 
stats) (European Parliament 2012:13). It is anticipated that such a common issuance 
of debt with financial risk sharing amongst members of the single currency area ‘may 
require a change to the Treaties’ (ibid). Furthermore, it is also emphasised that a 
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‘precondition’ for any common debt issuance is the setting up of a ‘sustainable fiscal 
framework’ and ‘control instruments to prevent moral hazard’ (ibid). This could 
account for why a ‘key feature of a genuine EMU’ is said to be the creation of a 
‘European Treasury Office’, which would have enhanced powers to revise national 
budgets (European Parliament 2012:12). Again then, solidarity is linked to fiscal 
discipline and member state compliance with their budgetary commitments as set 
out under the SGP framework.  
 
It is a significant observation that the patterns of discourse contained within 
the parliamentary report under analysis here correspond significantly with those 
uncovered for the more immediate crisis period within the European Parliamentary 
setting. As such, while the text of the report argues for deeper fiscal integration and 
the implementation of neo-Keynesian solidarity mechanisms on the output side 
(albeit with qualifications concerning member states compliance with the SGP), the 
political union aspect and the accompanying measures required to underpin the 
democratic legitimacy and accountability of decision making on the input side are 
also addressed equally as part of a synergising relationship. To begin with though, 
and rather surprisingly, the report lays out what is understood as dual basis for the 
Unions legitimacy: ‘that of the people represented by Parliament and the more 
intergovernmental (or indirect) route which is ‘through member states represented by 
the Council’ (European Parliament 2014:16). From a reading of the report, however, 
it is clear that the first legitimising route is prioritised, with a strengthened European 
Parliament being absolutely central to the vision of political union being advanced in 
this context. For example, within the text of the report it is made clear that it:   
 
‘‘[c]onsiders a substantial improvement of the democratic legitimacy 
and accountability at Union level of the EMU governance by an 
increased role of Parliament as an absolute necessity and a 
precondition for any further step toward a banking union, a fiscal 
union and an economic union’’ (European Parliament 2012:18-19).  
 
So it is the European Parliament that is understood to be the ultimate 
guarantor of democratic legitimacy and accountability on the input side at the 
European level. In fact, the report proceeds to argue that ‘the current 
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intergovernmental structure represents a severe lack of democratic legitimacy’ 
(European Parliament 2012:5). Also, the decision by Heads of State and 
Government to take the ‘intergovernmental route’ at times during the crisis—a 
decision which excluded the European Parliament from deliberations over crisis 
management and future reform options—is described with obvious disdain as 
‘deplorable’ (European parliament 2012:17).  
 
Following along this trajectory, the report subscribes to a view that as a 
general rule all ‘proposals falling within the competence of the Union decisions 
should be taken in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure’ (i.e. with the 
full involvement of the European Parliament as co-legislator) (European Parliament 
2012:17). Also it is deemed necessary that the ‘executive powers of the Commission 
in the rules-based approach to the economic governance framework’ (as set out 
under the reinforced SGP framework), must be open to ‘ex-post democratic control 
by, and accountability to Parliament’ (ibid). And it is reasoned that the 
‘intergovernmental instruments’ that have been developed with a view to responding 
to the financial and economic crisis should be ‘communitarised’—again in order to 
embed them in a framework where the European Parliament can provide adequate 
oversight (ibid). Looking more to the future, the report has a clear vision of what 
needs to accompany any centralisation of powers at the European level, again 
involving a strengthened European Parliament: 
 
‘‘[W]here new competences are transferred to or created at Union 
level or new Union institutions are established, corresponding 
legitimacy, democratic control by, and accountability to, Parliament 
should be ensured’’ (European Parliament 2012:17).  
 
According to this view, legitimacy can therefore be guaranteed if fiscal (or 
broader economic) integration is accompanied by parallel steps to strengthen the 
role of the European Parliament over decision making within EMU. Cooperation 
alongside the national parliaments is also envisioned as being important here too 
though in order ‘to improve exchange of views and the quality of the parliamentary 
activity in the field of the EMU’ (European parliament 2012:17-18). The report does, 
however, warn against the creation of a ‘new mixed parliamentary body’, which it 
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argues would be both ‘ineffective and illegitimate on a democratic and constitutional 
point of view’ (ibid). This statement is further evidence as to the pinnacle role 
understood to be played by the European Parliament in conferring democratic 
legitimacy and accountability on the input side as part of any future political union 
aspect within EMU. Finally, European policy-makers are called upon to ‘prepare for 
the necessary Treaty changes in order to guarantee legal certainty and democratic 
legitimacy’ while at the same time ensuring that ‘new intergovernmental agreements 
should be excluded’ (European Parliament 2012:18).    
 
The discourse findings from the parliamentary report can be reinforced 
through a further reading of the informal discourse sourced from MEP’s who sit on 
the relevant ECON Committee. As was touched upon in the last section, the majority 
of MEP’s have been found to be in favour of integration steps being taken within 
EMU towards a qualitatively deeper level of fiscal union—and this theme can again 
be further explored here. To begin with, the former vice-president of the ECON 
Committee, MEP Mr Pablo Zalba Bidegain from the centre-right EPP group, labels 
the setting up of a ‘European Treasury’ along with further progress towards ‘debt 
mutualisation’ as at present only ‘possibilities’ (Interview Extract J 2013:3). The issue 
of the ‘German mentality’ is raised as a particular problem area in this context 
because it requires them to want ‘to clarify and to have every small detail clear 
before we move on’ (i.e. in relation to member states compliance with the SGP 
budgetary rules) (ibid). Ultimately, though, the conclusion reached by the vice-
president of ECON is an uncompromising one: ‘Over the longer term we need these 
deeper fiscal integration measures though, otherwise we will fail’ (ibid). 
 
When questioned if fiscal transfers and/or some level of debt mutualisation 
are necessary to stabilise the single currency area, MEP Ms Danuta Maria Hübner 
also answers to the positive: ‘I think we are and should be moving in that direction’ 
(Interview Extract K 2014:4). Again, this answer is not given without qualification 
though:  
 
‘’Of course, to reach a point where debt mutilation measures in 
particularly can be developed we need to make sure all of the 
surveillance mechanisms are in place to reduce moral hazard. There 
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is a risk in Europe that as you move to more and more control from 
the central level then moral hazard becomes an issue as national 
governments push responsibility for their economic situation onto the 
European level’’ (Interview Extract K 2014:4). 
 
The analysis outlined above is overlapping with the one made by the vice-
president of ECON who cited the hurdle of the German mentality on this issue. Of 
course, the report by the European Parliament also points to the need to balance the 
setting up of solidarity mechanisms with a series of parallel measures to calm fears 
over moral hazard and ensure compliance with the SGP framework.  
 
 
MEP Bas Eickhout from the centre-left Group of the Greens/European Free 
Alliance cites the contrasting situations between Spain and the UK as evidence for 
the necessity  of taking a number of integration steps within EMU towards a deeper 
level of fiscal union:  
 
‘‘So why did it go so wrong in Spain but not the UK? That has to do 
with the currency union, i.e. it was not very easy for investors to 
move capital out of the UK whereas the opposite was true for Spain. 
So a country getting into problems was getting in more problems 
because of the nature of single currency area it was part of […..] So, 
in the end, for a stable currency we need certain mechanisms 
including a mutualisation of debt and fiscal transfers —I do not see a 
stable currency without that in the end. And I think we need a 
permanent or automatic stability mechanism tied to the economic 
cycle of member states’’ (Interview Extract L 2014:2) 
 
According to this analysis, the implementation of risk sharing mechanisms 
and some kind of fiscal capacity with a transfer system between member states is 
not an optional extra but integral to the very functioning of the single currency area 
over the long term. And notably, like the interviewees cited above, the MEP adds 
that ‘for political reasons you would need more fiscal oversight as an accompaniment 
to these deeper solidarity mechanisms’ (Interview Extract L 2014:3). Finally, MEP Ms 
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Emilie TURUNEN from the centre-left S&D grouping also argues that substantial 
integration steps need to be taken towards the introduction of certain fiscal solidarity 
mechanisms within EMU in order to guarantee the functioning of the single currency 
area: ‘Well I think it is very tricky because we can be certain that we have a fragile 
and non—functioning monetary union—and we still have that after the reforms have 
been introduced. So if one wants to make the single currency area stable we need to 
have more fiscal integration in terms of a larger budget, debt mutualisation schemes 
and even Eurobonds—ultimately yes’ (Interview Extract M 2014:2). 
 
Again, however, as in the parliamentary report drafted as a response to the 
President of the European Council’s towards a genuine EMU report, output oriented 
discourses concerning the progression towards a deeper level of fiscal union are 
paralleled by an equal concern with the input dimension and the steps that need to 
be taken towards a flanking political unions aspect . For example, the former vice-
president of the ECON Committee, MEP Mr Pablo Zalba Bidegain from the centre-
right EPP group, warns of the consequence of not progressing with integration on 
the political side:  
 
‘‘I mean no one wants to be in control —that is clear. But I think that 
unless the economic governance reforms are controlled politically by 
the European Parliament these will fail. And it is not just the reforms 
that will fail but the project. I mean, we know that the solution to the 
crisis is more Europe: more economic integration, more political 
integration and so on. But we know that citizens in Europe are really 
disaffected with the EU. And why, if the solution is Europe are 
people disaffected with Europe? I think that it is the lack of 
democratic legitimacy’’ (Interview Extract J 2013:2).   
 
This raises the question of what reforms need to be implemented in order to 
inject more democratic legitimacy into EMU governance. And, on this point, the vice-
president of ECON is uncompromising that ‘we need somehow more democratic 
political control by Parliament over decision making within EMU’ (ibid). With this in 
mind the interviewee is also quick to add that while on many issues the European 
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Parliament is already in fact a ‘real co-legislator along with the Council’ (post-Lisbon), 
fundamentally ‘this has to change more’ (ibid).  
 
MEP Mr Olle Schmdt from the centralist ALDE is also of the belief that a 
‘delegation of power to the Parliament needs to come-step by step, in line with the 
fiscal integration process’ (Interview Extract H 2013:2). For the MEP, however, the 
development of a political union also involves national parliamentary involvement, 
including at a regional level: 
 
‘‘[N]ational politicians have to take responsibility and be accountable 
in the national parliaments. They have tried to look at Brussels and 
say these are the bad guys- and this is not of course true. […..] I 
have changed my mind. We need to create different fora, also within 
the political parties, so that we mix up those that are responsible at 
the national level and perhaps even at the regional level where we 
have federal states—and here in parliament’’ (Interview Extract H 
2013:2). 
 
MEP Ms Emilie TURUNEN from the centre-left S&D grouping puts forward a 
vision of a political union which is shaped more exclusively around a ‘strengthening 
of the European Parliament within the workings of EMU’ (Interview Extract M 2014:2). 
As to how much power should be conferred upon the European Parliament, then the 
answer given is that this would be entirely ‘dependent on how much you integrate 
fiscally—but the MEP was clear that ‘the two must run side by side’ (ibid). The 
interviewee also questions whether there is a ‘real appetite’ for such an integration 
leap, although the final conclusion given is a stark one: ‘I do not see us going 
backwards—not politically or economically’ (ibid).  
 
Finally, MEP Bas Eickhout from the centre-left Group of the Greens/European 
Free Alliance has a more explicitly ‘federal’ and all together more far reaching vision 
of what a future political union should look like within Europe. At the heart of this 
vision is the idea of a ‘clear separation of competencies between the European 
Parliament and its national level counterparts’ (Interview Extract L 2014:3). The MEP 
elaborats on what such a set up might entail in practice:  
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‘‘I could foresee in the future that you will have the European 
Parliament and then your second chamber which would become 
more a representative of national parliamentarians. This second 
chamber would replace the role of governments within EU decision 
making as it currently takes place. I do not see that change taking 
place tomorrow but on the real longer term I could foresee a debate 
like that and I don’t mind’’ (Interview Extract L 2014:3) 
 
Clearly, this vision would be dependent on an altogether more far reaching 
integration leap within EMU towards what would in practice be a European ‘federal’ 
economic government. At its heart would be a European Parliament much 
strengthened than its current form. And, what is more, the traditionally 
intergovernmental structures, which have traditionally been at the heart of EMU and 
European decision making more generally, would be replaced by national 
assembly’s sitting in Europe. It follows, then, that while opinions have been shown to 
differ as to the precise steps that need to be taken, all the MEPs cited here 
demonstrate a strong commitment to the input dimension of legitimacy and the 
necessity of accompanying of any fiscal integration process with parallel steps 
towards the development of a political aspect. And again, the stand out feature here 
is prospect of a strengthened role for the European Parliament, with national 
parliaments also seen as being able to contribute through various channels too. 
 
Many of the dominant patterns of discourse uncovered within the report 
drafted on towards a genuine EMU, and which have been reinforced through a 
reading of more informal discourse, can be intertextually located as part of earlier 
documents produced from the European Parliament setting. However, due to the 
continuity in the patterns of discourse shown for the European Parliament setting 
between the immediate and post crisis periods, the intertextual  elements of the 
report can be said to overlap significantly with those intertextual findings 
demonstrated in the previous section covering the more immediate crisis period. In 
brief though, it was observed that the European Parliament has actively advanced 
arguments in favour of the implementation of neo-Keynesian solidarity mechanisms 
within EMU since before the single currency areas inception, including calls for an 
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enlarged EU fiscal capacity and/or steps towards the mutualisation of member state 
sovereign debt (see European Parliament 1996, 1997, 1997c, 2008, 2009). And it 
was also observed that the European Parliament has historically combined these 
output oriented discourses with an equal concern for strengthening democratic 
legitimacy and accountability of decision making within EMU on the  input side, with 
the strengthening of its own role within EMU being the primary policy suggestion 
here (see European Parliament 1996, 1997a, 2007, 2008).  
 
To conclude this section, from an analysis of the parliamentary report drafted 
on towards a deep and genuine EMU—in conjunction with a reading of more 
informal discourse sourced from MEP’s—it has been revealed how the European 
Parliament in the post crisis period has attempted to address the input and output 
dimensions of legitimacy together as part of a synergising relationship with the 
overriding objective of making a qualitative integration leap within EMU towards a full 
fiscal and political union. In terms of the output oriented discourse, this has reflected 
a principal concern for increasing neo-Keynesian solidarity mechanisms within EMU. 
And one key priority here has been an enlarged EU budget with an array of 
redistributive and stabilisation functions—along with a gradual roll over to a debt 
redemption fund and the mutualisation of member state sovereign debt envisioned 
over the longer term. 
 
 Neoliberal discourses have not been absent in this context, however, with 
increased fiscal solidarity being linked with member states compliance with their 
budgetary commitments made under the SGP framework. Such measures have 
been deemed necessary to diminish anxieties, particularly German ones, over moral 
hazard. Separately, with reference to the input side of the debate, it has been seen 
as essential that integration towards a deeper level of fiscal union is matched by 
equal steps towards the setting up of a flanking political union aspect. Central to this 
vision of political union has been a markedly strengthened European Parliament, 
with the representative body being understood as the ultimate guarantor of 
democratic legitimacy and accountability at the European level. Also, national 
parliaments have been understood as continuing to play an important 
communication role here too, although their role in conferring input legitimacy is seen 
as being somewhat secondary to the European Parliament (that is, in the context of 
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decisions taken exclusively at the European level). Finally, alongside calls for 
strengthened parliamentary oversight within EMU, there has been a fundamental 
rejection of intergovernmental decision making structures throughput the crisis 
period, which are labelled as undemocratic and illegitimate.   
 
 
Conclusion  
 
 
In recent times there has been an ongoing trend which has seen more powers 
and influence being won by the European Parliament in what has historically been 
an EMU dominated by intergovernmental policy coordination. Nevertheless, aided by 
the institutional reforms introduced under the Lisbon Treaty, the European 
Parliament has fought tirelessly to provide its own input into the fiscal governance 
reform debate evolving in Europe. In identifying the reform discourse itself to emerge 
out of this institutional setting, it has in fact remained highly consistent throughout the 
immediate to post-crisis period. The reform discourse has, for example, consistently 
sought to address both the input and output dimensions of legitimacy as part of a 
synergising relationship with the prospect of making a qualitative integration leap 
towards full fiscal and political union. First, on the output side, the discourse has 
been set around the prospect of implementing far reaching neo-Keynesian solidarity 
mechanisms within EMU, including the prospect of an enlarged EU budget along 
with steps towards the joint mutualisation of sovereign debt over the longer term. 
Moreover, while measures to strengthen the SGP framework have not been totally 
absent within this schema, fiscal disciplining measures have not been the reform 
priority here. This is, at least partly, attributable to the fact that the European 
Parliament shunned more neoliberal interpretations of the crisis which attach blame 
for Europe’s sovereign debt troubles on the fiscal profligacy of certain member states. 
Instead, an interpretation of the crisis more closely aligned with Keynesian thinking 
prevailed, with the Eurozone crisis being understood as being as much of a balance-
of-payments crisis as a public debt crisis.  
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Turning to the input side of the reform discourse, the European Parliament 
has adopted a strong normative position throughout the crisis period which dictates 
that integration in the direction of a deeper level of fiscal union be accompanied by 
equal steps in the direction of a flanking political union aspect. Key here has been 
the position of a strengthened European Parliament at the heart of EMU decision-
making, with the parliamentary body being understood as the only institution with the 
capacity to ensure the democratic legitimacy and accountability for decisions taken 
at the European level. Yet national parliaments, acting in coordination with their 
supranational equivalent, have also been understood as having an important role to 
play here, even if it is an altogether secondary one when it comes to decision 
already transferred to the European domain. With such a commitment to a 
strengthened European Parliament, it is of little surprise that intergovernmental 
decision-making and structures have been more explicitly rejected as being 
undemocratic and illegitimate features of EU governance. Finally, as a model of 
fiscal federalism, such a reform agenda would, if implemented, represent a 
significant departure from the status quo—although given the European Parliaments 
historically more marginal position within EMU, there are still doubts over its capacity 
to push it through to implementation.   
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Chapter Nine: Legitimising Discourse—a Social Practice 
Dimension 
 
 
Discourse Findings  
 
 
Through the application of the first two stages of Fairclough’s three-layered 
model of CDA, two key patterns of discourse have been identified as guiding the 
process of EU fiscal governance reform subsequent to the financial and economic 
crisis. The first and most dominant reform discourse is underpinned by neoliberal 
ideological thinking, and it is currently very much in the ascendency within the EU 
institutions at the heart of decision-making within EMU. There is a second pattern of 
discourse for EU fiscal governance reform, however, that has been seen to have 
emerged from within the more marginal EU parliamentary setting. This counter 
reform discourse is distinguished in that it seeks to address both the input and output 
dimensions of legitimacy as part of a synergising relationship with the prospect of 
making a qualitative integration leap towards full fiscal and political union. With the 
key patterns of discourse identified, it is time to proceed to complete the third and 
final stage of the analysis which takes place at the broader level of social practice. 
Analysing discourse as a form of social practice involves giving due consideration as 
to the wider policy environment (in terms of the ‘institutional’, ‘situational’ and 
‘societal’ context) from which the reform discourse has been produced (see chapter 
3).  
 
It is also at this broader level of social analysis that CDA will be combined with 
a selection of theoretically informed insights and ideas with a view to enriching the 
analysis.  In brief, the insights to be gained from the ‘new’ institutionalism literature 
will be a central feature here, with particular attention being paid in this instance to 
the historical and discursive components. While historical institutionalism’s focus on 
concepts such as ‘path dependency’ and ‘critical junctures’ is useful for helping us 
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understand the ‘stickiness’ that often characterises many aspects of EU policy-
making (Pierson 1996, Greer 2000, Mahoney 2001, Bulmer 2009, Ackril & Kay 2006), 
discursive institutionalism helps us focus more on the role of ‘substantive ideas’ and 
‘discursive interactions’ in  bringing about potential change (or continuality as the 
case may be) (Schmidt 2006a, 2008a, 2011). When combined with a deeper 
understanding of structural forms of power (Strange 1994), such theorising should 
provide a powerful explanatory framework with which to explore the historical roots 
of the constraining discourse environment that has led to the current reform debate 
over EU fiscal governance becoming entrenched around a limiting neoliberal 
narrative. It should also be made clear from the outset that the intention of this 
chapter is not to provide a full theoretical account of the development of EU fiscal 
governance over time through the lens of the major EU integration theories. Studies 
of this nature have, after all, already been completed (for an exhaustive overview of 
the SGP through the different theoretical lenses consult Heipertz & Verdun 2010). 
  
 
EMU: Convergence Towards Neoliberalism 
 
 
During the time when EMU was first being developed as an idea in the 1960s 
and 1970s Keynesian policies were still frequently seen to be pursued by member 
states within Europe. Yet by the 1980s there was an acute shift in economic thinking 
amongst the monetary authorities of Europe away from Keynesian in favour of 
neoliberalism and its early financial counterpart ‘monetarism’ (McNamara 1998, 
Verdun 1998, Marcussen 2000, Heipertz, M. & Verdun 2004, 2005, 2011). The 
monetarist paradigm attaches primary importance to the objective of ‘price stability’ 
as a condition for growth, with independent central bank control over interest rates 
being an important factor here too (Verdun 2011:91-93). However, while monetarism 
as a set of economic ideas is to a large extent concerned with monetary policy and 
its related institutional frameworks, it is also understood to be important that 
excessive levels of public debt do not inhibit the maintenance of the price stability 
objective (Heipertz & Verdun 2011:93). Thus, monetarism, and neoliberalism more 
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generally, do have as a core teaching a requirement for governments to adhere to 
strict fiscal discipline objectives.  
 
In view of this shift towards neoliberalism, it is of little surprise that when 
central bankers were bought together to draft the 1989 Delors report (a report 
outlining a blueprint of the road towards full EMU as laid down in the Maastricht 
Treaty) they drew very closely on the German Bundesbank as their model of 
monetary integration, which at the time represented the living ‘embodiment’ of 
monetarist paradigm (De Grauwe 2007:164). In terms of Germany’s structural power, 
Germany was in a particularly strong position to shape the construction of EMU due 
to its underlying economic weight and owing to the domineering strategic position of 
the D-Mark and of the Bundesbank within prior European currency arrangements, 
including the European monetary System (Verdun 1998, Marsh 2011). Moreover, it 
should also be observed in this context that ‘ordoliberalism’ was the underlying 
economic ideology that informed the German negotiating position on EMU (Dyson 
2002C). As an ideology ordoliberalism combines neoliberal ideas with the social-
democratic ideas of welfare and industrial partnership (Gamble 2013:58). Therefore, 
alongside a requirement for independent central banks geared towards the objective 
of ‘price stability’, the need for ‘automatically enforceable rules on fiscal discipline’ is 
again a strong feature here (Dyson 2002c:177). It is no surprise, then, that the 
increasing consensus in favour of neoliberalism experienced on a global scale only 
served to legitimise and further strengthen the German negotiating position on 
EMU—a set of circumstances which further facilitated the institutionalisation of 
neoliberalism (or German ordoliberal principles) within the EMU framework. 
 
It is a peculiar feature of EMU, though, that while there developed a relative 
consensus that monetary policy would function in accordance with the German 
domestic model, very little thought was given during the negotiations leading up to 
the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to the possibility of taking accompanying 
integration steps within Europe towards a deeper level of fiscal and political union. 
Commenting on the fiscal union aspect specifically Verdun remarked:  
 
‘‘[T]here was no common understanding about how much, and which, 
taxes would have to be harmonized, or indeed levied at the 
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Community level, or about who would be responsible for it, who 
would pay for it, and who would benefit for it. Fiscal policy 
harmonisation was just simply one step too far; there was no support 
for a transfer of sovereignty over these matters to the European 
level’’ (Verdun 1999:122).  
 
The prospect of setting up within EMU a system of fiscal redistribution or 
solidarity of the sort that exists in most mature fiscal federations was therefore never 
really discussed prior or subsequent to the agreement on the monetary set up. It 
would seem that with fiscal policy remaining so deeply entrenched within the national 
parliamentary tradition of member states, any talk of relinquishing sovereignty or 
transferring tax and spending powers to the EU level  in this highly politically salient 
area would be too much. Moreover, while a second intergovernmental conference 
was convened on the topic of ‘political union’, it was limited largely to a discussion on 
foreign and security matters (Verdun 1999). This neglect was ultimately reflected in 
the institutional design for EMU that was eventually arrived at which has been seen 
to be deficient by numerous authors in relation to the criteria of democratic 
accountability and legitimacy on the input side (Verdun, 1998, Verdun and 
Christiansen 2000, Hodson & Maher 2001). 
 
Following the provisions laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, Europe was 
therefore left with a single currency area characterised by a profound ‘asymmetry’ 
between a centralised monetary policy and a decentralised fiscal policy. However, 
from the perspective of aligning EMU within an institutional framework that is in 
keeping with neoliberal ideas of ‘sound money’, the process of EMU integration 
(particularly from a German ‘ordoliberal’ perspective) was not completed at 
Maastricht. After all, as previously indicated, neoliberalism implicitly demands a strict 
fiscal discipline policy as a means to ensure the maintenance of the key monetarist 
price stability objective. And, up until this point, the Maastricht Treaty only provided 
limited provisions for enforcing fiscal disciple in the form of the convergence criteria 
and excessive deficit procedure, loosely defined (Heipertz & Verdun 2011:80). This 
inevitably resulted in a build-up of domestic pressure throughout the mid 1990’s 
being placed upon Theo Waigel, the then German Minister for Finance, from a 
‘sceptical Bundesbank’, ‘unfavourable public’, ‘opposition parties’ and ‘internal 
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competitors’ who all wished to ensure that EMU would not imply a weakening of the 
‘stability’ culture that is ingrained into German ordoliberal and broader neoliberal 
economic thinking at the time (Heipertz & Verdun 2011:85-109). 
 
It was set against this institutional and ideational context that Waigel 
advanced a proposal for a rules-based ‘Stability Pact for Europe’ in 1996. Yet, 
despite the domestic pressures building upon Waigel to cement fiscal discipline 
within EMU, the eventual legislative proposal produced by the Commission the 
following year did not include some of the more divisive elements, including 
‘automatic sanctioning mechanisms’ or the creation of an ‘independent Stability 
Council’ (Heipertz, & Verdun 2004, 2005, 2011). This was because such far reaching 
obligations could not be implemented under the legal basis provided for by the 
Maastricht Treaty (Heipertz, & Verdun 2004, 2005, 2011). And following the troubles 
in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty there was understandably little appetite across 
Europe for any significant Treaty reform. Moreover, the Commission and the majority 
of member states led by France (with the notable exception of Holland) were anxious 
to avoid any further restrictions on national sovereignty and supported ‘flexibility’ and 
political ‘discretion’ (Heipertz & Verdun 2011:102). In the end, therefore, there was a 
high degree of legal spill over between the Maastricht Treaty and the eventual rules-
based SGP framework as it was finally adopted through secondary legislation (see 
Article 99 TEC and Article 104 TEC and their equivalent protocols, which together 
form the basis of the preventative and corrective arms of the pact) (Heipertz, & 
Verdun 2004, 2005, 2011).  
 
The idea of path dependency is relevant at this point. As observed during the 
theoretical and conceptual overview, the basic idea is relatively simple and it has 
been summed up well by Bulmer when commenting on the contribution made by 
Paul Pierson in a text called Politics in Time (Pierson 2004): 
 
‘‘Path dependence is not just about expressing the point that history 
matters; it highlights how political processes entail trajectories that 
are difficult to reverse because they are underpinned by 
mechanisms of positive feedback and increasing returns, as 
reflected in sunk costs and vested interests (Bulmer 2009:209-310)’’.  
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There are also several reasons to suspect that path dependency is a concept 
that is well suited to explaining institutional inertia in the fiscal governance domain. 
First there is the issue of sunk costs to consider. It is an obvious point, for example, 
that an elaborate cooperation framework has been built around the rules-based SGP, 
including institutional provisions, procedures as well as complex methodologies for 
implementation. Any major policy change would therefore involve substantial 
financial costs. There are also the ‘learning’ costs to consider for those actors who 
have adapted to the SGP over time. This includes not only officials located within DG 
ECFIN and within the various committees, but also actors working at a more political 
ministerial level. 
 
 It should also be acknowledged that the negotiations on EMU leading up to 
Maastricht, as well as subsequently during the negotiations on the SGP, were the 
result of decades of political negotiation amongst officials from twelve independent 
states. The solutions arrived at, then, reflect often painstaking compromises in what 
is an extremely complex and contested policy environment—and this is not to speak 
of the difficulty generally of translating economic ideas into legislation. Such a 
political investment over time renders any major institutional or legal break with the 
past particularly difficult in the fiscal governance policy setting. Of course, as 
observed above, the institutional rigidity arising from sunk costs is also further 
reinforced in this context by the constraining factor of treaty change. Treaty change 
is, after all, a complex process and fraught with political danger resulting from the 
difficulties any ratification process would likely face. Any negotiation on major 
changes involving treaty change, or even negotiations on smaller scale amendment 
to secondary legislation, is also likely to be particularly challenging in this context 
due to the highly politically salient nature of budgetary matters. Any policy 
amendments are, therefore, likely to be hotly contested, often in view of the general 
public.  
 
Finally, there are also the forces of vested interests to consider. This includes 
the officials who control and administer the SGP framework who have converged 
around it over time, including commission officials located within DG ECFIN and 
members of the secretariat. From a self-interest point of view, major changes are 
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likely to be demanding on them personally. There is also the vested interest of the 
actors who encouraged the neoliberal construction of EMU since its inception. This 
includes, in particularly, German politicians and members of the Bundesbank, as well 
as many other politicians and policy experts from across Europe who were active in 
the formation of the single currency area. Many of these actors, whether working at a 
technical or more political level, have staked their reputation on the credibility of the 
SGP framework on numerous occasions past and present. And politicians more 
specifically have also often been seen to pursue strategies for electoral interest that 
have committed them to be on the side of a strict interpretation of EU budgetary 
rules. Together the existence of sunk costs and the forces of vested interest help to 
encourage a high degree of structural inertia or institutional path-dependency in the 
fiscal governance setting.  
 
Despite the observations made above, there was a possibility at least of more 
fundamental reform in the early 2000’s when the governments of Germany and 
France made assurances at the time in the form of tax deductions to the voting 
public that were out of line with budgetary commitments made under the SGP 
framework (Heipertz, M. & Verdun 2005, 2011). In response, the Commission took 
the decision in 2004 to uphold their treaty obligations following the advancement of a 
blocking majority in the ECOFIN Council by appealing to the ECJ for legal advice—a 
move which resulted in a ECJ judgement challenging ECOFIN’s decision to suspend 
the EDP while in effect failing to force the institutions compliance (Heipertz & Verdun 
2005, 2011, Hallerber & Birdwell 2008). The fact that such challenges were facing 
the SGP so early in its existence led to the European Council endorsing a ECOFIN 
Council report on the reform of the SGP in 2005 on the basis of a Commission 
proposal.  
 
As would be expected, in view of their difficulties at the time in meeting their 
EU level budgetary commitments, during negotiations France and Germany were 
vocal in advocating a more ‘flexible interpretation of the SGP’ (Heipertz & Verdun 
2001). Yet, despite the reform agenda being driven forward by the powerful axis of 
Germany and France, the eventual amendments, apart from providing for a more 
flexible interpretation of the rules, were again highly path-dependent and failed to 
fundamentally alter the procedures, rules-based nature, or two-pronged structure of 
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the SGP (Morris et al 2007, Crowley & Rowley 2008, Heipertz & Verdun 2011). This 
is because, reinforced by the existence of sunk costs and the forces of vested 
interest, the neoliberal consensus amongst European policy actors on the need to 
embed EMU with rules for fiscal discipline had not gone away; no one was calling for 
the complete abandonment of the pact altogether; and Treaty Change was not a 
desirable option at the time (Heipertz & Verdun 2005, 2011). And furthermore, in 
practice even a slight re-working of the original SGP regulations required a high 
degree of consensus amongst member states given that amending 1467/97 required 
unanimity and 1466/97 required QMV in the Council (Heipertz & Verdun 2011:172).  
 
To conclude this section’s findings, it has been demonstrated how the 
asymmetric institutional design of EMU arose at a time when a global shift was 
taking place in economic thinking away from Keynesianism in the direction of 
neoliberalism and its financial counterpart monetarism. It was set against this 
paradigm shift that Germany was able to fully utilise its structural power in order to 
ensure that EMU was implemented largely in accordance with the German model, i.e. 
with an independent central bank orientated towards the maintenance of price 
stability. Key factors ensuring Germany’s structural power over EMU design included 
its considerable economic weight and dominance within previous currency 
arrangements within Europe, as well as the hegemony of the Bundesbank and 
German ‘ordoliberal’ ideas at the time. Yet, with the monetary aspect of the 
negotiations on EMU progressing fluidly in Germany’s favour, little thought was given 
to the possibility of ensuring integration steps towards a deeper level of fiscal and 
political union. This was also compounded by state sovereignty concerns amongst 
member states that showed little interest in relinquishing control over tax and spend 
policies to the European level. Of course, though, in order to address German 
concerns that errant member states may run excessive budgetary deficits and 
undermine price stability, the rules-based SGP framework was introduced in 1997 
with the expectation of guaranteeing fiscal discipline within EMU. 
 
 It was against this institutional and ideational backdrop that Europe arrived 
with an EMU framework characterised by a highly limited model of fiscal federalism: 
one with rules-based fiscal discipline with at best indirect channels of democratic 
legitimisation on the input side. From quite an early stage it was also made apparent 
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that path dependency is likely to be a strong feature in the fiscal governance sphere, 
with the existence of sunk costs and the forces of vested interest helping to 
encourage a high degree of structural inertia in a policy setting that remains deeply 
embedded at the national level. Ultimately, these findings were confirmed in 2005 
when the reform of the SGP failed to deliver anything beyond incremental changes. 
This was also encouraged by the fact that throughout this period the neoliberal 
consensus on the necessity of embedding EMU with strict budgetary rules remained 
deeply embedded.  
 
 
Finical and Economic Crisis: a Critical Juncture  
for EU Fiscal Integration? 
 
 
During the first 10 years of the single currency area the EU level commitment 
to neoliberalism, and to the necessity of implementing rules-based fiscal discipline 
within EMU, remained relatively steadfast, not discounting the minor reform 
initiatives to the SGP that took place in 2005. However, there was always a 
possibility that a ‘critical juncture’ event—triggered perhaps as a result of an 
exogenous economic shock—could result in a fundamental transition from the 
previous institutional order. In order for change on this scale to take place, such a 
critical juncture event would need to be accompanied by a significant breakdown in 
the prevailing neoliberal consensus built up over EU fiscal governance. And just 
such a critical moment appeared to be on the horizon following the onset of the 2008 
global financial crises and the interconnected heightening of sovereign risk concern 
that ensued in Europe around two years later. Together these chains of events were 
seen to bring spectacularly to an end the benign macroeconomic environment that 
endured before the crises. Yet an analysis of the reform discourse for EU fiscal 
governance being produced from around this period has in fact revealed that 
neoliberal ideological thinking is still in the ascendency within the EU institutions at 
the heart of decision-making within EMU, with the notable exception of the European 
Parliament. These discourse findings raise the issue of how one can account for the 
continued dominance of neoliberalism in the face of what many would have 
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predicted as a likely critical juncture event in the form of the financial and economic 
crisis.  
 
To begin with, it is important to point out that senior policymakers within 
Europe perceived the financial and economic crisis as presenting a challenge of 
potentially ‘existential’ proportions’: that is, not only as existential challenge to the 
single currency area but also to the Union itself (see Interview Extract O 2014:1 with 
a Senior Spokesman for the European Council President). As an almost functional 
necessity, therefore, it was deemed vital that policymakers responded to the 
challenges presented by the crisis. But it was not only the substance of the response 
that was deemed important here, it was also the timing and the rapidity of the 
response that was seen to be a decisive factor. This crucial point is picked up on by 
a senior member of the Cabinet for the European Council President: 
 
‘‘Of course, it was absolutely imperative that we responded in an 
urgent manner and often ad hoc manner in order to contain 
contagion risks and prevent a sovereign default or at worse a 
disorderly exit by a periphery member state from the Eurozone. We 
were also responding directly to external market pressures that have 
the capacity to react quicker than decision makers. When faced with 
such an emergency situation you need act quickly, so yes decisions 
were taken outside of the Community Method during the heat of the 
crisis’’ (Interview Extract Q 2014:1). 
 
A number of notable phrases are used to describe this period above: ‘urgent’, 
‘emergency’ ‘risk’ and ‘pressure’. Moreover, there was also the ever present 
perception that policymakers were battling uphill against market forces that can react 
at a far greater speed than Europe can legislate for. These articulations together add 
up to a crisis context consumed by risk (e.g. contagion, sovereign default or 
disorderly exit ect….), with an added timing element resulting from the need to keep 
up with market forces.  It was in this context of crisis, then, that intergovernmental 
decision-making, which was historically already very pronounced within the EMU set-
up generally, became of heightened importance. And, as elaborated on within 
previous chapters, particularly important here was the role played by the European 
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Council as Head of State or Government were bought together to guide the Union 
through the crisis period.  
 
In accounting for the continued dominance of neoliberalism over the ongoing 
reform debate for EU fiscal governance, several points related to the observations 
made above are worth making here. To begin with, the sunk costs and vested 
interests previously spoken about are still a limiting factor over the current debate for 
fiscal governance reform. In fact, it is likely that during a period defined by crisis, 
structural inertia is likely to be exaggerated in view of the need to find solutions in 
what remains a highly complex and contested policy environment. Path dependency 
is also reinforced by the fact there is again little desire amongst member states to 
push for the associated treaty amendments that would be required for a qualitative 
integration leap in the direction of a deeper level of fiscal and political union. The lack 
of support for a revision of the treaties from across the political spectrum—even 
within Germany where some officials initially greeted the prospect of treaty change 
positively—is a topic spoken about at some length by one senior member of the 
Cabinet for the European Council President: 
 
‘‘[W]hile German leaders in particular were more enthusiastic, at 
least early on, as to the possibility of revising the treaties, this 
enthusiasm has been much reduced in recent times. I think there is a 
realisation here that most member states, including France, have no 
desire for a big new treaty—not given the problems such ratification 
would bring in the current political climate. Also, German ideas as to 
fiscal and political union are much more limited than the rest. They 
are therefore wary of opening a path to greater integration that could 
leave them worse off financially’’ (Interview Extract Q 2014:4).  
 
That such negative sentiment is seen to exist at present when discussing the 
topic of treaty change is not unsurprising, particularly given the politically salient 
nature of the reforms and the difficulties that arose when presenting the Lisbon treaty 
for ratification before national parliaments. Separately, a senior spokesman for the 
European Council President summs up the situation succinctly:  
 
208 
 
‘‘Of course, leaders read opinion polls and they can see that there 
are major public opinion issues with the European Union and the 
euro as it is. Against this backdrop talk of treaty change 
evaporates—that is the reality we have. We have to deal with this as 
good as possible’’ (Interview Extract O 2014 :4. 
 
On top of the problems concerning the ratification process for any forthcoming 
treaty, there is also the issue of overcoming the substantive differences of opinion 
amongst member states over a policy area that remains deeply rooted at the national 
parliamentary level. For example, it has been demonstrated within previous chapters 
how a series of constraining discourses amongst key member states (though 
particularly between Germany and France), concerning both sovereignty concerns 
and issues of moral hazard, have served to steer the reform debate away from any 
talk of progressing with more reaching integration steps within EMU in the direction 
of a deeper level of fiscal and political union. In concise form, the debate can be 
summed up as follows: France (along with the periphery states) calls for more 
solidarity but is unable to stomach the other side of the German (and core states) 
bargain, i.e. heightened rules on fiscal discipline. Also, of course, in view of the 
unanimity rule (whereby any major treaty amendment undertaken through either the 
ordinary revision procedure or the simplified revision procedure requires the 
unanimous approval by Heads of State or Government), a divergence in opinion 
amongst member states over the transfer of powers up to the supranational level is 
likely to become a major obstacle to change in this area, further entrenching 
neoliberalism along a path-dependent line.  
 
With dwindling political support for a qualitative integration leap within EMU 
amongst member states, it leaves the scope of the existing reform agenda restricted 
to largely building on secondary legislation as part of the existing legal framework. In 
the context of this reform episode this would involve tweaking, rather than replacing, 
the two original regulations that make up the preventative and corrective arms of 
SGP framework (Council regulation No 1466/97 and No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997, as 
revised as part of the 2005 reforms). The persistent dominance of neoliberalism 
within the ongoing reform debate over EU fiscal governance reform can therefore be 
identified as partly representative of a form of legal spill over from the original legal 
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framework. This can again be interpreted as a classic example of path dependency 
within an institution, leading to at best incremental change.  
 
This path dependency is also aided a continued commitment to neoliberal 
ideological thinking with the dominant EU institutions involved in the EU fiscal 
governance. Again, as revealed in earlier chapters, this includes Commission 
officials located within DG ECFIN, as well as members of the secretariat who are 
represent the Commission at both ministerial and committee level. On top of a 
commitment to a neoliberal reform agenda, these officials have also demonstrated a 
high degree of scepticism concerning the actual desirability and political feasibility of 
making a qualitative integration towards a deeper level of fiscal and political union. A 
number of so called ‘hardliner’ (or core) countries have also taken up a strong 
position on enforcing fiscal discipline within EMU since the crisis. Most obviously this 
includes Germany as by the far the most vocal and powerful advocate of fiscal 
rectitude; but it has also been joined by several other member states including the 
‘Netherlands’, ‘Finland’, ‘Sweden’ and ‘Slovakia’ (Interview Extract F 2013:2) . Of 
course, the ECB is also important here too who, as already observed, was set up as 
very much the living ‘embodiment’ of monetarism (De Grauwe 2007) and therefore 
has remained a staunch defender of rules-based fiscal discipline within EMU.    
 
Such a formidable coalition can be contrasted with the position of the more 
marginal European Parliament whose counter reform discourse articulates a 
contrasting vision for a qualitative integration leap within EMU towards full fiscal and 
political union. The European Parliament is almost alone in diffusing its reform 
discourse for EU fiscal governance. On top of this, while the European Parliament 
has enjoyed an enhanced legislative role following the Lisbon reforms (changes 
which made it possible for the parliamentary body to amend key pieces of legislation 
introduced as a response to the crisis), its tangible role within EMU is still largely 
limited to supervisory and consultation privileges. The European Parliament was also 
excluded from much high level intergovernmental deliberation that took place at the 
height of the crisis. This means that the degree of communicative overlap between 
the parliamentary body and officials located within the adjoining EU institutions, 
whether at Commission, Ministerial or Committee level, has been relatively limited 
within this context. In view of the institutionally restricted role of the European 
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Parliament within EU fiscal governance, it is therefore difficult to envision the 
parliamentary body acting on its own being able to successfully see its counter 
discourse for EU fiscal governance reform through to implementation.  
 
Within the context of this crisis situation as already described, the notion of 
German structural power also needs to be factored in to this analysis in greater detail 
when accounting for the persistence of neoliberalism within the ongoing debate over 
EU fiscal governance reform. It has already been demonstrated in previous chapters 
that Germany was influential in pushing the advancement of a neoliberal reform 
agenda in the wake of the financial and economic crisis (see also Dullien & 
Torreblanca 2012, Featherstone 2012, Schmidt 2012, amongst others)—with the 
promotion of strengthened rules-based fiscal discipline under the SGP framework 
being the defining feature here. And again, the policy solutions being uploaded by 
Germany have been found to be consistent with the German domestic variant of 
neoliberalism: ‘ordoliberalsim’. At the heart of the explanation for Germany’s 
considerable capacity to shape the reform agenda over EU fiscal governance is its 
structural economic power within the current EMU setup. As is observed by one 
senior official when commenting on the inevitably of Germanys leading role: 
 
‘‘But of course Germany takes a leading role here in view of its 
economic size. So Germany automatically was seen to take on a 
leading role, whether it wanted it or not. In fact, at crucial stages 
during the crisis Merkel became, albeit reluctantly, almost a de facto 
president-—with Europe often relying on her decision-making to 
keep the currency bloc together. France under the stewardship of 
Sarkozy also had a role to play here, yet it was a reduced one due to 
its economically weakened state. In effect, Sarkozy was forced to 
concede too many of Germanys demands during the crisis 
deliberations’’ (Interview Extract G 2013:6). 
 
Clearly, Germany’s structural economic power within EMU is underpinned first 
and foremost by its economic size, with Germany being by some distance the largest 
European economy and the fourth largest economy in the world (Speck 2014). Due 
to its economic size within Europe, Germany has also been the lead contributor to 
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the emergency bailout funds that have been activated during the crisis. It should also 
be added that Germany made it through the financial and economic crisis in 
comparatively good order, particularly when compared with many other euro area 
countries. To quote an article that appeared in Foreign Affairs in June 2013: 
 
‘‘Not only has the German economy bounced back from the 2008–9 
financial crisis -- with revitalized export industries and record-low 
unemployment -- it has done so while most other European 
economies are still reeling. Where other countries see only economic 
hardship in their future, Germany sees an influx of skilled immigrants, 
low borrowing costs, a balanced budget, and a growing housing 
market. All of that is a boon for the German economy -- and for 
Merkel, who is up for reelection in September’’ (Reisenbichler & 
Morgan 2013) 
 
So Germany, lifted by a solid manufacturing base and a government deficit 
that is close to balancing (although its debt to GDP ratio is approaching 80%), found 
itself in a relatively prosperous position amid a fragile Eurozone periphery. This could 
also account for why economically stagnating France has been forced to concede far 
more ground to its German counterparts than historically may have been the case.  
 
At a more ideational level, German structural power has also enhanced by the 
fact that neoliberalism has been deeply embedded within the EMU framework since 
the founding of the single currency area. As such, Germany’s neoliberal ideas as to 
how to reform EU fiscal governance are more likely to be received positively at the 
European level where, as already observed, there is already a high degree of 
consensus around neoliberal principles amongst experts and policy officials located 
within DG ECFIN and further down at Committee level. This is reflected in the fact 
that Germany, in a similar manner to officials located with the DG ECFIN, was also 
keen to promote a neoliberal reading as to the causes of the crisis in the first 
instance: ‘[Chancellor] Merkel framed the crisis as a failure of individual counties to 
solve their problems of competitiveness through timely budgetary and structural 
reform’ (Schmidt 2012:10). Also, of course, German policy solutions have a natural 
tendency to conform in a legal sense with pre-existing agreements within EMU, 
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making them more receptible to be uploaded to the supranational level. In sum, as 
was witnessed during earlier periods of EMU construction and reform, Germany, 
buttressed by its considerable structural power resources, has been in a highly 
advantageous position to upload neoliberal policy ideas in the wake of the financial 
and economic crisis.    
 
To bring this section to a conclusion, though the application of broad range of 
theoretical tools and power concepts, a number of ideational and institutional factors 
have been identified as contributing to the constraining discourse environment 
prevailing in the EU fiscal governance sphere. To begin with, the concept of path 
dependency and the link between sunk costs and vested interests has been invoked 
again, and they have been shown to be very pronounced in a policy setting that 
remains deeply embedded at the national level. Also, bolstered by such limiting 
forces, policy-makers acting in a scenario defined by crisis have been discouraged 
from proposing a more radical departure from the status quo due to lack of support 
for a revision of the treaties from across the political spectrum and due to a series of 
constraining discourses abounding amongst member states concerning both 
sovereignty concerns and issues of moral hazard. This has left the scope of the 
existing reform agenda limited to largely building on secondary legislation in an 
example of legal spill over, i.e. building on the SGP framework for fiscal discipline. 
This path dependency has also been aided though by a continued convergence 
around the neoliberal paradigm within the dominant EU institutions. Finally, 
Germany’s structural power within EMU has also been an important factor here, with 
the country found to be in a unique position, due to both its economic standing and 
for historical reasons, to upload neoliberalism to the European level.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The first section of this chapter was centred on exploring the historical roots of 
the current constraining discourse environment that has led to the debate over EU 
fiscal governance reform being dominated by neoliberalism. It was found that there 
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was a period of ideational convergence within Europe towards neoliberalism during 
the initial formation of the single currency area. This was facilitated by an acute shift 
in economic thinking amongst key monetary authorities away from Keynesian in 
favour of neoliberalism and its early financial counterpart ‘monetarism’. And German 
structural economic power was also influential in facilitating the final 
institutionalisation of neoliberal policy goals within EMU too. Notably, the prospect of 
moving towards a deeper level of fiscal union, as an accompaniment to integration 
on the monetary side, was never really discussed at this stage in view of sovereignty 
concerns and the fact that tax and spend policy remains so deeply embedded within 
the national parliamentary tradition of many member states within Europe. However, 
from the perspective of aligning EMU within an institutional framework that is in 
keeping with neoliberalism, the rules-based SGP framework for fiscal discipline was 
introduced through secondary legislation in 1997 in instance of legal spill-over. 
 
Notably, the institutional and ideational forces that led to the establishment of 
neoliberal policy goals early on within EMU are similar to those that have given rise 
to a constraining discourse environment in the modern period, following the financial 
and economic crisis. For example, the forces of path-dependency are still ever 
present within the policy setting, rendering any agreement over a changed reform 
path in what is a politically highly salient area highly challenging. This is reinforced 
by a mixture of sovereignty concerns and moral hazard fears amongst member 
states, which serves to further discourage progress towards deeper fiscal and 
political integration. And, of course, the issue of treaty change is a constant limiting 
factor here. The structural power of Germany within the EMU set-up is also again a 
defining feature in the modern period, with the dominant economic power in Europe 
continuing to shape the design and rules embedded within the single currency area 
in a neoliberal direction. Finally, the ideational convergence that perpetuated the 
institutionalisation of neoliberalism within EMU during the founding years of the 
single currency area appears to have remained strong within many of the dominant 
EU institutions. Together, these institutional and ideational forces—many of which 
have a long history of limiting change within EMU—are likely to ensure that the 
reform debate for EU fiscal governance remains set around a limiting neoliberal 
narrative. 
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Chapter Ten: Conclusion 
 
 
 
The central research question guiding this research process has been: Which 
legitimising discourses are shaping EU fiscal governance reform. And through the 
implementation of Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of CDA it has been charted 
how the emerging debate over EU fiscal governance reform has been dominated by 
a neoliberal legitimising discourse. In fact, neoliberalism has been observed to be 
very much in the ascendency within all the EU institutions that currently lie at the 
heart of decision-making within EMU, including in the principal intergovernmental 
forums as well as in the EU Commission setting. In terms of the reform priorities 
underpinning this pattern of discourse, they have been largely set around the 
securing of strengthened fiscal discipline within EMU on the output side through 
building on, rather than replacing, the pre-existing rules based SGP framework. Such 
neoliberal policy prescriptions have been seen to result, in part, from a misguided 
neoliberal framing of the financial and economic crisis in the first instance—with 
member states failure to observe adequate levels of fiscal discipline in line with 
European rules being framed as a key causal factor leading up to the crisis events 
that took place. Given that the focus has been firmly set around the securing of fiscal 
discipline on the output side, input legitimacy has featured as a matter of secondary 
importance within this context and has been assumed to occur indirectly via 
representation of member states in the Council and European Council. In view of the 
dominance of neoliberalism within the major EU institutions—and in view of the 
institutional and ideational forces further constraining the discourse environment—it 
can be expected that the efforts to reform the EU’s fiscal governance arrangements 
are likely to bring about at best incremental change along a path-dependent line. 
 
There are some possible negative implications, however, that could arise from 
reforming EU fiscal governance on the basis of a neoliberal narrative. To begin with, 
there is a risk that a failure to embed what is a significantly strengthened budgetary 
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surveillance framework with more direct forms of democratic legitimacy and 
accountability mechanisms—whether through an increased role for the European 
Parliament or via improved parliamentary oversight from the national level, or both—
could ultimately provoke a backlash from the citizen base as they reject the new 
neoliberal surveillance measures seen as imposed externally. After all, the reforms 
implemented to date building on the SGP have been driven to quite an extent from 
within the intergovernmental institutions—and in particular from within the European 
Council setting which brings together Heads of State or Government. While a case 
could be made that there is a form of indirect citizen representation in play here 
given ministers links to the democratic nation state (Moravcsik 2002), this is a highly 
problematic interpretation of events. 
 
First, it has already been demonstrated that Germany, buttressed by its 
considerable structural power within EMU, has been dominant within the 
intergovernmental institutions in uploading neoliberal policy solutions in the wake of 
the financial and economic crisis. It is, therefore, clear that national parliaments are 
by no means equal in their indirect representation at the European level. This is most 
evident in the European Council setting, which has been influential in guiding crisis 
management at key stages during the crisis. And, while it could be rightly asserted 
that smaller countries retain the right of veto in this setting, in practice following 
negotiations or periods of hard bargaining it is inevitable that member states, 
particularly less powerful ones, will end up with policies imposed upon them out of 
line with their initial preferences. It is also hard to be sure how ministers could be 
assured of what their citizen preferences are in the first instance given a lack of 
direct democratic inputs and citizen debate over the future of fiscal governance 
within Europe. Even placing these criticisms aside, while a reliance on indirect citizen 
representation may have been adequate at a time when the EU was defined more as 
a regulatory state (Majone 1996), now that the recent legislation passed within EMU 
has more explicit redistributive consequences this argument holds less weight  (due 
to the limitations imposed on member states budgets). Of course, choices 
concerning restrictions on fiscal policy are also a uniquely salient issue and liable to 
become politicised. This would imply that there are strict limits to the neoliberal 
centralisation of fiscal policy that can be pursued without democratic inputs before 
the citizen base reject them. These limits are also exacerbated by the economic and 
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financial crisis, particularly in the periphery states where internal devaluation with 
little in the way of financial solidarity has only served to exacerbate citizen 
disillusionment and national tensions.  
 
In terms of the neoliberal budgetary surveillance and sanctioning procedures 
being pursued under the SGP framework, there is a high risk then that these 
instruments will ultimately prove ineffective without sufficient democratic 
underpinnings. Certainly, from a historical point of view, it has already been 
observed how an over reliance on indirect forms of democratic legitimisation 
undermines the very output potential or policy effectiveness of the SGP. And it is still 
far from clear that when faced with a significant challenge from a domestic 
government—a government that is responsible first and foremost to their citizen 
base—if the strengthened SGP framework will hold up. At present, it would seem 
probable that if there was a repeat of the debacle that occurred in 2003, when 
France and Germany breached the EDP rules, then again no European authority 
would have the legitimacy to overrule them or impose sanctions. This is because the 
Commission still lacks a democratic mandate to defend the SGP rules against 
national prerogatives, particularly if it is one of the more powerful member states 
caught up in the sanctioning procedure. Also, as an inherently political body, the EU 
executive is liable to refrain from advancing procedures under the SGP in any case 
due to wider political considerations, as it has done repeatedly in the past. So, then, 
while the Commission’s position has actually been strengthened marginally since the 
onset of the financial and economic crisis, largely due to the advent of reverse 
qualified majority voting in the Council over the advancement of sanctioning 
procedures (making it harder for dissenting member states to form blocking 
majorities), the effectiveness of the SGP remains vulnerable to the domestic 
considerations of sovereign member states where democratic input legitimacy 
ultimately still lies. 
 
In sum, serious doubts need to be raised concerning the legitimacy of 
reforming EU fiscal governance on the basis of neoliberal narrative. Not only is the 
policy effectiveness of this framework in serious doubt, due to its failure to provide 
adequate channels of democratic input legitimacy, but it risks provoking a backlash 
from the citizen base at large as they reject its policy prescriptions. As a response to 
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these failings, it would seem logical to advocate the implementation of the counter 
reform discourse that has emerged from within the European Parliamentary setting 
as a possible alternative integration route for EU fiscal governance. This discourse is 
distinguished in that it has sought to address both the input and output dimensions of 
legitimacy as part of a synergising relationship with the prospect of making a 
qualitative integration leap towards full fiscal and political union. On the output side 
this discourse has been set around the prospect of fixing the deficiencies present 
within EMU since the outset (i.e. the lack of a fiscal union) by implementing more in 
the way of neo-Keynesian solidarity mechanisms. And, while not left completely 
unaddressed, there has been altogether less of a focus on strengthening fiscal 
discipline within EMU by building on the SGP framework. This reflects the fact that a 
Keynesian view as to the causes of the crisis was adopted in the first instance, with 
the Eurozone crisis being viewed as being as much of a balance-of-payments crisis 
as a public debt crisis. In making reference to the input side of the reform discourse, 
it has also been understood as vital here that any integration steps taken in the 
direction of a deeper level of fiscal union is also accompanied by equal progress 
towards the setting up of a flanking political union aspect. Key here has been the 
prospect of a strengthened European Parliament over decision-making within 
EMU—although national parliaments, acting in coordination with their supranational 
equivalent, have also been understood as having an important role to play in 
underpinning democratic legitimacy and accountability within this schema.  
 
By combining rules-based fiscal discipline with solidarity mechanisms, it is 
probable that this model would prove to be more acceptable to the citizen base at 
large—with the obvious exception of the core countries where moral hazard 
concerns are prominent. In doing so, it would also in turn temper the risk of a citizen 
backlash.  Moreover, the idea at least is that by combining these arrangements with 
accompanying steps towards a deeper level of political union—one involving the 
setting up of a governing structure where the European Parliament is endowed with 
adequate levels of budgetary power and democratic legitimacy to enable it to 
constrain national governments—European citizens would be able to collectively 
decide on the particular nature of the sanctioning mechanisms and solidarity 
instruments being developed at the European level. Yet it has to be acknowledged 
that the particular balance to be struck between national parliaments and the 
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European Parliament has still left quite ambiguous here. In essence, though, this 
pattern of discourse is as a whole has been premised on the prospect of setting up a 
European economic government involving significant transfers of budgetary 
sovereignty and a forging together of the two dimensions of legitimacy as part of a 
synergising type relationship. If realised, such a level of fiscal and political integration 
would also been seen to rectify many of the original design failures identified as 
preventing the proper function of EMU since its launch (De Grauwe 2013).  
 
However, the CDA analysis carried out at the level of social practice has 
revealed a number of institutional and ideational forces—many of which have a long 
history of limiting change within EMU—that are likely to ensure that the reform 
debate for EU fiscal governance remains set around a limiting neoliberal narrative. 
And this is despite the emergence of a possible critical juncture event in the form of 
the financial and economic crisis, which had the potential at least to bring about a 
significant breakdown in the prevailing neoliberal consensus. To begin with, there 
are the forces of path-dependency in the form of sunk costs and vested interests, 
which are likely to reinforce institutional inertia in the fiscal governance domain. 
Fundamental change is also limited by the almost complete lack of support for treaty 
change in what is an extremely complex, contested and politically salient policy area. 
There is also the broader political European context to consider here, where anti-
establishment parties have been on the rise. 
 
 This path-dependency is also further reinforced by the series of constraining 
discourses abounding amongst member states (though particularly between 
Germany and France), concerning both sovereignty concerns and issues of moral 
hazard, which have served to limit the reform debate. This means that while the 
possible integration steps on the path towards a deeper level of fiscal union are at 
least discussed, they have been left for the most part for the longer term—with 
seemingly little enthusiasm for their implementation amongst the member states or 
from EU officials. As to the political union aspect, challenging questions concerning 
the accompanying political integration measures that may be required have been 
almost completely side-lined during the crisis period. It is no surprise, then, that the 
appropriate role and balance between the European and national level parliaments 
has been largely left to be answered at some point in the future. As the dominant 
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economic power in Europe, the structural power of Germany within the present EMU 
set-up is also perhaps stronger now than it ever has been. This is in contrast to the 
position of France, whose economic and political influence in Europe is weaker now 
than it has been historically. This has had the effect of leaving Germany in a position 
to shape the design and rules embedded within the single currency area in a firmly 
neoliberal direction. Finally, and not to be underestimated, the ideational 
convergence that perpetuated the institutionalisation of neoliberalism within EMU 
during the founding years of the single currency area appears to have remained 
strong within many of the dominant EU institutions.  
 
Together these institutional and ideational forces are giving rise to a highly 
constraining discourse environment—leaving the debate over EU fiscal governance 
reform to remain firmly entrenched around a limiting neoliberal narrative. And, in 
view of the continued dominance of neoliberalism across much of the EU’s 
institutional landscape, it would seem highly improbable that the European 
Parliament will be in a position to guide its counter reform discourse through to 
implementation. Instead, the efforts to reform the EU’s fiscal governance 
arrangements are likely to bring about at best incremental change along a path-
dependent line. This means that, despite serious doubts being raised over its 
legitimacy and ultimately effectiveness, more initiatives building on the SGP 
framework for fiscal discipline are the most probable future possibility in terms of 
future fiscal integration within Europe—with little in the way of fiscal solidarity or 
political integration. As model of fiscal federalism, the current integration phase 
within EMU is therefore expected to represent the point of minimum departure from 
the status quo: i.e. with rules-based fiscal discipline and indirect channels of 
legitimisation remaining the norm. This would also signify that many of the deeper 
structural deficiencies that have been seen to play a large role in bringing about the 
intensification of the financial and economic turbulence in Europe in the first place 
would not have been corrected.   
 
This research has demonstrated the value of conceptualising legitimacy 
through an analytical framework receptive to both institutional form and practice and 
its interactive construction elements. In particularly, the manner by which claims to 
legitimacy have been partly constructed through dominant ideologies is a significant 
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finding —and one which would be overlooked if a purely institutional analysis were 
adopted. This research has also further revealed some of the complexities standing 
in the way of effective legitimisation at the EU level. It has demonstrated clearly, for 
example, some of the dangers of relying on effective policy outputs, particularly 
within integration domains that traditionally lie at the heart of national sovereignty. 
This is because, ultimately, a lack of legitimacy on the input side may lead to the 
erosion of policy effectiveness itself—or at least the implementation of policy that is 
out of line with citizen preferences.  
 
Perhaps the key lesson here, however, is that there are no easy solutions to 
this legitimacy dilemma owing to the significant challenges of securing democratic 
accountability at the EU level (i.e. addressing the so called ‘democratic deficit’). The 
precarious balance between national parliaments and the European parliament 
remains after all and very few actors, at least in the EMU policy-making context, 
have a true vision as to the future direction political integration in Europe should take. 
This is compounded by sovereignty concerns and disagreement over what powers 
and roles the European Parliament should take on in relation to is national level 
counterparts. These findings are also relevant to broader concerns on transnational 
democracy, which are set in the context of several contemporary developments 
including globalisation, regionalisms and global civil society. This is because the 
research highlights some of the key challenges of implementing democracy beyond 
the nation state level.  
 
Aside from legitimacy considerations, the benefits of adopting a historical 
approach to EU studies generally has been made clear. Most notably, the concept of 
path-dependency and its related arguments have been revealed to have a large 
impact on the status of EU integration in what is a highly complex, multiple actor 
institutional environment. This study, therefore, builds on earlier studies that have 
also demonstrated the power of path-dependency in adjoining policy areas such as 
the CAP and the Multi-Annual Financial Framework. Within the context of EMU more 
specifically, this research has also provided more evidence as to the asymmetric 
nature of integration in this policy environment, with monetary integration once again 
preceding economic and political integration. The benefits of going beyond a purely 
institutional or material analysis to factor in the role played by ideational factors has 
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also been shown to add significant explanatory potential when exploring integration 
within EMU. The social construction of EMU through ideology, for example, have 
been revealed to be paramount in an area which is often solely approached through 
the lens of economics.  
 
Finally, some of the limitations of this research need to be discussed. First, 
this research has focussed on the fiscal governance reform discourse emerging 
largely at the EU level as opposed to nationally at the member state level. Of course, 
given the high level of representation of national ministers and officials within EU 
level politics, national opinions have still been factored into the analysis. However, it 
would be worthwhile adopting a more explicitly domestic politics approach to the 
study of fiscal governance reform. Such an analysis could be used to assess the 
internal situation of the member states, particularly France and Germany, for a more 
in depth reading of how their governments came to play contrasting roles throughout 
the crisis period. It is also important to point out that the ongoing reform debate over 
EU fiscal governance is part of a far broader reform debate covering economic, 
financial and banking issues within EMU. While the lack of a fiscal union aspect was 
without doubt one the key shortcomings exposed by the financial and economic 
crisis, agendas for reform have been set in play for all these policy-making areas. A 
far broader political economy type analysis therefore needs to be carried out to 
assess the state of integration in these areas combined—and it would be highly 
relevant to factor in legitimacy considerations here too. While it could be speculated 
that there may be similar constraining forces in play across these policy domains, 
this would be merely speculation at this stage. 
 
 It is also interesting to note that these integration areas are all intimately 
interlinked. In particular, in view of recent proposals to set up a common fund to 
facilitate bank resolution, it can reasonably be asserted that the setting up of a full 
banking union within EMU would in practice de facto mark the arrival of a fiscal union. 
Clearly, there is much to be further researched here concerning the interconnects 
between the various policy domains, particularly when discussing the political 
integration that might need to follow. Similarly, another vital issue that requires 
clarification in this context is how the contrasting situations between the Eurozone 
and non-Eurozone countries will impact on integration within EMU moving forward. 
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And again, this is also an interesting question to pose in the context of any future 
political integration, with proposals being aired for a possible euro-chamber (i.e. a 
two-tier system within the European Parliament). Regarding the overarching 
methodological approach drawn upon, criticisms could be made that a more 
positivistic or systematic analysis of legitimacy could have been formulated with a 
view to reaching more exacting judgements of the interplay between the input and 
output dimensions (perhaps in terms of synergy or trade-off).  However, it is believed 
that the benefits of drawing on a moderately constructivist CDA type approach far 
outweigh the costs given that it facilitates a ‘thick’ description of legitimising 
discourses at both the linguistic level and of how they interact in the broader social 
cultural and political context. It is also hoped that this research has made a 
contribution to our understanding of the ideational and institutional roots of the 
current impasse in European Integration.   
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Figure 1 Decision-Making under the Preventative Arm of the SGP 
 
 
 
Source: Commission (2013a) 
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Figure 2: Decision-Making under the Preventative Arm of the SGP 
 
 
 
Source: Commission (2013a) 
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Interview Guide 
 
 Please note that this interview guide is only a rough overview of the 
questions posed during the interview process. As made clear in chapter 4, 
questions were structured specifically in accordance with the interviewee’s 
job location, role and area of expertise. The interview itself with also open-
ended in format.  
 
The interview will follow Plymouth University’s ethical guidelines for human 
participant research. And just to remind you that you can at any time during the 
interview process withdrawal from the interview in its entirety. Moreover, any 
questions you feel uncomfortable answering please say so and we will move swiftly 
on. And, as matter of course, your identity will remain strictly anonymous and you 
will not under any circumstance be quoted directly within any subsequent research 
piece. Finally, I would just to make you aware that I am keen to keep this interview 
semi structured and open ended so please feel free to expand on any issues which 
you consider to be of particular importance which may not have been posed directly 
in the questions. The focus of my questions, reflecting my research, are largely 
concerned with the topic of fiscal governance reform in the wake of the financial and 
economic crisis. And just to make you aware that many of the questions are more 
political in nature as opposed to purely technical, reflecting the particular angle of 
my research. 
 
Question directly related the interviewee   
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1) First of all, in order to contextualise your answers, could I briefly ask you to expand 
on what your particular role entails in relation to decision-making within the EU’s 
fiscal and broader economic governance framework?  
 
 
General Institutional Observations 
 
Now obviously, fiscal and broader economic governance within the EU has been 
strengthened significantly since 2010 following the introduction of the six-pack, two-
pack, and fiscal compact, with more to come. But before I pose some questions 
about the reform agenda itself being developed for fiscal governance in the EU, I 
wanted first to ask you some questions on your perception as to the impact of the 
crisis upon the Unions key decision-making procedures and institutions, particularly 
in relation to the ‘Community Method’.  
 
2) And my first question in this context is just to ascertain your thoughts on what some 
commentators have termed as a rise in the European Council’s role as top executive 
power when set against the Commission’s traditional role as the initiator of 
legislation.  
 
3) Have these policy environments functioned during the crisis as deliberative forums 
to prepare the ground for political comprise at a more senior level of governance-
with the most controversial of issues being left to be solved in the European 
Council?. 
 
 
4) And now, more in relation to the European Parliament. During this crisis period, as 
efforts have been made to reform fiscal and economic governance within the EU, do 
you think it been marginalised at all during this process? 
 
5) In your opinion, do these general transformations you describe to EU decision 
making pose any challenges in relation to the democratic legitimacy and 
accountability of EU policy making? If yes are these justified by the need to respond 
effectively to the crisis?  
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Details of the Reform Agenda Itself 
 
 
And I would like to ask some questions in particular reference to the so called “four 
presidents” 'Towards a genuine economic and monetary union' report released in 
Dec 2012 and the European Commission’s  ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union’ (questions framed in accordance with the 
interviewees working location): 
 
From my reading of the documents it is evident that the immediate priority in 
responding to the challenges presented by the financial and economic crisis has 
been to strengthen budgetary coordination, surveillance and discipline by building 
on the rules-based SGP framework, through the full implementation of the six-pack, 
two-pack and fiscal compact.  
 
6) In your opinion, are these short-term priorities the correct ones?  
 
Over the medium to longer term both reports envision a graduated reform process 
towards a more highly integrated ‘fiscal union’ combining more centralised 
budgetary control as a perquisite for the setting up of various solidarity mechanisms 
in the future. Although the Commission’s report does go noticeably further than the 
Four Presidents report in terms of its commitment to deeper fiscal integration- with it 
mentioning the possibility of common debt issuance, a European Treasury, a 
autonomous euro area budget with a stabilisation function and a European veto over 
national budgets.  
 
7) My question is then, what level of fiscal integration do you personally believe needs 
to be put in place in order to respond effectively to the challenges presented by the 
economic and financial crisis?  
 
 
Political Reform Aspects (in relation to the two reports mentioned above)  
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8) In the two reports there seems to be an understandable focus on overcoming of 
challenges presented by the crises and restoring stability and growth. However, as a 
consequence, it would seem that the section on political Union has remain under 
developed. So my question is does this reflect an unwillingness to tackle challenging 
questions concerning democratic input legitimacy and accountability, at least in the 
short term? 
 
9) As an accompaniment to the fiscal integration process as envisioned in the two 
reports, I would like to ask you if there are any priority steps you personally believe 
need to be taken, over the short and long term, towards a enhanced  political union 
at the European level in order to ensure adequate levels of democratic legitimacy 
and accountability (treaty change, more involvement of the EP, ) 
 
10) Very generally speaking, in relation to the reform agenda and the manner with 
which it has been applied, are you yourself satisfied that it has been  implemented 
with adequate consideration as to the principles of democratic legimtacy and 
accountability. 
 
11) Final question: What do you envision as the biggest hurdle to cross on the path 
towards the realisation full political and fiscal union.  
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